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Preface
‘From the Crash to Covid and Beyond’ reviews the 
social situation in the 27 EU member states and 
makes some proposals and recommendations for a 
more sustainable and inclusive future. As the title 
suggests, the data in this report surveys trends 
between the financial crisis of 2008 up to the 
ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. In fact, one of the key 
findings of this report - that the European Union 
itself and many member states never fully recovered 
from the crash of 2008 - should inform investment 
policy at EU level as work on rebuilding our society 
and economies gets underway. In this time of 
unprecedented crisis, the European Union must 
heed the lessons from the financial crash of 2008. 
Twelve years on from the last major shock, and after 
seven years of continuous growth, the first year of 
Covid-19 has seen the European Union confront:
•  14.9 million people unemployed 
•  5.8 million people long-term unemployed (repre-
senting over 37 per cent of total unemployment 
across the EU, a cause for concern) 
•  2.9 million young people aged under 25 
unemployed (the highest rates are in Spain, 
Greece and Italy)
•  84.5 million people living in poverty (over 3.5 
million more people than in 2008) - of whom over 
18.7 million are children (one fifth of Europe’s 
children are living in poverty). 
The European Union never fully recovered from 
the financial crisis and without substantial and 
coordinated action now, the current social and 
economic crisis could destroy it. A strong response 
based on the European Social Model is required. 
This response must be based on investment in a 
sustainable future, in our social and human capital. 
The European response must be focussed on 
protecting people across the lifecycle, young and old, 
men and women, those with an income and those 
with no incomes. Those people who were already in 
a difficult situation before the Covid-19 crisis have 
been hit the hardest, and unlike in 2008, they must 
be protected as part of any recovery. 
‘From the Crash to Covid and Beyond’ is the 
thirteenth publication in Social Justice Ireland’s 
European Research Series. This report analyses 
performance in areas such as poverty and inequality, 
employment, access to key public services and 
taxation. These areas are examined in light of 
the key social policy responses of the European 
Union to the financial crisis of 2008 including the 
social investment package, as well the more recent 
pandemic-related European Recovery Plan.
The report also points to some policy proposals and 
alternatives for discussion. These include the right 
to sufficient income, meaningful work and access to 
key quality services. These policy proposals explore 
how these areas might be delivered for a changing 
world and in the wake of the current public health 
emergency.
We hope that this report can make a timely and 
significant contribution to the development of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights and the post Europe 
2020 Strategy policy process. The aim of the European 
Pillar of Social Rights is to take account of the 
changing realities of Europe’s societies and the world 
of work. Failure to deliver a balanced policy approach 
between economic and social policy across the 
European Union for several decades has contributed 
to the crisis that Europe finds itself in today. 
Focusing on this century alone we see that the 
original Lisbon Strategy also known as the Lisbon 
Agenda or Lisbon Process, was deemed to be such a 
failure that it had to be revised half way through its 
ten-year lifespan. The revised version eliminated the 
social aspects of policy that had been a feature of the 
original iteration of the Lisbon Strategy. This seemed 
to suggest that it was the social aspects of policy 
3
European Research Series | From the Crash to Covid and Beyond
that were holding back the economic priorities of job 
creation. This analysis in turn proved to be false as 
the Lisbon Strategy in its second iteration also was 
deemed to be a failure. 
In 2010 the Lisbon Strategy was replaced by the 
Europe 2020 strategy. In practice this, too, has not 
had the positive impact on social aspects of policy 
that it is meant to address. Of particular significance 
is its failure to reduce poverty substantially or to 
even make major progress towards reaching the 
target set. The European Union is strong on rhetoric 
but weak on delivery where the social aspects of 
policy are concerned. Failure to deliver on social 
aspects of policy, in particular on reducing poverty 
and long-term unemployment and improving access 
to quality services, will have major implications for 
the future of the EU as it will strengthen the growing 
conclusion that it is not a democratic project but is, 
rather, focused on delivering outcomes that favour 
the economically powerful. 
The purpose of our European Research Series is to 
contribute to the debate and discussion on policy 
issues that affect all members of the European 
Union. To date this research series has produced 
comprehensive reviews of Ireland’s performance 
towards its Europe 2020 targets, a comprehensive 
examination of the impact of policies pursued by the 
European Union and its members states after the 
financial crisis of 2008 and an extensive analysis of 
how European member states have been performing 
in terms of social and economic targets after the 
crisis. Some of this research focussed on those 
countries most affected by the crisis. 
Social Justice Ireland’s European Research Series 
provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis 
of key issues, and it also makes a series of policy 
proposals national and EU level. These proposals are 
aimed at ensuring a more sustainable and inclusive 
future for European citizens.
Our research has consistently shown that a more 
integrated social dimension across the European 
Union is required to ensure the European Social 
Model can meet the challenges of new realities and 
that the damage to social cohesion across the Union 
caused by the last crisis can begin to be repaired. 
This publication points to the need to examine 
alternatives and to develop a social welfare and 
support system that can adapt to changing realities 
and withstand future shocks. Minimum income 
schemes, the Living Wage, Basic Income schemes, 
the changing nature of work, adequate investment, 
access to quality services, representation and 
sustainability are policy areas which are discussed 
and examined in this research. We present this 
research as part of our ongoing contribution to the 
European policy process. 
Social Justice Ireland would like to thank Dr Ann 
Leahy and Dr Peter Hession for their work in 
preparing and producing the research for this 
publication. They have brought a great deal of 
experience, research, knowledge and wisdom 
to ensure that this publication is a worthwhile 
contribution to the ongoing discussion on how to 
secure a more sustainable and inclusive future for all 
in the European Union. 
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1 1 Introduction  and Context
1  Quantitative easing means creating money by buying securities, such as government bonds, from banks with electronic cash that did 
not exist before. The new money swells the size of bank reserves in the economy by the quantity of assets purchased (The Economist, 
9 March 2015)
This report is one of a series that Social Justice 
Ireland has published addressing the social situation 
in Europe. In previous reports, we considered the 
background to the economic crisis of 2008, its 
aftermath and the European policy response to 
it at some length. In this report we briefly refer to 
the crisis and its aftermath and then consider more 
recent social policy developments in Europe and in 
particular policy responses to the crisis created by the 
Covid-19 pandemic. In the following Chapters, we 
examine the legacies of the financial crisis of 2008-
09 on European member states and their impact 
on the handling of the current global public health 
emergency, addressing poverty and social exclusion, 
inequality, employment and unemployment, 
education, health services and taxation. We also 
include a Chapter in which alternative policy 
approaches are discussed to address some of the 
challenges outlined in the report, particularly as 
the pandemic creates unprecedented risks to social 
equity and public health while also representing a 
potential break with the policies of the recent past. 
In this light, we finish with some recommendations. 
The findings of this report thus aim to connect 
the uneven legacies of recovery dating from the 
2008 financial crisis to the present conjuncture 
and should inform European investment policy on 
rebuilding our society and economy as EU member 
states pursue recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic.
In the first report in this series, we reviewed progress 
(or the lack of it) in key areas of social policy focusing 
on the period 2008 and 2013 and we subsequently 
updated this in later reports. Like the last reports in 
this series, this year’s report is essentially an annual 
review focusing on development in the most recent 
years. 
1.1 Background: The Crisis and its Aftermath
The origins of the global economic crisis and the 
official reaction to it are discussed in previous 
reports in this series. In short, its origins lie in 
bad regulation and bad financial practices in the 
United States. What began as a clear failure of 
the market economy (particularly amongst financial 
institutions) was soon interpreted as a problem 
of the overstretched role of the state leading to a 
prioritisation of austerity policies. This approach 
soon hardened into orthodoxy among the financial 
leaders of Europe (Krugman, 2015).
As the crisis spread, budgetary consolidation, eco-
nomic recovery and protecting the euro emerged 
as the dominant political priorities. This in turn 
spurred the European Central Bank to launch a pro-
gramme of quantitative easing1 from 2015 designed 
to stimulate the economy by encouraging banks to 
make more loans. By contrast, long-running com-
mitments to social equity at the European level 
have been critically weakened in this context as a 
gulf emerges ‘between the rhetoric and the reality 
of “social Europe”’ (O Cinneide, 2014). While prom-
inent economists such as Thomas Piketty (Piketty et 
al. 2017) have argued Europe’s putative ‘democrat-
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ic deficit’ remains a major obstacle to reviving this 
focus, others have emphasized longer-term political 
risks to the EU arising from its current ‘social defi-
cit’ (Copeland, 2015). Links between austerity and 
the intensification of Euroscepticism have thus been 
widely cited as factors underlying the UK’s decision 
to withdraw from the EU in 2016 (Fetzer, 2019).
In this context, it is interesting that in recent times 
there has been acknowledgement of mistakes made 
in imposing austerity on the part both of economists 
and international bodies (see Skidelsky 2018; Scally 
2019). This has been evident since at least 2013, 
when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
chief economist Olivier Blanchard acknowledged 
the Fund had ‘significantly underestimated the 
increase in unemployment and the decline in private 
consumption and investment associated with fiscal 
consolidation’ (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). More 
recently, IMF economists have gone further in 
explicitly arguing that:
‘Austerity policies not only generate substantial 
welfare costs … they also hurt demand—and thus 
worsen employment and unemployment…. The 
evidence of the economic damage from inequality 
suggests that policymakers should be more open 
to redistribution than they are’ (Ostry, Loungani 
and Furceri 2016: 40-41). 
Another example comes from the OECD which 
for some time is explicit that mistakes were made 
in the response to the economic crisis (see OECD 
2015b). They call for a greater focus on well-being 
and its distribution to ensure that growth delivers 
progress for all. They relate this to very high levels 
of inequality in the OECD and to the fact that 
large income inequalities undermine growth and 
wellbeing, and require, amongst other things, that 
taxation systems are reformed to ensure that they 
are progressive enough (OECD 2015b).
While the Europe 2020 Strategy introduced in 2010 
focused on achieving high levels of employment, 
productivity and social cohesion, it is well recognised 
that, following the crisis, trust in democratic 
institutions declined (Foster and Frieden, 2017) and 
social cohesion came under new pressure (Eurofound, 
2018b). This is due not only to the economic and 
employment crisis and the response to it, but also 
due to longer-term trends such as growing inequality, 
immigration and increased cultural diversity and also 
increasing social disparities in relation to issues of 
poverty, labour market access, health and equitable 
education. Perceived insecurities related to income, 
accommodation, and employment are increasingly 
recognised as having negative impacts upon both 
well-being and trust in institutions, and this has 
only accelerated in the midst of the current public 
health emergency (Eurofound, 2020a).
1.2 Developments of Recent Years
While noting the bloc’s economy was set to enter a 
seventh year of uninterrupted growth on the eve of 
the pandemic, the European Commission’s Annual 
Sustainable Growth Strategy for 2020 acknowledged 
that ‘investment and potential growth … remain 
below pre-crisis levels’ as Europe faced ‘a period of 
subdued growth’ (European Commission, 2019d). 
As recently as the May 2021, EU leaders have again 
sought to confront the persistence of skill shortages 
and underemployment across Europe alongside the 
longer-term challenges posed by population aging, 
digitization and climate change (European Council, 
2021a).
Even prior to the arrival of Covid-19 in spring 
2020, it has been clear that uneven recovery over 
the previous decade has meant that the benefits of 
growth have not been equally felt. Despite some 
positive developments in recent years, the EU has 
thus failed to meet its Europe 2020 target of lifting 
at least 20 million people from the risk of poverty 
and social exclusion and still remained ‘far from the 
original objective’ by 2019 (Employment Committee 
and Social Protection Committee, 2019). There are 
also concerns about the way that the employment 
picture is evolving – especially as regards growth 
in temporary, part-time and precarious work and 
falling or stagnating wages.
The European Commission’s Employment and Social 
Developments review for 2020 similarly notes that, 
even prior to Covid, ‘important weaknesses’ continue 
to exist including high youth unemployment, gender 
gaps and disparities in social protection which have 
helped to fuel both rising income inequality and in-
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work poverty across a majority of Member States 
(European Commission, 2020a). Evidence from 
Eurobarometer surveys likewise indicate a rising 
climate of insecurity among European citizens 
relating to prices, health and social security, pensions 
and the financial situation of their household as well 
as concerns relating to environment, climate and 
energy issues and housing. Europeans increasingly 
demand action to address the evident contrasts, 
while continuing efforts to address other important 
challenges – notably migration and security – and 
to combat climate change and environmental 
degradation (European Commission 2019a). One 
issue recently highlighted in the way that the 
recovery is evolving relates to growing inequality 
between regions, which is one factor leading to 
disenchantment with existing political systems 
(Eurofound and European Commission Joint 
Research Centre, 2019).
The Barcelona European Summit of 2002 sought to 
define the ‘European social model’ as one which aimed 
to strike ‘a balance between economic prosperity and 
social justice’ (European Council, 2002). However, 
it is argued that despite the formulation of specific 
social policy objectives at the EU level – for example, 
the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy– there is as 
yet no integrated EU strategy that consistently and 
comprehensively combines the two key objectives: 
growth and social justice (Schraad-Tischler and Kroll, 
2014). Overall the EU needs to find a way to rebalance 
its policy focus and give greater prominence to social 
priorities, which were neglected, especially during 
the crisis, 2008-2013. In the wake of the present 
public health crisis, Social Justice Ireland believes that 
the European project must reassert its credibility in 
the face of current challenges by strengthening its 
social foundations. 
As former reports in this series have indicated, it 
is clear that the rising tide of nominal growth over 
recent years has failed to lift all boats. A rising 
tide does not provide everyone with a boat (the 
foundation upon which to participate in society) or 
repair the damage to some boats caused by social 
and economic exclusion (Clarke and Kavanagh 
2019:7). Perceived quality of public services is a 
key driver for higher trust in institutions, pointing 
to the value of public participation in the co-design 
of services (Eurofound 2019c). While the economy 
and economic growth are important, they exist in a 
context, and economic growth is as much an effect 
of social progress as a potential contributor to social 
progress. 
1.3 EU – Key Social Policy Responses
The European Council adopted the Europe 2020 
Strategy in 2010 as a key response to the economic 
crisis. It set out to develop a more balanced and 
sustainable approach for the future (European 
Commission 2010). The strategy was seen as a step 
forward in the development of EU policymaking, 
because it recognised the importance of social issues. 
It committed European states to work towards 
targets in a range of areas including on poverty and 
social exclusion, employment and education and 
established an agreed set of indicators designed to 
measure progress toward meeting those targets. 
As the programmes reaches its concluding point, 
reflection on the progress or otherwise towards 
meeting its targets will form a key focus of this 
report.
Adopted in 2013, the European Commission’s Social 
Investment Package reiterated the importance of 
an active inclusion approach and set out how well-
designed social policies can contribute to economic 
growth as well as protecting people from poverty 
and providing economic stabilisers. The European 
Commission argues that addressing excessive 
inequality in Europe requires adequate levels of 
social investment, investment in lifelong learning, 
and social expenditure that is more responsive to 
the economic cycle (that is, periods of growth and 
periods of recession) and integrated welfare reforms 
supported by well-functioning labour markets 
(2015). Other initiatives taken include the Youth 
Guarantee, the Youth Employment Initiative (the 
main EU funding programme to facilitate the roll-
out of a guarantee to which member states are 
committed) aimed at supporting particular regions 
where youth unemployment is higher than 25 
per cent, launched in 2014 and due to conclude in 
2023. March 2021 has also seen the launch of the 
EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child and the 
European Child Guarantee outlining guidelines for 
Member States regarding support for vulnerable 
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children relating to housing, education, healthcare, 
and nutrition (European Commission, 2021d).
In March 2017, the Commission presented a White 
Paper setting out a broader vision for the future 
of the EU and the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). The White Paper presented five scenarios 
of the potential state of the Union in 2025. 
However, Social Justice Ireland and other civil society 
organisations pointed to the fact that social issues or 
social policy barely feature in any of these scenarios, 
confirming a perception that the EU has become an 
economic project that has failed to come to terms 
with social issues. Social Justice Ireland believes that 
an alternative option for the future of the EU should 
ensure the engagement of all sectors of society 
in decision-making processes, something that is 
essential for the kind of partnership that is required 
to address the current challenges.
The EU contributed to the formulation of the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (or SDGs) 2030 
agenda. The Commission’s Reflection Paper ‘Towards 
a Sustainable Europe by 2030’, January 2019, notes 
how the EU compares favourably with other world 
regions in many respects but acknowledges that 
democracy, economy and natural environment 
all need continuous efforts to ‘consolidate 
achievements, to fully overcome the negative impact 
from the economic and financial crisis, to decouple 
the improvement of our health, welfare and well-
being from environmental degradation, to overcome 
social inequalities, and to address challenges that go 
beyond borders’ (European Commission 2019c). It 
is also interesting that a review of the performance 
of 193 UN countries in addressing SDG targets 
suggests that Nordic countries – Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland – top the SDG Index while each also 
faces challenges on meeting one or several SDGs 
(Sachs et al 2019). The decision in 2019 of the 
new von der Leyen Commission to integrate SDGs 
into the European Semester – the annual cycle of 
economic policy coordination across the EU – has 
been praised in some quarters for indicating a greater 
degree to commitment to meeting these goals. 
However, critics have argued, inherent tensions 
between the constraints of EU policymaking and the 
STGs themselves will likely continue to represent a 
‘conundrum’ (Sabato and Mandelli, 2021).
The European Pillar of Social Rights in 2017 is the 
European Commission’s latest major initiative in 
the field of employment and social affairs. It is 
understood as official recognition that the reactions 
to the Eurozone crisis neglected the EU’s social 
dimension. It articulates 20 key principles, structured 
around three categories: equal opportunities and 
access to the labour market; fair working conditions, 
and social protection and inclusion. March 2021 saw 
the launch of the European Pillar of Social Rights 
Action Plan as the latest iteration of this programme, 
including a more detailed roadmap to fulfilling the 
plan and a richer set of indicators by which progress 
toward the targets can be assessed. However, as both 
trade unions and employers groups have recently 
noted, the Action Plan is non-legally binding in its 
own right while remaining subject to existing EU 
competencies and budgetary rules encompassing all 
Member States (European Trade Union Congress, 
2021; European Enterprise Alliance, 2021). 
As Crespy (2017) and others have argued, the long-
term congruence of EU social policies within existing 
constraints – particularly those relating to fiscal 
discipline – continues to raise serious questions 
about the coherence of the EU’s socio-economic 
strategy as a whole. What some have described as a 
putative ‘socialisation’ of EU policy-making through 
the mainstreaming of social policy into instruments 
like the European Semester remains hotly contested 
(Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2018). For critics of this 
view, such integration merely obscures the fact that 
the EU’s mandate in social affairs remains limited by 
inclination, and both successes and failures result 
from responsibility shared with Member States 
(Menéndez-Valdés 2017). Overall, it is clear that its 
implementation will require a commitment to its 
aims and actions not only at European level, but by 
Member States, social partners and governments at 
national and regional level (Menéndez-Valdés 2017). 
Another recent follow up to the European Pillar of 
Social Rights has been the adoption of a new Directive 
(2019/1152) on Transparent and Predictable 
Working Conditions. This Directive modernises 
existing obligations to inform each worker of his 
or her working conditions and aims to create new 
minimum standards to ensure that all workers, 
including those on atypical contracts, benefit from 
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more predictability and clarity as regards their 
working conditions. Thus, each worker is to benefit 
from a set of provisions to reduce precariousness. 
However, arguably it does not address the worst 
forms of precariousness and does not, for example, 
prohibit zero-hours contracts (Piasna 2019). EU 
Member States will have until 2022 to transpose the 
new rules into their national legislation. 
A consultation launched in February 2020 around 
the proposed directive on Digital Platform Workers 
will seek to address similar issues affecting the ‘gig 
economy’, with a sectoral study carried out for the 
Commission in 2019 acknowledging ‘self-employed 
platform workers dependent …in precarious 
situations, appear to be the most vulnerable 
and least protected’ (Kilhoffer et al., 2019). The 
European Parliament’s Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs has recently responded to this by 
emphasising ‘the need to better combat bogus self-
employment’ as a whole, while noting the Directive 
forms a piece – alongside the Digital Services Act 
(2020/825) and the Digital Markets Act (2020/842) 
– of a wider ongoing push to regulate ‘big tech’ by 
the European institutions (Employment and Social 
Affairs Committee, 2021a). Yet as critics of this 
process have rightly pointed out, tensions are likely 
to emerge between advancing workers rights and 
the Commission’s core institutional commitment to 
‘the competitive functioning of the digital economy’ 
(Dufresne and Leterme, 2021).
Proposals launched by the European Commission 
in October 2020 for an EU Directive on Adequate 
Minimum Wages (2020/682) likewise aims to give 
legislative force to Principle 6 of the European 
Pillar of Social Rights concerning ‘the right to fair 
wages’ (European Commission, 2017). The Directive 
does not seek a uniform statutory minimum wage 
across the EU, but rather aims to establish certain 
prerequisites - such as minimum thresholds 
connected to gross wage rates, wage growth and 
purchasing power - for national minimum wages 
without prejudice to collectively-agreed minimum 
wages (Wixforth and Hochscheidt, 2021). While 
the ILO has recently noted a real increase in 
minimum wages in 23 of the 27 Member States this 
year (International Labour Organization, 2021), 
major inequalities in rates of increase persist as 
negotiations on the Directive appear to have stalled 
in the face of opposition from certain Member States 
partly on the basis of putative EU ‘overreach’ in this 
area (Eurofound, 2021a). By contrast, the launch in 
2019 of a new European Labour Authority charged 
with coordinating the enforcement of EU law on 
labour mobility, has been criticized as a ‘toothless 
tiger’ due to the voluntary nature of Member states’ 
participation (Employment and Social Affairs 
Committee, 2018).
Another piece of policy conspicuous for its absence in 
the updated European Pillar of Social Rights Action 
Plan was a proposed Eurozone unemployment 
insurance scheme of the kind first proposed by the 
German economist Sebastian Dullien (2007). The 
new Commission has indicated this will ultimately 
come to succeed current pandemic income support 
measures including the Support to mitigate 
Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) fund, 
claiming the latter ‘should be seen as an emergency 
operationalization of a European Unemployment 
Re-insurance Scheme’ (Vandenbroucke et al. 2020). 
Other recent measures, including the Work Life 
Balance Directive (2019/1158), represent a more 
obviously incremental advance on foundational 
European social legislation dating back to the 
Maternity Leave Directive (92/85) and Working 
Time Directive (2003/88). Taken together with the 
new Commission’s Gender Equality Strategy 2020-
2025 and the Child Guarantee, the Work Life Balance 
Directive advances exiting priorities around labour 
market activation to provide a firmer EU framework 
addressing paternity leave, the introduction of carer’s 
leave, flexible working arrangements for carers and 
the provision of formal care services. While some 
advocates have likened this to an ‘emerging right to 
care in the EU’ (Caracciolo di Torella, 2017), critics 
have pointed to the lack of European thresholds 
on payments and employment conditionalities 
surrounding worker access to the carer benefits 
(European Women’s Lobby, 2019). 
This ties back into the wider concept of social 
investment, which is characterised by policies that 
‘prepare’ individuals and families to respond to new 
social risks of the competitive knowledge society by 
investing in human capital from early childhood on, 
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rather than simply to ‘repair’ damage after moments 
of economic or political crisis (Hemerijck 2014). The 
European social investment package calls for social 
protection systems that guard against risks across 
the lifecycle, emphasising the need for well-targeted, 
comprehensive and enabling benefits and services. It 
stresses that welfare systems fulfil three functions: 
social investment, social protection and stabilisation 
of the economy. 
The social investment approach relies on the as-
sumption that social and economic policies are mu-
tually reinforcing and that the former, when framed 
from a social investment perspective, represents a 
precondition for future economic and employment 
growth. The Social Investment Package aims for 
quality employment for those who can work and for 
resources sufficient to live in dignity for those who 
cannot (European Commission 2013a). 
1.4 The Covid Crisis
On the eve of the pandemic’s arrival and as a new 
European Commission settled into office, a rising 
chorus of voices were coming to apprehend ‘the end 
of social Europe’ (Graziano and Hartlapp, 2019). 
Although similar accounts of ‘the death of social 
Europe’ gathered pace throughout the rightward-
shift of the European Commission under Jean-
Claude Juncker from 2014 (Ewing, 2015; Menz and 
Crespy, 2015), a fresh emphasis on climate change 
and digitization – but broad continuity with Barroso 
and Junker era social policies – appeared to affirm 
this trajectory as Ursula von der Leyen assumed 
the Presidency of the European Commission in 
December 2019 (European Commission, 2019e).
The impact of Covid-19 from the first quarter of 
2020 altered this situation markedly as Member 
States and the European Commission developed 
a set of emergency initiatives designed to meet 
the unprecedented social and economic challenges 
posed by Covid-19. Out of a total EU budget of 
€1.07 trillion agreed for 2021–27 in November 
2020, initiatives such as the €100 billion Support 
to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency 
(SURE) fund is specifically designed to help Member 
States address the short-term impact of the 
pandemic on labour markets. This was followed in 
July 2020 by agreement on a separate €750 billion 
Next Generation EU (NGEU) fund, likewise intended 
to support member states hit by the pandemic but 
encompassing wider public investments around 
the incoming Commission’s stated priorities. To be 
channelled to Member States via a Recovery and 
Resilience Facility created in February 2021, the 
NGEU is thus being framed as an ‘opportunity’ 
for ‘recovery from the COVID-19 crisis and of 
undertaking green and digital transitions in an 
inclusive way’ (European Council, 2021a). 
The Porto Social Summit of May 2021 affirmed 
a revival of rhetoric around ‘social Europe’ as 
the overarching framework surrounding Covid 
mitigation in the wake of both the European Pillar of 
Social Rights Action Plan, unveiled in March 2021, 
and the wider suite of measures being introduced 
to tackle the pandemic’s impact in keeping with the 
EU’s Strategic Agenda to 2024 (European Council, 
2019; 2021b). This shift, however, does little to 
obscure the enduring realities of a long-term ‘social 
deficit’ across Europe and the lack of both robust EU 
competencies and capacities in relation to the now 
critical area of public health (Thill and Kirov, 2020). 
Throughout the first half of 2020, the size, condi-
tionality and financing of what would become the 
European Recovery Plan and Fund, encompassing 
the NGEU and broader MFF investment packages, 
was characterised by significant contention among 
Member States before a compromise was reached in 
July 2020. The relaxation of fiscal disciplines under 
the Stability and Growth Pact from March 2020, 
compromises surrounding conditions attached to 
a balance of EU loans and grants, and most con-
tentiously of all the issuance of a form of common 
debt through European Commission borrowing all 
marked degrees of divergence from past practices. 
Although it remains too early to tell how permanent 
these shifts may prove, contrasts have been drawn 
between the EU’s current response to the pandemic 
and what the European Commissioner for Economy 
Paolo Gentiloni has recently referred to obliquely 
as ‘the mistakes of the past’ in reference to the now 
discredited austerity policies pursued following the 
financial crisis (European Commission, 2020b). 
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As of summer 2021, talk of retrenchment and fiscal 
‘normalization’ has already begun to emerge, but 
the scale of the post-pandemic recession is likely to 
halt a reversion to the status quo ante in the short 
run at least (Bastasin, 2021; Wieser, 2021). The EU 
still faces the potential for a ‘double dip recession’ 
by the end of 2021, with the bloc’s GDP contracting 
by 0.4 per cent in the first quarter of the year. The 
April 2021 EU unemployment rate likewise stood at 
7.3 per cent, with worst-case scenario predications 
of a peak of 11.2 per cent by the end of the year with 
recovery to pre-pandemic levels only being attained 
in 2024 (Eurostat, namq_10_gdp) This will partly 
depend on the pace of the scaling down of EU and 
government ‘furlough’ and employment support 
schemes, which could potentially leave 59 million 
Europeans – 26 per cent of all those employed across 
the EU – vulnerable to future job losses (Chinn et al. 
2021). 
The pandemic has carried a stark human cost. To 
date, there have been over 47 million reported 
infections and 1.24 million reported deaths across 
the continent of Europe (European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control, 2021). In its wake, 
the pandemic has also laid bare and exacerbated 
deepening social fissures across the EU, particularly 
in relation to health, housing, and job security. To 
what extent the post-Covid recovery may also bring 
a lasting break with the failed policies of the past 
remains, as yet, unclear. The remainder of this report 
details the scale of the task at hand against the 
backdrop of a decade of uneven progress leading up 
to the current unprecedented conjuncture created by 
the pandemic, including recommendations for what 
can constitute a genuinely inclusive process of social 
and economic reconstruction.
1.5 This Report
When the experts who are part of the European Social 
Policy Network assessed the implementation of the 
Social Investment Package in EU Member States, 
they found its implementation to be very limited 
(Bouget et al 2015). These experts grouped countries 
of the EU into the following three categories as to 
how they perform relative to social investment:
• Group 1: Has well established social invest-
ment approach to many social policies; tend 
to have good linkages between different poli-
cy areas when addressing key social challeng-
es;
• Group 2: Still to develop an explicit or pre-
dominant social investment approach, while 
showing some increasing awareness in a few 
specific areas; and
• Group 3: Social investment approach has not 
made many significant inroads into the over-
all policy agenda.
The first group includes mainly Nordic and central 
European countries while the third grouping includes 
mainly newer accession countries from Eastern 
Europe along with some southern countries. See 
Table 1. We set out these groupings here as we will 
return to this categorisation in later sections of this 
report as we review the performance of countries 
under a number of social indicators.
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Table 1 Social Investment: EU Countries And Main Policy-Making Trends
Groupings Countries
Group 1: Has well established social investment approach to many 
social policies; tend to have good linkages between different policy 










Group 2: Still to develop an explicit or predominant social investment 











Group 3: Social investment approach has not made many significant 











Source: Three groups defined by European Social Policy Network; this report also acknowledges that the line between the groups is not 
always a sharp one (Bouget et al 2015).
For Social Justice Ireland every person has seven 
core rights that need to be part of the vision for 
the future: the right to sufficient income to live 
with dignity, to meaningful work, to appropriate 
accommodation; to relevant education, to essential 
healthcare, to real participation and the right to 
cultural respect. See Table 2. Social Justice Ireland 
believes that deliberative processes are crucial to the 
future of Europe founded on the idea of deliberative 
democracy in which decisions are made based on 
reasoned evidence-based and enlightened debate in 
which decisions taken are justified and accessible to 
the general public.
2  That is, taxes on production and imports, income and wealth, capital taxes, and compulsory social contributions paid by employers 
and employees 
Table 2 Social Justice Ireland - Seven Core Rights
Seven Core Rights
sufficient 














This report is intended to be complementary to 
another published annually by Social Justice Ireland 
in which we track Ireland’s progress in a European 
context in reaching the Sustainable Development 
Goals (over the short and long term) (see Clark 
and Kavanagh, 2017, 2019; Clark, Kavanagh and 
Lenihan, 2018).
In Sections 2 to 4 of this report, we will discuss 
issues relevant to the realisation of some of the 
above rights by looking at social indicators under 
the headings of poverty and social exclusion, 
employment/unemployment, and services in health 
and in education. We will also look at how countries 
compare in respect of total taxation2 (Section 
5). Throughout the report we will review how the 
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groupings of countries relative to their performance 
under social investment and set out in Table 1 
perform in relation to some of these headings. We will 
then set out some alternative approaches to policy-
making in Section 6, and finish by drawing some 
conclusions and making some recommendations in 
Section 7.
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2 2  Poverty, Social Exclusion and 
Income Inequality
3  The 60 per cent threshold is adopted in the Europe 2020 Strategy. It is also possible to examine incomes below other thresholds such 
as 40 per cent, 50 per cent or 70 per cent.
Social Justice Ireland includes the right to sufficient 
income to live with dignity amongst its list of core 
rights that need to guide policy-making in the future. 
(For the full list, see Table 2.) This is consistent 
with the Global Goals for Sustainable Development 
which involve a commitment to 17 Global Goals 
(also known as Sustainable Development Goals or 
SDGs) with targets that include ending poverty and 
fighting inequality over the next 15 years, as well as 
tackling climate change. Social Justice Ireland argues 
for these goals to be at the core of policy-making in 
the years ahead.
In 2010 the EU set a target in the 2020 Strategy to 
reduce the number of Europeans living in or at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion by 20 million by 2020. 
In this section, we take that as a starting point by 
referring to how Europe is progressing in relation 
to that target and we will also look at some further 
indicators of poverty/inequality as well as impacts on 
certain groups. We will finish this section by looking 
briefly at income inequality and at financial distress. 
2.1  Poverty and Social Exclusion and other 
Measures 
First it is necessary to refer to the issue of how 
poverty is defined. Used in the Europe 2020 strategy, 
the indicator, ‘poverty or social exclusion’ is based 
on a combination of three individual indicators – 
an income measure which is related to the median 
income of each country, a measure of a lack of 
resources and a work-exclusion measure. Specifically, 
these take the form of the following three indicators:
(1) people who are at risk of poverty - people 
with an equivalised disposable income be-
low the risk-of-poverty threshold set at 60 
per cent of the national median (or middle) 
equivalised disposable income (after social 
transfers) (Eurostat, t2020_50)3;
(2) people who are severely materially de-
prived - have living conditions severely con-
strained by a lack of resources; they experi-
ence at least 4 out of a list of 9 deprivation 
items (See Glossary for the full list) (Eu-
rostat, t2020_50); or 
(3) people living in households with very low 
work intensity - those aged 0-59 living in 
households where the adults (aged 18-59) 
work less than 20 per cent of their total work 
potential during the past year (Eurostat, 
t2020_50).
The combined ‘poverty or social exclusion’ indicator 
corresponds to the sum of persons who are at risk 
of poverty or severely materially deprived or living 
in households with very low work intensity. Persons 
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are only counted once even if they are present in 
several sub-indicators. It is also possible to examine 
each of the indicators separately and we will do so in 
this report. In Table 3 we set out a summary of the 
position relative to each of these indicators (using 
2008 as a baseline and giving information from 2013 
to 2019), and we discuss each of them further below. 
Sometimes there can be diverging trends among 
the three sub-indicators because of their different 
nature and the three related but distinct concepts of 
poverty they represent. The Glossary at the back of 
this report contains more detailed definitions of the 
indicators used in the EU 2020 Strategy.
The dynamics of poverty (or looking at poverty over 
time) is an important dimension of measurement, 
including issues around probability of exiting 
and entering poverty in different groups of the 
population (Vaalavuo 2015). Results show great 
variations between countries even when those 
countries have similar at risk of poverty rates; 
there are also differences between age groups in the 
patterns of poverty exit and entry. However, as these 
dynamic measures are not widely used yet in Europe 
we focus on the most commonly used measures.
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Table 3 People Experiencing Poverty, EU-28, 2008, 2013 to 2019
Poverty Indicators
People at risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion 
People at risk 
of poverty (60% 
threshold)
People experienc-
ing Severe Material 
Deprivation
People in households 
with very low work 
intensity
EU-28 Number % Number % Number % Number %
Total population
2008** 116m 23.7 80.9m 16.6 41.5m 8.5 34.6m 9.2
2013 122.8m 24.6 83.4m 16.7 48m 9.6 41.1m 11
2014 122m 24.4 86.m 17.2 44.4m 8.9 42.1m 11.3
2015 119m 23.8 86.7m 17.3 40.3m 8.1 39.8m 10.7
2016 118m 23.5 87m 17.3 37.8m 7.5 39.1m 10.5
2017 113m 22.4 85.2m 16.9 33.1m 6.6 35.3m 9.5
2018 110m 21.9 86.2m 17.1 29.7 5.9 32.4m 8.8
2019 107.5m 21.4 84.5m 16.8 27.5m 5.5 31.3m 8.5
Children (under 18) 
2008** 25m 26.5 19.2m 20.4 9.3m 9.8 7.3m 7.8
2013 26.3m 27.9 19.3m 20.5 10.5m 11.1 9m 9.6
2014 26.2m 27.8 19.92m 21.1 9.8m 10.4 9.2m 9.9
2015 25.5 27.1 19.96m 21.2 8.9m 9.6 8.8m 9.4
2016 24.9m 26.4 19.8m 21 8.02m 8.5 8.7m 9.3
2017 23.6m 24.9 19.2m 20.2 6.76m 7.1 7.7m 8.1
2018 22.9m 24.3 19.17 20.3 6.2m 6.6 6.9m 7.4
2019 22.2m 23.4 18.7m 19.4 5.7m 6.0 6.6m 7.0
Older people (over 65s)
2008** 19.2m 23.3 15.6m 18.9 6.1m 7.5 n/a n/a
2013 16.4m 18.2 12.3m 13.7 6.2m 7
2014 16.3m 17.8 12.6m 13.7 5.7m 6.3
2015 16.3m 17.4 13.2m 14.1 5.1m 5.6
2016 17.2m 18.2 13.8m 14.6 5.5m 5.8
2017 17.54m 18.2 14.4m 15 5.1m 5.3
2018 18.3m 18.6 15.6m 15.9 4.6m 4.7
2019 18.7m 18.9 16.3m 16.5 4.4m 4.4
Source: Eurostat Online Databases: t2020_50, t2020_51, t2020_52, t2020_53, ilc_lvhl11, ilc_li02, Ilc_mddd11, ilc_peps01
** Rates for 2008 relate to EU-27 countries, not EU-28, as this was prior to the accession of Croatia
In previous reports in this series, we concluded that, 
having set targets to reduce poverty and promote 
inclusion in 2010 in the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
Europe moved farther away in subsequent years 
from achieving those targets and countries were very 
divergent in their experiences. The risk of poverty 
or social exclusion rate (the combined indicator of 
poverty used in the Europe 2020 strategy) increased 
between 2008 and 2012. It has improved since then 
but there are also a number of issues, which this 
18






report will highlight. Our main focus is on recent 
years, especially the period between 2017 and 2019 
(2019 being the latest year for which comparable 
rates are available across Europe). 
Thus, the risk of poverty or social exclusion rate has 
improved each year since 2012 but stands at 21.4 
per cent in 2019 (EU-28), still representing more 
than one in 5 Europeans, and amounting to over 
107 million people (Eurostat online database code 
t2020_50). Between 2017 and 2019 the rate dropped 
by one per centage point from 22.4 per cent to 21.4 
per cent (-5.5m people), which is welcome. However, 
given that the numbers affected in 2008 had been 
about 116 million people (that is, in EU27)4, Europe 
has only reduced the number by about 8.5 million 
people (but see note below about this calculation 
relative to EU285). Thus Europe is still very far off-
track in meeting the target to reduce the numbers 
affected by 20 million by 2020. 
As the most recent report from the Social Protection 
Committee notes, even prior to the deteriorating 
social and economic situation created by the Covid-19 
crisis since spring 2020, the fruits of several years 
of growth in the EU have been ‘offset … by uneven 
developments in the income distribution, including 
increasing depth of poverty, the rising risk of poverty 
for people living in (quasi-)jobless households and 
the limited progress towards the Europe 2020 
target to reduce poverty and social exclusion’ (Social 
Protection Committee, 2020). Overall trends have 
therefore masked persistent difficulties amongst 
some groups as well as divergence between member 
states including persistently high levels of poverty 
in several countries dating back to the fallout from 
the 2008-09 economic crisis. Aggravating these 
social and economic fissures, the Covid-19 crisis has 
widened and deepened inequalities between social 
groups in income, employment, housing and health 
(Eurofound, forthcoming 2022). This report explores 
the wider contexts and trends which have helped to 
4  This relates to EU-27 countries not EU28, as it was prior to Croatia joining. The figure had risen to about 117.9 million in 2010 when 
the Europe 2020 Strategy was initiated but 2008 was the baseline year
5  Eurostat gives -6.8m as the cumulative difference to 2008 for EU27. However, it gives -7.15m as the cumulative 
difference to 2008 for EU28 (Eurostat Online database: [ilc_peps01], latest update 29.11.19) This is likely to be because 
Croatia joined EU in 2013 and thus EU28 data is only available starting from 2010 (when the level was 117.9m, EU28) 
(European Commission, Europe 2020 Targets, pdf).
frame the current crisis, highlighting the structural 
roots of problems the pandemic has served to reveal 
and worsen.
Part of this wider context includes the reality that 
some population groups (notably people with 
disabilities, people with a migrant background and 
ethnic minorities) are more vulnerable than others 
in terms of access to education, services and the 
labour market, which in turn has translated into 
poorer employment outcomes, lower well-being 
and a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion 
(European Commission 2019a). Eurostat (2019a) 
also highlights how some groups face a higher 
risk of poverty and social exclusion; these include 
single households, migrants and people with lower 
education levels as well as their children. 
The most recent Eurostat (2021a) report monitoring 
progress towards the SDGs in an EU context 
suggests that 28.1 per cent of all people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion were affected by more 
than one dimension of poverty in 2019 (looking at 
the three dimensions of poverty that the Europe 
2020 Strategy measures - see above). In total, 5.9 
per cent were affected by all three forms which have 
been falling at differential rates, with income poverty 
only beginning to do so since 2016. Simultaneously, 
the share of those affected by only one dimension 
of poverty has decreased, which means that, despite 
the favourable decrease in the overall share of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the depth of 
hardship for those affected has increased slightly 
(Eurostat 2021a). 
In 2019, the highest rates of poverty or social 
exclusion were to be found in Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Greece where the rates were at or above 30 
per cent. In 4 other countries (Latvia, Lithuania, 
Italy and Spain) the rate was over 25 per cent. The 
lowest rates were found in Czechia (12.5 per cent), 
Slovenia (14.4 percent) and Finland (15.6 per cent), 
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followed by Slovakia (16.4 per cent). Thus, Czechia, 
Slovenia and Slovakia achieve a comparably high 
degree of prevention of poverty or social exclusion, 
despite only having average economic performance 
highlighting the importance of the social policies 
pursued (see Schraad-Tischler 2015: Schraad-
Tischler et al 2017). 
Even though there have been improvements in the 
most recent year in some countries with typically 
high rates, there continues to be great divergence 
between countries. For example, there was a 
difference of nearly 20.3 percentage points between 
the country with the highest rate (Bulgaria at 32.8 
per cent) and that with the lowest (Czechia 12.5 per 
cent) (Eurostat, code: t2020_50). See Figure 1. 
Figure 1 People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion (%), Eu-28, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database code: t2020_50. 
Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was prior to the accession of Croatia).
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in the poverty or 
social exclusion rates amongst EU countries between 
2018 and 2019. Disimprovements were observed in 
several countries including, notably, the UK (+0.8 
percentage points) and also in some countries with 
traditionally relatively low rates such as France 
(Eurostat t2020_50). The greatest improvements 
(between -1.5 and -2 percentage points) occurred in 
the newer accession states of Lithuania and Slovenia, 
and also in the Mediterranean in Greece, Italy and 
Malta.
Turning for a moment to the review that we 
referenced in Section 1, Table 1, above, of the extent 
to which countries take a social investment approach 
in their policies (Bouget at al 2015), we can also 
review the performance of countries in preventing 
poverty or social exclusion, in light of how well they 
are constituted in relation to social investment. 
All of the countries that are in Group 1 for social 
investment (identified by the European Social Policy 
Network as having a well-established approach to 
many social policies, Bouget et al 2015) and set out 
in Table 1, are ranked better than the EU average 
in terms of protecting people from poverty or social 
exclusion – this is true for 2018 and 2019 and for 
prior years. These countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, 
Sweden and Slovenia. When it comes to how the 
ten countries that are in Group 3 in relation to social 
investment (that is, the social investment approach 
has made the least inroads into the overall policy 
agenda), it appears that in 2019 (consistent with 
prior years), 8 out of ten of them have above average 
rates of poverty or social exclusion and several have 
the highest rates of poverty or social exclusion 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, 
Croatia and Estonia). From this Group 3 (with the 
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least developed social investment approach), only 
the Czechia and Slovakia achieve rates of poverty or 
social exclusion lower than the EU-28 average. 
As we discussed in previous reports, Czechia has 
been considered, in a Europe-wide review of social 
justice, to demonstrate middling economic per-
formance, but to be relatively more effective at de-
livering fairness in society, illustrating how social 
policy plays a critical role in achieving social justice 
(Schraad-Tischler 2015). Slovakia is considered to do 
relatively well in terms of protecting its population 
from poverty because of its comparatively even in-
come distribution patterns (Schraad-Tischler 2015). 
Slovenia is considered to be showing incremental 
improvement on delivering social justice and to be 
performing comparatively well on policies affect-
ing children and youth (see Schraad-Tischler 2015: 
Schraad-Tischler et al 2017), which we come to be-
low.
Figure 2 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Eu-28, Pp Change in Rate, 2018 to 2019
Source: Eurostat online database code: t2020_50.
We turn now to look at the risk of poverty rate, a 
relative income measure representing a percentage 
(in this case 60 per cent) of the median income in 
a given country and the most commonly agreed 
measure of poverty across Europe prior to the 
adoption of the 2020 Strategy. In 2019, 16.8 per 
cent of the population (EU-28) was living at risk 
of poverty (over 86 million people). The rate was 
marginally lower than the 2018 average rate (17.1 
per cent) (Eurostat online database, code t2020_52) 
although fluctuations in this rate occur relative to 
median income so they can increase when incomes 
increase. However, the 2019 rate was still marginally 
higher than the 2008 rate and considerably more 
people were affected in 2018 than in 2008 (in 2008 
the rate was 16.6 per cent, affecting 80.9 million 
people EU-27) (Eurostat online database, code 
t2020_52). See Table 3.
There was a large divergence between member states 
with a 13.7 percentage point difference between the 
highest rate (Romania, 23.8 per cent) and the lowest 
(Czechia, 10.1 per cent). See Figure 3.
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Figure 3 People at Risk of Poverty (%), EU-28, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database code: t2020_52 Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was prior to the accession of 
Croatia).
Figure 4 shows the percentage point changes in 
the risk of poverty rates between 2018 and 2019 
for EU-28 countries. The risk of poverty indicator 
rose in several countries and not only amongst the 
countries with traditionally high rates. The rate has 
increased most in the Luxembourg (+0.8 percentage 
points), Sweden (+0.7 percentage points), Bulgaria, 
Poland, Czechia, Romania, Malta and France. The 
most significant decreases occurred in Lithuania, 
Ireland, Belgium, Slovenia, Germany, Austria and 
Croatia (all improved by 1 percentage point or more).
Figure 4 Risk of Poverty, EU-28, PP Change in Rate 2018 to 2019
Source: Eurostat online database code: t2020_52.
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We can also look at countries’ performance on the 
risk of poverty indicator in light of how well they 
perform in relation to social investment and set out 
in Table 1, in Section 1. Again we find that all of the 
countries that are in Group 1 for social investment 
(identified by the European Social Policy Network as 
having a well-established approach to many social 
policies, Bouget et al 2015), are ranked better than 
the EU average in terms of protecting people from 
relative poverty (again, Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden 
and Slovenia). By contrast, several countries with 
the least developed social investment approach have 
the highest rates of poverty (including Romania, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Estonia).
Figure 5 Severely Materially Deprived Persons, Rate (%), EU-28, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database, code t2020_53. Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was prior to the accession of 
Croatia).
Severely Materially deprived people have living 
conditions severely constrained by a lack of resourc-
es. (See Glossary for a list of the resources that are 
taken into account). As we reported in previous re-
ports in this series, following 2008 some substantial 
increases occurred in this indicator. The numbers af-
fected increased each year between 2008 and 2012 
(Eurostat online database, code t2020_53). The av-
erage EU-28 rate of severe material deprivation was 
5.5 per cent in 2019, representing approximately 
27.5 million people, but down from a rate of 5.9 per 
cent in 2018 (and representing over 29.7 million 
people). It is a positive development that there have 
been improvements in this indicator in recent years. 
As Figure 5 shows, there is a good deal of divergence 
across EU-28 in relation to severe material depriva-
tion, with very high levels in some countries, par-
ticularly amongst the newer members of the union, 
and very low rates in other countries. The rates in 
2019 were highest in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania; 
lowest in Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland. 
Figure 6 shows that the rate fell in many countries 
between 2018 and 2019. This is very welcome. 
However, there was some deterioration in a small 
number of countries where the rates are traditionally 
relatively low – the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland 
and Malta. 
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Figure 6 Severe Material Deprivation, PP Change in Rate, 2018 to 2019
Source: Eurostat online database, code t2020_53.
The third and final measure of poverty that we review 
- called Very Low Work Intensity – is used in the 
Europe 2020 Strategy to measure labour market 
exclusion. It takes account of those aged 0-59 living 
in households where the adults (aged 18-59) work 
less than 20 per cent of their total work potential 
during the past year. In the previous report in this 
series we reported on the very significant increases 
in this measure from 2008, something related to 
very great increases in unemployment. The 2019 
rate was 8.5 per cent (down from 8.8 in 2018). The 
highest rates were found in Greece, Ireland and 
Belgium (Eurostat code t2020-51). 
2.2  Poverty and Social Exclusion and other 
Indicators – Specific Groups
In this section we will look at some groups in more 
detail, again using the poverty measures that are 
most used at European level.
Children - Children were strongly affected by the 
economic crisis and the rate of poverty or social 
exclusion they experience continues to be higher 
than for the general population. Thus, when we look 
at the position of children (under 18), those who 
are considered to be at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion numbered nearly 22.2 million in 2019 
or 23.4 per cent (EU-28 average) (Eurostat online 
database, code ilc_peps01). The 2019 rate was only 
marginally better than the 2018 average rate (24.3 
per cent). This indicates some progress since 2016, 
when the average rate (26.4 per cent, EU-28) had 
been similar to what it had been in 2008, before 
the crisis (26.5 per cent, 2008 rate, EU-27). Thus, 
while little improvement occurred in the situation 
of children for many years, there has been some 
welcome improvement more recently, but still large 
numbers of children remain affected.
There is great divergence in the rates across the EU. 
The highest rates are in Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Spain, Italy and the UK (2019). The lowest rates 
are in Slovenia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland and 
Germany. See Figure 7. 
Despite improvements in recent years, in some 
countries the percentage of children affected is 
very high indeed at over 30 per cent in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Spain and Greece followed by Italy (27.8 
percent) and Lithuania (26.5 per cent). The fact that 
such very high numbers of children continue year 
on year to experience poverty or social exclusion is 
a major concern and has long-term consequences for 
the people and families concerned as well as for the 
EU as a whole.
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Figure 7 Children (u 18): Poverty or Social Exclusion Rate (%), EU28, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat Online Database ilc_peps01. Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was prior to the accession of Cro-
atia).
Figure 8 shows the percentage point changes in the 
rates of member states between 2018 and 2019. The 
greatest disimprovements occurred in Sweden (with 
a notable increase of 2.5 percentage points), Estonia, 
Luxembourg, and Spain. The country showing the 
greatest improvement was Latvia (which traditionally 
has a relatively high rate). 
Figure 8 Children: Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, PP Change in Rate 2018 to 2019
Source: Eurostat Online Database ilc_peps01.
Taking the second indicator, children who are at 
risk of poverty (a measure of income poverty), they 
numbered almost 18.7 million and the rate was 19.4 
per cent (a slight decrease on the 2018 rate of 20.3 
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per cent) (Eurostat online database, code ilc_li02). 
This means that around one fifth of Europe’s children 
are still living in situations of income poverty (that 
is, below the 60 per cent threshold of median income 
in their countries). 
As Figure 9 shows, in 2019, the rates were highest 
in Romania (30.8 per cent), Bulgaria (27.5 per cent), 
Spain (27.4 per cent) and Luxembourg (24.8 per cent) 
followed by Italy and Lithuania. Rates were lowest 
in Denmark, Finland and Slovenia (all between 10 
and 10.5 per cent). Again, there are large divergences 
between countries. The greatest improvements in 
risk of poverty amongst children occurred (2018-
2019) in Austria, followed by Latvia and Croatia. The 
greatest disimprovements occurred in the Sweden, 
Luxembourg and Estonia. 
Figure 9 Children (u 18): Risk of Poverty Rate (%), 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database, code ilc_li02. Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was prior to the accession of 
Croatia). 
As the European Commission (2020a) notes, the 
proportion of children at-risk-of poverty
varies considerably across the EU, as does the 
impact of social transfers on poverty reduction. 
The strongest poverty reduction impacts of social 
transfers registered in countries with low or medium 
levels of child poverty (Finland, Hungary, Denmark, 
Ireland, UK, Poland, Germany, Austria and Slovenia).
As we discussed in the previous report in this 
series, childhood severe material deprivation 
(experiencing a severe lack of resources) worsened 
in most member states following 2008. By 2019, 
the average rate was 6.0 per cent (representing 
almost 5.7 million children). However, it had been 
reducing since 2012 (when it was 11.8 per cent, 
and then representing over 11 million children) 
(Eurostat online database, code ilc_mddd11). The 
newer accession countries and some southern 
European countries tend to have the highest rates. 
In 2019 Bulgaria (20.2 per cent) had the highest rate 
– although there have been significant reductions 
in the rate in recent years. Bulgaria was followed by 
Romania (17.7 per cent) and Greece (17.6 per cent). 
While the rates in some countries (notably, Bulgaria 
and Romania) are considerably lower than in 2008, 
there remains a very striking increase in the rate in 
other countries such as Greece and Cyprus (that is, 
as compared to 2008). 
By contrast, this indicator conveys a very different 
picture for many other countries. For example, very 
low rates are in evidence in Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Germany, Finland and the Netherlands (all with 
rates below 2.5 per cent). See Figure 10.
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Figure 10 Children (u18): Severe Material Deprivation Rate (%) 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database, code ilc_mddd11. Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was prior to the accession 
of Croatia). 
Focusing on changes between 2018 and 2019, 
the rate has decreased in a majority of member 
states. The greatest improvement has occurred 
in Latvia (-2.3 percentage points) followed by 
Hungary (-2.1 percentage points) and Romania (-2 
percentage points). But the rate increased in some 
countries, notably Malta, Sweden and Bulgaria (all 
of whom registered increases of between 0.8 and 1.1 
percentage points). 
Improvements in the indicators discussed relative to 
children are welcome. However, it is also of concern 
to see some disimprovements in recent years in 
some countries. Overall, it is clear that the dangers 
of ongoing high levels of child poverty, social 
exclusion and deprivation are very serious. Poverty 
tends to persist over time and be transmitted across 
generations, which means that children born into 
poverty bear a higher risk of poverty in adult life 
than the average population (Eurostat 2021a). For 
example, the European Commission (2018c) notes 
that almost 70 per cent of adults with a low ability 
to make ends meet grew up in a household in the 
same situation (2011 data). Moreover, it is true that 
the risk of poverty or social exclusion particularly 
affects families where parents could not benefit 
from an extensive education. For example, between 
2010 and 2016 the increase in the risk of poverty 
or social exclusion was particularly high for children 
of parents with the lowest educational attainment, 
while the increase was minimal for other children. 
Thus, education, which is a strong determinant of 
poverty or social exclusion for adults, also strongly 
influences whether children are at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion (European Commission 2018c; 
Eurostat 2021a).
The European Pillar of Social Rights recognizes the 
importance of protecting children from poverty 
and states that “children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds have the right to specific measures 
to enhance equal opportunities” (Principle 
11). A dynamic perspective on poverty (that is, 
experience of poverty over time) underlines the 
key role of proactive policy measures, like social 
investment, or preventative social protection 
and services, whose results are only visible in the 
long run and are often not prioritised (Vaalavuo 
2015). A survey of social justice across Europe 
concludes that the northern European countries, 
in particular, offer a positive example of how child 
poverty can be quite effectively fought if socially 
27






disadvantaged groups receive targeted support 
through a functioning tax-and-transfer system; 
that study also points to the need to work towards 
a more sustainable remedy through achieving 
greater equality in the education system and the 
labour market (Schraad-Tischler et al. 2017). 
The EU’s Social Protection Committee (2020) 
notes that access to affordable quality early 
childhood education and care, along with well-
designed work-life balance policies, is key to 
improve children’s life prospects, while at the same 
time supporting the labour market participation 
of their parents, notably mothers. The ability to 
tackle the challenges of child poverty and youth 
exclusion will be decisive in Europe’s capacity to 
guarantee a long-term future to its citizens.
Older People – When we consider the position of 
older people (usually taken to mean those over 65), 
and again using the most commonly used poverty 
indicators, the European average rate for poverty 
or social exclusion was 18.9 per cent in 2019 
(representing 18.7 million people). This was only 
a slight increase on the 2018 rate (18.6 per cent) 
but it represents a relatively large increase in the 
numbers affected (+300,000 people approximately). 
The rate was higher for those aged 75+ (20.2 per 
cent), approximately the same rate as for 2018 
(Eurostat online database, code ilc-peps01). This 
issue is significant for policy-makers (as well as for 
the individuals concerned) given that populations 
are ageing at an unprecedented rate.
Poverty or social exclusion affects nearly twice as 
many women as men in older age. For those aged 65+, 
the rate for women was 21.1 per cent (representing 
11.6 million people), whereas for men it was 16.1 
per cent (representing 7 million people) (2019). The 
rate for women aged 75+ is even higher at 23.3 per 
cent (6.2 million people), whereas that for men aged 
75+ is 16 per cent (or 3 million people). Of relevance 
here is the fact that the pension gap between men 
and women remains large and is likely to persist, 
and that people who are in non-standard work 
or are self-employment often face less favourable 
conditions for accessing and accruing pension rights 
(EU Social Protection Committee 2020). The growth 
of precarious work situations, which we deal with 
later in this report, makes this an issue of increasing 
concern.
There is great variation in the poverty or social 
exclusion rates of older people across Europe. See 
Figure 11. The newer accession countries tend to 
have higher rates. These include Latvia, Bulgaria 
and Estonia (all with rates over 40 per cent) and also 
Lithuania, Romania and Croatia (both over 30 per 
cent) (2019). The lowest rates in 2019 were found in 
Denmark, Luxembourg (both with a rate at or below 
10 per cent), France and the Netherlands (both with 
rates under 13 per cent). Between 2018 and 2019, 
the largest increases in this rate occurred in Bulgaria 
(+2.7 percentage points), Malta (+2.4 percentage 
points), and Cyprus (+2.4 percentage points). 
Lithuania, Estonia and Spain had the greatest 
decreases (at or more than 2 percentage points).
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Figure 11 Older People: Poverty or Social Exclusion Rate (%), EU-28, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database, code ilc_peps01 Note: 2008 average rate is for EU-27 as rate for Croatia not available.  
When we look at the at risk of poverty rate (that 
is, a measure of income poverty using the 60 per 
cent of median income level), the 2019 average 
rate for those aged 65+ was 16.5 per cent or almost 
16.5 million people (EU-28). This is up from a rate 
of 16.1 per cent affecting some 15.8 million people 
in 2018 (Eurostat ilc_li02). In fact, this rate has 
been increasing from 2013 (when it had been 13.7 
per cent affecting 12.3 million people) (Eurostat 
ilc_li02). Thus, approximately 4.2 million more older 
people are experiencing income poverty in Europe in 
2019 than in 2013. 
The highest rates (65+) occurred in 2019 in some 
of the newer accession countries of Latvia (43.7 per 
cent), Estonia (46.3 per cent), Bulgaria and Lithuania. 
The lowest rates were seen in Slovakia (8.7 per cent), 
France, Luxembourg and Denmark (each under 10 
per cent) (Eurostat online database ilc_li02). Again, 
as we discussed above (relative to the poverty or 
social exclusion measure), there is a significant 
gender difference between men and women at older 
ages, with risk of poverty affecting far more women 
(10.2 million women) than men (6.2 million) (2019).
The average severe material deprivation rate 
for this age group was 4.4 per cent representing 
approximately 4.4 million people aged 65+ (EU-
28) in 2018 (Eurostat online database, code ilc_
mddd11). Fortunately, the rate was down on the 
2018 rate (of 4.7 per cent) and the numbers affected 
had also decreased (from around 4.6 million in 2018 
to 4.4 million in 2019). Again, the rate is higher for 
older women than older men and many more women 
are affected.
There is great variation in the levels of this form of 
deprivation across Europe, with approximately 30 
percentage points difference between the country 
with the highest rate, Bulgaria (31 per cent), and 
those with the lowest, Luxembourg, Sweden and the 
Netherlands (in these three countries it represents 
less than 1 per cent). See Figure 12. Again some of 
the newer accession states tend to have the highest 
rates such as Bulgaria (31 per cent), especially, and 
also Romania (15.9 per cent) and Lithuania (11.5 per 
cent).
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Figure 12 Older People: Severe Material Deprivation Rate (%), 2008, 201 and 2018
Source: Eurostat online database, code ilc_mddd11. Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was prior to the accession 
of Croatia).
The rate is also high in Greece (13 per cent) thought 
there has been a welcome decrease (from 13.6 per 
cent) between 2018 and 2019. Prior to 2017, the 
rate had increased each year in Greece since 2009 
(when it had been 12.1 per cent) – and it is notable 
that this was in contrast to some newer accession 
countries where it has fallen consistently since 2008. 
This illustrates how the situation of some groups 
in Europe (in this case, Greek older people) could 
worsen at a time when the overall position of the EU 
economy was improving. 
Overall, while this indicator shows welcome im-
provements, increases in the average rate occurred 
in several member states between 2018 and 2019, 
most notably in Slovakia where there was an increase 
of 0.9 percentage in the year. Hungary and France 
showed the next biggest increase (+0.4 per cent). 
This is a trend to watch given that disimprovements 
are happening all at a time of population ageing as 
well as growth and recovery in Europe. 
Working Poor – The final group that we examine in 
this section is the working poor. The in-work at-risk-
of-poverty rate refers to the percentage of persons 
in the total population who are at work (employed 
or self-employed) but at risk of poverty - again, 
based on the relative income level - below the risk-
of-poverty threshold, at 60 per cent of the national 
median equivalised disposable income (after social 
transfers). 
In 2019, 9.2 per cent of employed people (aged 18+) 
were living under the poverty threshold (EU-28) and 
it has been at similar levels since 2014 (Eurostat 
Online database, code ilc_iw01). The average rate 
has increased since 2008, when it had been 8.6 per 
cent. 
The highest rates in 2019 occurred in Romania (15.7 
per cent), Spain (12.7 per cent), Luxembourg (12.1 
per cent), and Italy (11.8 per cent). The lowest rates 
occurred in Finland (2.9 per cent) and Czechia (3.5 
per cent). See Figure 13.
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Figure 13 In-Work Risk of Poverty Rate, EU-28, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat Online database, code ilc_iw01. Employed people aged 18+. Note: EU average rate for 2008 relates to EU27 (as this was 
prior to the accession of Croatia).
This means that about 10 per cent of employed people 
in the EU live in poverty on an ongoing basis and, 
obviously, that getting people into work is not always 
sufficient to lift them out of poverty. The EU Social 
Protection Committee (2020) argues that income 
from employment often needs to be complemented 
by adequate benefits and notes that the working 
poor represent around a third of working-age adults 
who are at-risk-of-poverty. They amounted to an 
alarming 20.5 million people (in 2017) (Pena-Casas 
et al 2019). A report from the European Social Policy 
Network (Pena-Casas et al. 2019) suggests that 
in certain categories of the population (including 
younger people, people with lower education levels, 
and non-standard workers, poor households with 
children including lone parents) in-work poverty 
is significantly higher and has in some cases been 
increasing significantly in recent years. Many factors 
can contribute, but Eurofound (2017a) links non-
standard forms of employment in many countries to 
the expansion in the proportion of those at risk of 
in-work poverty.
While governments typically combine measures 
such as minimum income, minimum wage, income 
replacement or supplement, active labour market 
policies, tackling labour market segmentation, family 
and in-work benefits that directly influence in-work 
poverty, addressing it is often not a stated policy goal 
(Pena-Casas et al 2019). Moreover, a number of other 
policies and measures (such as childcare, housing 
and healthcare) which may only have an indirect 
impact on in-work poverty are equally important to 
address this complex issue (Pena-Casas et al 2019).
The European Commission (2019a) cites evidence 
suggesting that higher trade union density is 
associated with lower in-work poverty rates. Limited 
policy attention is paid to this group (there is not, 
for example, a specific focus on them in the Europe 
2020 strategy). There is a clear need for a specific 
policy focus on this group and better documenting 
their social situation. 
2.3 Income Inequality
Inequality is about exclusion; exclusion from par-
ticipating up to one’s capabilities in the econom-
ic, social and political life of the community. It is 
widely agreed that economic prosperity alone will 
not achieve social progress and that high inequal-
ity levels leave much human potential unrealised 
as well risking damage to social cohesion and eco-
nomic activity and undermining democratic par-
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ticipation (Eurostat 2019a). One Sustainable De-
velopment Goal aims to reduce inequalities (SDG 
10) focusing on inequality within and between 
countries. 
In OECD countries (broader than Europe), the 
richest 10 per cent earn incomes 9.6 times that of 
the poorest 10 per cent (OECD 2015c). Wealth is 
even more concentrated than income – the top 10 
per cent of wealthiest households hold almost half 
of total wealth, the next 50 per cent hold almost 
the other half, while the 40 per cent least wealthy 
own little over 3 per cent (OECD 2015c). These 
are very striking inequalities. The IMF’s Christine 
Lagarde (Lagarde 2018) suggests that, at first glance, 
inequality does not seem to be as big a threat in 
Europe as elsewhere, thanks to strong social safety 
nets and redistribution, which she characterises as 
important achievements that have helped millions 
of people and strengthened Europe’s position 
compared to many other advanced economies. She 
also highlights that Europe’s youth may be falling 
behind now for a range of reasons.
High levels of income inequality are associated 
with a wide range of health and social problems 
across countries (Wilkinson and Pickett 2007). The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has shown that 
income inequality also matters in economic terms 
– that is, for growth and its sustainability. Income 
distribution itself impacts on growth (Dabla-Norris 
et al 2015). Specifically, if the income share of the top 
20 per cent (the rich) increases, then GDP growth 
actually declines over the medium term, suggesting 
that the benefits do not trickle down, contrary to 
what has been the received wisdom. In contrast, 
an increase in the income share of the bottom 20 
per cent (the poor) is associated with higher GDP 
growth. That report concludes that poor people 
and the middle classes matter the most for growth 
through a number of interrelated economic, social, 
and political channels.
One measure of income inequality is the GINI 
coefficient, an index ranging from 0 to 100 
where 0 represents a perfectly equal distribution 
of income and 100 represents a perfectly unequal 
distribution. See Glossary. The higher the GINI 
coefficient, the greater the income inequality. 
According to the GINI coefficient indicator, there 
was a very slight decrease between 2017 and 2018 
in average levels (as there had also been between 
2016 and 2017) within EU-28 (Eurostat ilc_di12). 
The 2018 ratio was 30.9 (it had been 30.6 in 
2017). The countries with the greatest income 
inequality (according to the GINI coefficient) in 
2018 were Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania 
and the UK. Those with the lowest included 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Czechia, Belgium and Finland. 
Luxembourg (+2.3 percentage points) followed by 
Romania and Germany (both with +2 percentage 
points) were the countries showing the greatest 
increases between 2017 and 2018. 
Another measure of income inequality is the income 
quintile share ratio or the S80/S20 ratio, which is 
a measure of the inequality of income distribution. 
It is calculated as the ratio of total income received 
by the 20 per cent of the population with the highest 
income (the top quintile) to that received by the 20 
per cent of the population with the lowest income 
(the bottom quintile). The average European S80/20 
ratio increased in recent years but only slightly and 
overall has remained relatively stable. The average 
was 5.0 in 2008 (EU-27), rising to 5.12 in 2018 and 
falling back marginally to 5.09 in 2019 (EU-28)). See 
Figure 14.
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Figure 14 Income Inequality EU-28, S80/S20, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database, code ilc_di11 Note: Rate unavailable for Croatia for 2008; the EU rate for 2008 relates to EU-27. 
6  That is, all income from work, private income from investment and property, transfers between households and all social transfers 
received in cash including old-age pensions.
7  Equivalence scales are used to calculate the equivalised household size in a household. For example, the equivalence scale used in 
Ireland attributes a weight of 1 to the first adult, 0.66 to each subsequent adult (aged 14+ ) living in the household and 0.33 to each 
child aged less than 14. The weights for each household are then summed to calculate the equivalised household size. Disposable 
household income is divided by the equivalised household size to calculate equivalised disposable income for each person, which 
essentially is an approximate measure of how much of the income can be attributed to each member of the household. This equivalised 
income is then applied to each member of the household. Eurostat uses a different equivalence scale attributing a weight of 1 to the 
However, there are substantial differences between 
countries. In 2019, while in some countries (notably 
Nordic, some Central European countries and some 
peripheral countries), the rich earned around four 
times as much as the poor or less, in Bulgaria and 
Romania the value was above 7. Between 2018 and 
2019, the greatest increases in the ratio occurred in 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Cyprus and Sweden.
The results of analysis using the GINI coefficient 
and using this indicator (S80/20) show that both 
indicators suggest a somewhat similar list of 
countries that can be considered most unequal. 
Income inequality would have been greater in all 
countries if social transfers had not been included 
(European Commission 2017). Social transfers 
reduced income inequality by less than 7 per cent 
in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Poland and Romania but by more than 25 per cent 
in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Ireland (in the 
period 2012-2015) (European Commission 2017).
2.4 Disposable Income and Financial Distress
To assess how disposable incomes compare across 
Europe and the changes over time, we look at 
disposable median net income. Disposable net 
income is the total gross disposable income6 minus 
social security contributions and income taxes 
payable by employees (Eurostat n.d.). This means 
it represents income available to individuals and 
households for spending or saving. But the living 
standards achievable by a household with a given 
disposable income depend on how many people and 
of what age live in the household and thus household 
income is ‘equivalised’ or adjusted for household 
size and composition so that the incomes of all 
households can be looked at on a comparable basis. 
The Glossary contains a definition of Household 
Disposable income and explains the Eurostat 
approach to equivalisation in more detail, which is 
used here to facilitate comparison across countries. 
National statistical agencies may take different 
approaches to equivalisation7. 
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We will look at the median income value, which 
involves dividing a population into two equal-sized 
groups: exactly 50 per cent of people fall below 
that value and 50 per cent are above it, because the 
average or mean household disposable income can 
be skewed by very high or very low incomes of a few 
having a disproportionate impact.
See Figure 15, which shows that in 2019 the highest 
levels of disposable income occurred in Luxembourg, 
Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and the 
first adult, 0.5 to each subsequent adult and 0.3 to each child – see Glossary.
Netherlands, the lowest in Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and other newer accession members. There 
is also great variation in the levels between the 
highest countries and the lowest. For example, the 
2019 figures in the top two countries, Luxembourg 
and Denmark, were just over €36,000 and €30,000, 
respectively; those in the countries with the lowest 
levels, Romania and Bulgaria, were both under 
€4,500. (This means that half of the people of these 
countries are considered to have disposable incomes 
above those amounts and half below.)
Figure 15 Median Disposable Annual Income (€): EU28, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat online database ilc_di03 (source: SILC) Note: Rate unavailable for Croatia for 2008; the EU rate for 2008 relates to 
EU-27. 
In previous reports in this series, when we looked 
at the countries where the greatest changes 
occurred between 2008 and 2013, we saw that 
by far the greatest reductions were in Ireland and 
Greece, while by far the largest increases occurred 
in Sweden followed by Belgium, Finland, Denmark 
and Austria. But even by 2019, the median level for 
Greece (-€2,605) is still lower than what it was in 
2008 (Eurostat ilc_di03). For changes between the 
latest years (2018 to 2019), see Figure 16. The vast 
majority of countries showed improvement during 
that period, with Sweden being the only country in 
which a disimprovement was observed.
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Figure 16 Change in Median Disposable Income (€), EU, 2018 to 2019
Source: Eurostat online database ilc_di03 (source: SILC).
8  The real GDHI growth for the EU is an estimation by DG EMPL, with available data from Member States. The nominal GDHI is 
converted into real GDHI by deflating with the deflator (price index) of household final consumption expenditure. The real GDHI 
growth for the EU is a weighted average of real GDHI growth in Member States 
However, nominal changes do not tell the whole 
story about income changes, as inflation also has 
a significant influence: ‘real’ means that nominal 
figures are deflated using the consumer price index. 
Accompanying the improvement in employment, 
gross disposable household income (GDHI8) in the 
EU registered a 2.3 per cent year-on-year increase 
in real terms in Q1 of 2019 (European Commission 
2019b). 
Analysis of income in the EU as a single distribution 
showed an improvement in the position of lower 
income groups and convergence among subsets of 
EU countries from 2007 to 2015. Those at the 10th 
percentile of the population (that is, the lowest) 
gained about 4 per cent in real terms, compared to 
their pre-crisis income. However, this was mostly a 
result of the rising income of some of the poorest 
in the newer accession states, while the income of 
the poorest in the southern member states of the EU 
deteriorated. When we look at the middle class (de-
fined as the income group between 75- 200 per cent 
of median national income), more than half (53 per 
cent) in the EU report a feeling of vulnerability and 
difficulty in making ends meet financially (European 
Commission 2019a). 
Incomes in cities are usually higher than those in 
rural areas (most notably in Romania and Bulgaria, 
where median income in cities is around 90 per 
cent and 60 per cent higher, respectively), but the 
likelihood of being in income poverty and severe 
material deprivation is higher in cities than in rural 
areas in most western countries of the EU (European 
Commission 2019a). 
Financial distress of households (defined as 
the need to draw on savings or to run into debt to 
cover current expenditures and based on personal 
perceptions) is still running at high levels especially 
for lower-income groups. From its historical peak of 
nearly 17 per cent recorded in early 2014 it gradually 
declined to 12.9 per cent of the overall population 
in February 2021 (European Commission 2021a). 
However, compared to February 2020, there 
are major differences across Member States and 
population groups. Reported financial distress has 
increased most for those on the lowest incomes 
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(lowest quartile) and reached 23.7 per cent, 0.2pp 
more than in February 2020. By comparison, for the 
wealthiest quartile financial distress stood at 6.2 per 
cent. Slight decreases were recorded for the second 
and third quartile of the population (between 1.4 
and 1.6 percentage points).
See Figure 17, where rates are shown for house-
hold distress across income quartiles, 2012-2021 
(latest figures for February 2021). It shows how the 
greatest distress is being experienced by the lowest 
income quartile (or lowest 25 per cent) but also by 
the second quartile (lowest 50 per cent). In February 
2021, it was recorded at 23.7 per cent for the low-
est-income quartile and at 14.9 for the second quar-
tile.
Figure 17 Household Financial Distress (%) 2012-2021: Total, and by Income Quartiles
Source: European Commission (2021a, Chart 11): European Commission, Business and Consumer Surveys, unadjusted data, 12-months 
moving average (DG EMPL calculations).
Note: Horizontal lines show the long-term averages for financial distress for the population as a whole and for households in the four 
income quartiles. The overall share of adults reporting having to draw on savings and having to run into debt are shown respectively by 
the light grey and dark grey areas, which together represent total financial distress.
2.5  Poverty, Social Exclusion and Income 
Inequality: Summary and Conclusions
The review set out in this Section shows how the 
Europe 2020 target set in 2010 of taking 20 million 
people out of risk of poverty or social exclusion is 
likely to be missed by a very wide margin when the 
statistical release for 2020 is published by Eurostat 
next year. While the risk of poverty or social 
exclusion rate has improved each year since 2012, 
the average rate still stands at 21.4 per cent in 2019 
(EU-28) (that is, more than one in 5 Europeans) 
amounting to over 107.5 million people (Eurostat 
online database code t2020_50). The picture that 
emerges in the 2018-2019 period (2019 being the 
latest year for which Eurostat has published rates as 
we prepare this report) suggests that despite recent 
improvements, there is reason for concern about 
a range of issues and the length of time that high 
levels of poverty or social exclusion have persisted is 
unacceptable in human and societal terms. Eurostat 
(2020a) highlights how some groups face a higher 
risk of poverty and social exclusion; these include 
single households, migrants and people with lower 
education as well as their children.
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In 2019, the highest rates of poverty or social 
exclusion were to be found in Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Greece where the rates were above 30 per cent. 
In 4 other countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Italy and 
Spain) the rate was over 25 per cent. The lowest rates 
were found in Czechia (12.5 per cent), followed by 
Slovenia, Finland, and Slovakia. A recent analysis 
from Eurostat indicates that despite the favourable 
decrease in the overall share of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion, the depth of hardship for 
those affected has increased slightly (between 2008 
and 2017) (Eurostat 2019a).
Even though there have been welcome improvements 
in the most recent year in some countries with 
typically high rates, there continues to be great 
divergence between countries. For example, 
there was a difference of nearly 20.3 percentage 
points between the country with the highest rate 
(Bulgaria at 32.8 per cent) and that with the lowest 
(Czechia 12.5 per cent) (Eurostat, code: t2020_50). 
Between 2018 and 2019, disimprovements in the 
poverty or social exclusion rates were observed in 
several countries including, notably, the UK (+0.8 
percentage points) and also in some countries with 
traditionally relatively low rates such as France 
(Eurostat t2020_50). The greatest improvements 
occurred in the newer accession states of Lithuania 
and Slovenia, and also in the Mediterranean in 
Greece, Italy and Malta.
Again, it is notable that those countries identified by 
the European Social Policy Network as having a well-
established approach to social investment (mainly 
Nordic and central European countries) tend to do 
well at protecting their populations from poverty 
or social exclusion relative to other countries with 
a less well developed social investment approach. 
Thus, some of the newer accession countries and 
some Mediterranean countries tend to be more 
negatively affected by poverty (as measured by the 
three indicators that are used for the Europe 2020 
strategy) than Nordic or central European countries. 
Looking at the second indicator used in the Europe 
2020 Strategy, the risk of poverty rate, a measure 
or relative income poverty, suggests that in 2019, 
16.8 per cent of the population (EU-28) was living 
at risk of poverty (over 86 million people), and that 
considerably more people were affected in 2019 
than in 2008 (in 2008 the rate was 16.6 per cent, 
affecting 80.9 million people EU-27) (Eurostat 
online database, code t2020_52). Other indicators 
showed more improvement - the average EU-28 rate 
of severe material deprivation was 5.5 per cent 
in 2019, representing approximately 27.5 million 
people, down from a rate of 5.9 per cent in 2018 (and 
representing over 29.7 million people). It is a positive 
development that there have been improvements in 
this indicator in recent years.
Children: Like other reports in this series, this 
report highlights again how ongoing high levels of 
poverty or social exclusion amongst children is one 
of the most challenging and serious issues faced by 
Europe, not least because it can affect the rest of 
one’s life and a tendency to live in poverty can be 
passed on to future generations. 
The rate of poverty or social exclusion that children 
(under 18s) experience continues to be higher than 
for the general population and about one quarter of 
children in Europe are affected. Thus, children who 
are considered to be at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion numbered nearly 22.2 million in 2018 
or 23.4 per cent (EU-28 average) (Eurostat online 
database, code ilc_peps01). Levels of severe material 
deprivation have, fortunately, improved for children 
in recent years, but there are also some reasons 
for concern, because the rates still remain at very 
much higher levels than in 2008 in some countries 
(notably, Greece and Cyprus). In short, poverty in 
all its forms still affects far too many children and 
childhood poverty remains a pressing problem 
because of its long-lasting effects on society and on 
the lives of individuals. A range of interventions are 
necessary to address this situation including access 
to affordable quality early childhood education and 
care, along with well-designed work-life balance 
policies.
Older People: Where older people are concerned 
(usually taken to mean those over 65), the European 
average rate for poverty or social exclusion was 
18.9 per cent in 2019 (representing 18.7m people). 
This was a slight increase on the 2018 rate (18.6 per 
cent) but it represents a relatively large increase in 
numbers (+766,000 people approximately). The rate 
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was higher for those aged 75+ (23.3 per cent) and 
that rate too had increased in the year (Eurostat 
online database, code ilc-peps01). Poverty or social 
exclusion affects nearly twice as many women as 
men in older age.
 The risk of poverty rate for those aged 65+ was 
16.5 per cent affecting almost 16.5 million people 
(EU-28), up from a rate of 16.1 per cent affecting 
some 15.8 million people in 2018 (Eurostat ilc_li02). 
The average severe material deprivation rate for 
this age group showed improvement during the year 
2018-2019 – falling to 4.4 per cent (representing 
approximately 4.4 million people aged 65+, EU-28) 
(Eurostat online database, code ilc_mddd11). This 
is an encouraging sign. However, many more older 
women than older men are affected by all aspects of 
poverty. These issues are significant for policy-makers 
(as well as for the individuals concerned) given that 
populations are ageing at an unprecedented rate and 
that there are many more older women than older 
men and they tend to have poorer pension provision 
(see Social Protection Committee 2020).
The situation of older people varies greatly as 
between countries, with very high levels of income 
poverty and material deprivation especially in newer 
accession countries and also in some Mediterranean 
countries.
Working Poor: In 2019, 9.2 per cent of employed 
people (aged 18+) were living under the poverty 
threshold (EU-28) and the average rate (that is, the 
in-work poverty rate) has been at similar levels since 
2014 and is still higher than it was in 2008 (Eurostat 
Online database, code ilc_iw01). Thus, in 2019 just 
over 9 per cent of employed people in the EU live in 
poverty. They amounted to an alarming 20.5 million 
people (in 2017) (Pena-Casas et al 2019). Some 
groups are particularly affected (including younger 
people, people with lower education levels, and non-
standard workers, poor households with children 
including lone parents). Limited policy attention is 
paid to this group.
When income inequality is examined there are 
concerns overall about increases over time. There 
are substantial differences between countries in 
Europe. In 2019, while in some countries (notably 
Nordic, some central European countries and some 
peripheral countries), the rich earned around four 
times as much as the poor or less, in other countries, 
notably, Bulgaria and Romania, the value was above 7.
When we examine median disposable income, 
the highest levels occur in Scandinavian, central 
and western European countries, the lowest in 
other newer accession members and there are very 
great variations in the levels. While, within the past 
year (2018-2019), median disposable income has 
increased in almost all Member States, levels for, 
especially, Greece and also Cyprus were still lower 
than they had been in 2008 (Eurostat ilc_di03). 
Financial distress (defined as the need to draw 
on savings or to run into debt to cover current 
expenditures) has gradually declined since 2014. 
However, the greatest distress is being experienced 
by the lowest income quartile (or lowest 25 per cent), 
23.7 per cent of whom were classified as being in 
financial distress in February 2021 representing a 
year-on-year increase of 0.2 per cent.
Overall, while there have been some improvements 
in the latest years (2018-2021) in several indicators 
and for key groups, Europe is still far off-track in 
relation to meeting its poverty reduction targets. 
The social indicators suggest little improvement 
for very many people living in Europe, with dis-
improvements for some groups in several countries. 
These include older people in some countries, an 
issue that particularly affects older women. Those 
working who still live in poverty is another group 
to be concerned about and this issue now affects a 
greater proportion of people than it did in 2008. The 
position of children, in particular, while improved 
somewhat continues to be strikingly negative for 
very many children with potentially very serious 
long-term consequences. Thus, a rising tide has yet 
to lift all boats.
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3 3 Employment and Unemployment
Social Justice Ireland includes the right to meaningful 
work amongst its core rights that need to guide 
policy-making in the future (see Section 1). 
3.1 Employment
The Europe 2020 strategy set a headline target that 
75 per cent of 20-64 year-olds would be employed 
by 2020. Following the 2008 crisis there were drastic 
job losses in Europe as a whole. There have been very 
significant improvements since 2013 as shown by 
Figure 18. In 2020 the average EU employment rate 
was 72.4 per cent (down from 73.9 in 2019). Prior to 
impact of the Covid crisis from 2020, employment 
in the EU increased by 17.3 million people since its 
lowest point in the first quarter of 2013 (European 
Commission 2021).
The latest data for the final quarter of 2020 indicates 
that employment across the EU remains 1.7 per 
cent below the pre-pandemic levels recorded during 
the final quarter of 2019, with a total of 3.9 million 
less people employed. Emergency job-retention 
measures have unquestionably cushioned the impact 
of the economic contraction caused by Covid-19 and 
the public health measures introduced to curb it. 
Alongside national furlough schemes, these include 
the EU’s Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks 
in an Emergency (SURE) fund which has so far (May 
2021) disbursed 89.6 billion euro to Member States 
(European Commission, 2021b). Eurostat data for 
the final quarter of 2020 suggests 8.5 million jobs 
are being supported through emergency support 
across 11 Member States (Eurostat, 2021b).
While a recovery in employment has been underway 
throughout the second half of 2020 (increasing by 0.5 
million between the third and fourth quarters), the 
outlook for job retention remains contingent on the 
future of existing supports. The pandemic has thus 
resulted in a severe shock to the labour market and 
called forth unprecedented levels of public support, 
yet it is important to note that the EU was already on 
course to miss its Europe 2020 employment target of 
75 per cent prior to the Covid crisis (Figure 18). The 
data explored in this chapter reflects the impact of 
the pandemic upon employment levels during 2020 
while also contextualising these against the backdrop 
of employment trends over the past decade.
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Figure 18 Employment in Europe (%), Ages 20-64, EU-28, 2008-2020
Source: Eurostat online database, code t2020_10
As Figure 19 shows, there are significant variations 
in the employment rates in different countries. In 
many Member States, employment rates have still 
some way to go to recover from the crisis. As was 
the case prior to the pandemic in 2019, Sweden 
continues to have the highest rate (80.8 per cent in 
2020), while Greece continues to have lowest (61.1 
per cent in 2020), a 19.7 percentage point difference 
between the two countries. Countries, especially 
in central and northern Europe, have exceeded the 
Europe 2020 strategy target of 75 per cent. Fourteen 
countries (that include Sweden, Netherlands, 
Germany, Czechia, Estonia, U.K., Denmark, Malta 
and others) have reached or exceeded the target, 
while other countries, especially in the south and 
periphery of Europe, are very far away from achieving 
it (looking at ages 20-64). The lowest employment 
rates in 2020 were found in Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Croatia. 
Some countries still have rates of employment that 
are a good deal lower than in 2008 – this is very 
notable in Greece (where the 2020 rate is still 6.8 
percentage points lower than the 2008 rate) and 
Cyprus (where the 2020 rate is still 2.2 percentage 
points lower than the 2008 rate). A 2018 report 
from Eurofound suggested that Germany and the 
UK accounted for most of the new jobs (net of jobs 
lost) created in the EU between 2008 and 2016, 
while most of the jobs lost in Greece and Spain in 
that period had not yet been recovered.
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Figure 19 Employment (%), ages 20-64, EU-28 Countries, 2008, 2019 and 2020
Source: Eurostat online database, code t2020_10. Line shows EU 2020 strategy target of 75 per cent.
Note: 2008 rate not available for France
In the final quarter of 2020 full-time employment 
decreased by 0.1 million people compared with the 
same quarter of the previous year and part-time 
employment decreased dramatically by 2.9 million 
on a yearly basis (European Commission, 2021a). 
When we look at demographic sub-groups, the EU 
employment rate varied across all population groups 
in the final quarter of 2020, increasing for those aged 
55-59 and 60-64 (by 0.4 and 0.9 percentage points) 
while shrinking for younger cohorts aged 20-24 and 
25-29 (down by 3.6 and 2.1 percentage points) when 
compared with the same quarter of the previous year 
(European Commission 2021a). The employment 
rate also decreased for people with all educational 
levels, the low-skilled (1.5 percentage points) 
compared with medium (0.5 percentage points) 
and high skilled workers (0.4 percentage points). 
This does not of course mean that there are not also 
ongoing challenges for these groups including for 
older workers, which we come back to below.
However, as we noted already, the way that the em-
ployment picture has been evolving over recent years 
prior to the shock of the pandemic is of concern and 
reflects structural changes in labour markets – es-
pecially regarding growth in temporary, part-time 
and precarious work and falling or stagnating wages. 
Constantly changing and erratic working hours have 
become a common experience for European workers 
(see Piasna 2019). According to Eurofound (2019a), 
concern is widespread that involuntary part-time 
and temporary work is making employment more 
precarious for people, and Covid has only served to 
exacerbate feelings of insecurity and vulnerability 
linked to these developments (Eurofound, 2021b). 
For example, in a review of working conditions 
between 2015 and 2018, Eurofound (2019a) found 
that the proportion of full-time permanent jobs is 
slowly diminishing, down from 59.5 per cent of all 
jobs in 2009 to 58.2 per cent in 2016. One-fifth 
of the EU labour force works part-time, and three-
quarters of these are women (Eurofound 2019a). It 
is notable that around a quarter of those working 
part-time want to work full-time (Eurofound 2019a). 
The reason they most commonly give for working 
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part-time is that they can’t find a full-time job. And 
this group is concentrated in the lower-paid, lower-
skilled end of the economy. Over half of involuntary 
part-timers (57 per cent) work in lower service 
occupations, such as sales and customer service 
work. Managers, on the other hand, are much less 
likely to be working part-time involuntarily.
Like part-time, temporary employment has been 
increasing in the EU over decades (although the 
rate dipped during the crisis as many employers cut 
costs by not renewing fixed-term contracts). With 
the recovery, growth in temporary employment 
resumed, rising from 10.9 per cent of all employment 
in 2014 to 11.2 per cent in 2018 (among 20–64-year-
olds) (Eurofound 2019a). Temporary employees are 
generally paid less than their permanent counterparts 
in the same company, and their prospects for career 
advancement, including opportunities for training, 
are poorer (Eurofound 2019a). Even their working 
time arrangements and the flexibility to manage 
these arrangements are worse and that is not to 
mention broader impacts that include financial 
insecurity, lack of access to loans and, as a result, 
fewer housing options. 
Younger people are often employed temporarily - 
in 2018, 43.5 per cent of employees aged 15 to 24 
had a temporary contract; and this situation did 
not always lead to permanent jobs as only around a 
quarter of workers with temporary contracts moved 
to a permanent contract over two consecutive years 
(in 2017) (Eurofound 2019a). 
Little growth in real wages (after 2013 when 
recovery was first noted) raised doubts about 
the strength of the recovery in income levels for 
significant segments of the workforce and for the 
population at large (Eurofound 2019a). Eurofound’s 
analysis suggests that in 2015 In Denmark, Ireland, 
France, Italy and Finland wage growth was moderate 
(1–3.6 per cent), mostly due to larger wage increases 
among the highest-paid employees than in other pay 
quintiles. Wages grew most strongly, by 4–12 per 
cent, in much of eastern Europe and was greatest 
among the lowest-paid employees (quintile 1), in 
the Baltic states, Czechia, Poland and Romania. On 
the other hand, in Bulgaria, especially, and Hungary, 
wages grew more among the highest-paid employees 
(quintile 5). Germany makes an interesting case as 
real wages grew significantly (3.5 per cent), but in its 
case, wages increased disproportionately among the 
lowest-paid employees as a result of the introduction 
of a minimum wage in 2015, a major policy decision 
aimed at fighting the rising numbers of employees 
not covered by wage floors and the growth of low-
paid work in the country (Eurofound 2019a). 
Eurofound notes that this beneficial effect of the 
minimum wage policy seems to have come with no 
significant impact on employment.
These wider employment trends form a central part 
of the context in which the Covid crisis has come 
to impact European labour markets. For example, 
self-reported data for 2020 published by Eurofound 
(2021) indicates that 37 per cent of respondents 
reported their working hours had decreased during 
the pandemic, with those in areas such as commerce 
and hospitality and construction – both sectors 
with above-average pre-pandemic levels of contract 
insecurity – reporting increases of over 50 per cent. 
(Eurofound, 2021c; Employment and Social Affairs 
Committee, 2016). What is estimated to be an overall 
decline of 14-15 per cent of hours worked in the EU 
between 2019 and 2020 has thus effected those in 
standard employment (i.e. permanent full-time jobs) 
to a disproportionately lesser extent than workers in 
less secure employment, particularly those on short-
term or ‘zero hours’ contracts. This picture is strongly 
reflected in the fact that the decline of 16.7 per cent 
in fixed-term (i.e. non-permanent jobs) in the EU 
between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020 
accounted for three-quarters of the overall decline 
in EU employment (Eurofound, 2021c). To date, the 
relative stabilisation of employment levels across the 
EU has only been made possible through extensive 
emergency employment protection measures.
Another significant long term trend which has 
come to shape the pandemic’s impact relates to 
the geographical distribution of EU employment, 
particularly in regional terms. A study of nine 
countries published by Eurofound and the European 
Commission (2019) indicates that population and 
employment growth have been much stronger in the 
capital city regions of all nine than in the other types 
of regions of the same country. Between 2002 and 
2017, employment grew by 19 per cent in capital 
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city regions compared to 10–12 per cent elsewhere. 
The study also draws links between interregional 
inequality and disenchantment with existing 
political systems and social bonds. Although research 
into the complex relationship between the pandemic 
and regional economic structures is still ongoing, 
preliminary estimates published by the European 
Commission (2020c) and the European Parliament’s 
Committee of the Regions (2020) suggests that 
these vulnerabilities have fed into the differential 
regional impact of lockdowns. In particular, this has 
effected those on the southern and south-eastern 
European periphery in regions with above-average 
levels of unemployment and underemployment with 
a traditionally high dependence upon tourism.
Taking a step back for a moment, despite very 
welcome improvements in employment in the 
EU, there are significant challenges ahead that 
require policy responses. On the positive side, it is 
interesting that projections of the impacts of a full 
implementation of the Paris agreement – if that 
were to happen – show that the transition to a low-
carbon economy could raise GDP and employment 
– amounting to an additional 1.2 million jobs in the 
EU by 2030, mostly in growing green(ing) sectors, 
which would be largely due to investment for 
transition (European Commission 2019a). These 
impacts, however, would vary a lot between sectors 
and countries. On the other hand, the EU Social 
Protection Committee (2020) notes that particularly 
in the context of an uneven post-pandemic recovery, 
new forms of employment, and associated gaps 
in access to social protection and lower incomes 
may put a growing number of people at higher 
risk of poverty and social exclusion. This in turn, 
potentially building on pandemic-era emergency 
measures to support employment, may require that 
social protection systems ensure access to adequate 
protection for all persons in employment, including 
various types of self-employment and non-standard 
working.
In its latest employment review the OECD (2020a) 
explores the ongoing impact of the pandemic on 
labour markets in addition to larger trends such 
as climate change and the slowdown of the global 
economy. These factors include:
• Automation – 14 per cent of existing jobs 
could disappear as a result of automation 
in 15-20 years, and another 32 per cent are 
likely to change radically. 
• Inequalities - Many people and communities 
have been left behind by globalisation and 
a digital divide persists in access to new 
technologies resulting in inequalities along 
age, gender, and socio-economic lines. 
• Precarity - Many are stuck in precarious 
working arrangements with little pay and 
limited or no access to social protection, 
lifelong learning and collective bargaining. 
The OECD suggests that, in addition to a focus 
upskilling and lifelong learning (or adult learning), 
reshaping social protection provisions in a post-
pandemic world must ensure better coverage of 
workers in non-standard forms of employment 
(OECD 2020b). They also argue for a greater focus 
on collective bargaining and social dialogue, both of 
which can complement government efforts to make 
labour markets more adaptable, secure and inclusive. 
3.2 Unemployment
Previous reports in this series detail the rise in 
unemployment following the 2008 crisis. The total 
unemployment rate for EU-28 in 2008 was 7 per 
cent, a rate that increased to 10.9 per cent by 2013 
(annual average, proportion of active population) 
(Eurostat code une_rt_a). There were great 
differences between the rates in different member 
states.
In 2020, the annual unemployment rate (EU-27) was 
7 per cent, up from 6.7 per cent in 2019 (Eurostat 
une_rt_a). The unemployed represented some 14.9 
million people (EU-27), still marginally higher than 
the number of unemployed people in 2008, although 
the number had greatly reduced on the 2013 figure, 
when unemployment reached its peak (Eurostat 
une_rt_a).
Figure 20 illustrates the very great divergence 
between countries both in terms of the rate of 
unemployment and in the degree of change between 
2008 and 2020. The countries with the highest rates 
in 2020 were Greece (16.3 per cent), Spain (15.5 per 
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cent), and Italy (9.2). Those with the lowest rates 
were Czechia, Poland, and the Netherlands (all with 
rates under 4 per cent).
We can also see from Figure 20 how in some 
countries (notably in Greece, but also in Cyprus 
Spain and Italy and others), unemployment levels 
remain very much higher than pre-crisis. In others 
(in Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and others) 
rates are better now than they were in 2008.
Figure 20 Unemployment (% active population), EU-28, 2008, 2019 and 2020
Source: Eurostat online database une_rt_a
As we prepare this report in 2021, the trend for 
unemployment to improve continues – with a rate of 
7.3 per cent reached in April 2021. Unemployment 
in the EU has receded by 8.8 million people since its 
peak in April 2013; in April 2021, there were 15.4 
million unemployed in the EU, about 1.4 million 
fewer than in the same month of the previous year 
(Eurostat, une_rt_m). Compared with a year ago, 
the largest reduction was registered in Bulgaria (-1.2 
percentage points).
It has been estimated that those who are unemployed, 
those who are involuntary part-time workers, and 
those who are inactive but willing to work represent 
somewhat over 40 million people (Eurofound 2018 – 
discussing 2017). There are supplementary indicators 
used to monitor the evolution of underemployment: 
‘available but not seeking,’ ‘underemployment’, and 
‘seeking but not available for work’ (measured as a 
percentage of the active population). Two of these 
indicators show recent improvements (European 
Commission 2019a;2019b). The proportion of 
workers in the EU who are ‘Available to work but not 
seeking’ (which includes the so-called category of 
‘discouraged’) stood at 3.6 per cent of the labour force 
in the final quarter of 2020 (European Commission, 
2021a). This rate decreased by 0.9 percentage points 
compared to the same quarter of the previous year. 
‘Underemployment’ (the proportion of those who 
would like to work additional hours and are available 
to do so) remained stable on the final quarter of 2019 
at 2.9 per cent of the labour force. But the rate of 
those ‘Seeking but not available for work’ continues 
to be at 0.8 per cent of the labour force. 
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In previous reports in this series we reported on how 
the long-term unemployment rate (unemployment 
for 12 months or more) had doubled between 
2008 and 2014 at EU level (that is, long-term 
unemployment as a percentage of the total number 
of active persons in the labour market). Fortunately, 
the long-term unemployment rate is now falling– 
although it is slow to improve and remains close 
to the pre-crisis rate of 2.6 per cent, and rates also 
remain higher than before the crisis in 13 Member 
States (Eurofound 2019a). 
While the rate remained stable in the year up to the 
final quarter of 2020 (at 2.7 per cent), long-term 
unemployment still affected about 5.8 million people 
(somewhat lower than the numbers affected in Q1, 
2008 - 6.1 million referring to the EU27) (Eurostat 
online database une_ltu_q; data not seasonally 
adjusted). Similarly, those unemployed for 2 years 
or more represented over 3.2 million people (Q4, 
2020), which is again lower than the 2008 figure 
(3.9 million, Q1, 2008) (Eurostat online database 
une_ltu_q). 
That unemployment continues to be an issue 
can be seen in how the proportions of Europe’s 
unemployed people that are long-term unemployed 
continue to be high. This can be seen from what is 
called the share of unemployment that is constituted 
by long-term unemployment (that is, long-term 
unemployment -12 months or more- as a percentage 
of total unemployment). The share of long-term 
unemployed as a percentage of total unemployment 
declined in 2020, but is still high (37.6 per cent, Q4, 
2020, compared to 41.2 per cent in Q4 2019, EU-
27) (Eurostat online database lfsq_upgal). In 2008 
it lay within this range at 38.8 per cent (Q1). Thus, 
long-term unemployment continues to be a concern 
with implications in human and social terms and 
with financial costs and possible impacts on social 
cohesion. 
Greece, Italy and Bulgaria had the highest shares of 
long-term unemployment in quarter 4, 2020. The 
share was particularly striking for Greece (66.4 per 
cent) and, not only had it increased for the previous 
two quarters, but it is also considerably higher than 
it was in 2008 in Greece (45.9 per cent, Q1, 2008) 
(Eurostat online database, code lfsq_upgal). The 
lowest ratios were found in Sweden (14.5 per cent) 
followed by Denmark and Finland. Thus, some 
countries have higher transition rates from long-
term unemployment back to employment than 
others. 
There are groups that do relatively less well in the 
labour market. Amongst them are disabled people – 
for instance, in 2016 about 48.1 per cent of people 
with disabilities were employed in the EU compared 
with 73.9 per cent of people without disabilities 
(European Commission 2019a). The employment 
rate of non-EU nationals (aged 20 to 64) was 14.8 
percentage points lower than the overall rate in 2017 
(Eurostat 2018a).
Both older and younger workers experience lower 
employment rates than other age groups (Eurostat 
2018a). While the employment rate for older workers 
(age 55-64) has been increasing over time – they are 
still the age group with the lowest employment rate 
(57.1 per cent as compared with 80.6 per cent for 
those aged 30-54 in 2017) (Eurostat 2018a, Figure 
1.4). As already mentioned, in the final quarter 
of 2020 the EU employment rate increased for all 
population groups, and most noticeably for people 
aged 60-64 (0.9pp) (compared with the same quarter 
of the previous year) (European Commission, 
2021a). But becoming unemployed at an older 
age means being more likely to remain so and to 
experience long-term unemployment (International 
Labour Organization, 2018). A large proportion of 
older workers feel that it would be difficult to find 
a job with a similar salary if they lost their current 
job – 57 per cent aged over 55 think it would be 
difficult, while just 30 per cent of workers under the 
age of 35 feel the same, a finding that underpins the 
argument for increased training opportunities for 
older workers (Eurofound 2019a). 
We turn next to the situation of young people who 
remain one of the most vulnerable groups in the 
labour market. 
3.3 Youth Unemployment
In previous reports in this series, we reported on the 
great dis-improvement in the youth unemployment 
position following 2008. The degree of change seen 
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between different countries was striking and this is 
the backdrop against which recent improvements 
must be seen. By 2013, the average EU-28 rate of 
youth unemployment (refers to those under 25) 
reached 23.8 per cent or some 5.6m people (of the 
active population (Eurostat online database une_
rt_a). In 2020, the average EU-27 rate increased to 
16.8 per cent from a pre-pandemic level of 15.0 per 
cent in 2019) (as a percentage of active population) 
(Eurostat online database une_rt_a). The 2020 rate 
is thus now 0.8 percentage points higher than the 
pre-crisis level in 2008. 
Figure 21 shows, that there is great variation in the 
rates of youth unemployment across Europe and 
there were very great variations in the rate of its 
increase after 2008. The rates (2020) were highest in 
Spain (38.3 per cent), Greece (35 per cent), and Italy 
(29.4 per cent) (Eurostat online database une_rt_a). 
By contrast, at the other end of the scale, the 2020 
rate in Germany was 7.4 per cent and it was less than 
10 per cent in two other countries (Czechia and the 
Netherlands). 
Figure 21 Youth Unemployment (% of active population), EU-28, 2008, 2019 and 2020
Source: Eurostat online database une_rt_a. Youth unemployment refers to those under 25 years.
In April 2021, youth unemployment stood at 17.1 
per cent in the EU-27, 1.1 percentage points higher 
than in the same month of the previous year and 
1.8 per cent higher than prior to the pandemic in 
April 2019. (Eurostat, une_rt_m). This represents 
211,000 more unemployed people aged 15-24 over 
the past 12 months. In 2020 Spain was the country 
with the highest level of youth unemployment (38.3 
per cent) followed by Greece (35.0 per cent) and Italy 
(29.4 per cent). A year-on-year increase was recorded 
in every EU Member State other than Greece, with 
the highest occurring in Lithuania (7.7pp), Estonia 
(6.8pp) and Luxembourg (6.2pp). (Eurostat, une_
rt_a).
In a report into long-term unemployment amongst 
young people, Eurofound (2017b) notes that the 
young people concerned are difficult to reach and 
often lack education and work experience, and that 
they are also more likely to face additional challenges 
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such as care responsibilities, poor health and lower 
levels of well-being than their peers. Eurofound 
suggests that they are not always in a position to 
take advantage of the economic improvements. 
A related area of concern involves young people 
who are neither in education nor employment 
(known as NEETS). There are many reasons why 
the NEET rate is one of the most concerning 
indicators relative to young people – it indicates 
detachment and discouragement in relation to both 
work and education. It includes young people who 
are conventionally unemployed as well as other 
vulnerable groups such as young disabled people and 
young carers (Eurofound 2016). Low educational 
attainment is one of the key determinants of young 
people entering the NEET category with other 
important factors including having a disability 
or coming from a migrant background (Eurostat 
2018a). Young people with lower education levels 
face a three times greater risk than those with 
tertiary education (European Commission 2017). 
Serious concerns have also been flagged about the so 
called ‘missing’ NEETS – young people who have a 
low level of education, have no work experience and 
are not registered with public employment services, 
and are therefore very difficult to reach and at risk of 
becoming deeply alienated (Eurofound 2016). 
The EU-27 average NEET rate (ages 15-24) was 11.1 
per cent in 2020, which was higher than in 2019 
(10.1 per cent), but down from a high of 13.2 per 
cent in 2012 (Eurostat edat_lfse_20). Looking back 
to 2008, the 2020 rate was only marginally higher 
(10.9 per cent, 2008) (Eurostat edat_lfse_20). The 
2020 NEET rate (ages 15-24) was highest in Italy 
at 19.0 per cent followed by Romania (14.8 per 
cent), Cyprus and Bulgaria (both 14.4 per cent). This 
means that in Italy, for example, almost one in 5 
young people is in this situation.
At the other end of the scale, the countries with the 
lowest rates were the Netherlands (4.5 per cent), 
Sweden and Czechia. While a slight decrease in the 
NEETs rate was recorded in between 2019 and 2020 
in Latvia (-0.8 pp), Denmark (-0.3 pp) and Belgium 
(-0.1 pp), there were increases in every other EU-27 
Member State.
Furthermore, when we look at the NEETs rate for 
slightly older age groups the picture is even more 
concerning. The EU-27 average NEETs rate for those 
aged 20-24, in 2020 was 15.7 per cent (greater than 
the 2008 rate of 15 per cent) (EU-28) (Eurostat 
edat_lfse_20). Looking at an even older group (ages 
20-34), the 2018 rate was even higher - 17.6 per cent 
(an increase in the 2008 level of 16.6 per cent). The 
fact that the rate is high, and is remaining relatively 
high, for these ‘older’ NEETs is a trend that should 
be of concern.
Overall, while there have been welcome improve-
ments in youth unemployment within recent years, 
the situation of young people is still difficult espe-
cially for some groups and in some countries. As the 
OECD (2019a) notes (relative to its member coun-
tries, which are broader than the EU), some groups 
are already falling behind and labour market dispar-
ities are increasing in many countries and this has 
been especially marked for many young people and, 
particularly, the low-skilled. They state:
They face an increased risk of low-paid employ-
ment when in work, and have experienced a rise 
in underemployment. Their risk of being neither 
in employment nor in education or training has 
also risen or remains high. Many of these chang-
es appear structural and go beyond the effects of 
the recent crisis. And they may well exacerbate al-
ready high levels of labour market inequality, fos-
tering further social and economic tensions. They 
also indicate that existing policies and institutions 
have been inadequate and need to be overhauled 
(OECD 2019a).
As elsewhere, the impact of the pandemic has only 
served to accentuate these trends. This is particularly 
the case given that while young people will come to 
shoulder much of the long-term burden created by 
the current crisis, their well-being is also likely to be 
‘superseded’ by measures intended to curb Covid’s 
impact in the short term. (OECD, 2020c).
3.4 Employment - Summary and Conclusions
From the vantage point of the ongoing public health 
crisis, the positive impact of emergency employment 
support measures has served to mitigate the effects 
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of what the European Commission has described 
as ‘an economic shock without precedent since the 
Great Depression’ (European Commission, 2020b). 
As vaccine rollout continues with 52.4 per cent 
of over-18 years olds having received at least one 
dose across the EU/EEA as of June 2021 (European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2021), 
the European Commission’s latest Winter economic 
forecast (2021c) projects that EU GDP will grow 
strongly in the second half of 2021 and in 2022. In 
this context, the progress of vaccination, easing of 
lockdown measures, and an improved global outlook 
have all been touted as factors which are ‘expected to 
foster the recovery’. (European Commission, 2021a). 
While the gradual recovery evident throughout the 
third and fourth quarters of 2020 is to be welcomed, 
a return to the pre-pandemic patterns of rising 
employment levels, declining unemployment and a 
reduction in involuntary part-time employment will 
also create an opening to address some of the longer 
term challenges outlined in this chapter. The impact 
of the pandemic on Europe’s society and economy 
has been profound, laying bare and accentuating 
structural disadvantages, vulnerabilities and 
inequalities in the labour market. It is thus vital that 
the path to recovery involves utilising positive economic 
momentum to deliver on new and more effective 
rights given many ongoing challenges and macro-level 
developments (such as automation, increasing precarity).
This is particularly true in light of the fact that 
even prior to the impact of the Covid, the EU was 
not on track to attain the Europe 2020 strategy 
employment target of 75 per cent by 2020. As we 
have seen throughout this chapter, there remains 
significant variations in the employment rates 
across different countries. Countries, especially in 
central and northern Europe, have exceeded the 
Europe 2020 strategy target, while other countries, 
especially in the south and periphery, are very far 
away from achieving it. The lowest employment 
rates in 2020 were found in Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Croatia (looking at ages 20-64). Some countries still 
have rates of employment that are a good deal lower 
than in 2008 – this is very notable in Greece and 
Cyprus.
However, there are concerns about the way that 
the employment picture is evolving in recent years 
– especially regarding growth in temporary, part-
time and precarious work and falling or stagnating 
wages. In relation to stagnating wages, Eurofound 
(2019a) draws attention to the case of Germany, 
where real wages grew significantly among the 
lowest-paid employees as a result of the introduction 
of a minimum wage in 2015 – in contrast to other 
countries where wage gains have been concentrated 
amongst higher earners.
Another issue is that employment recovery is not 
reaching all regions equally, as employment growth 
has been much stronger in the capital city regions of 
countries (Eurofound and the European Commission 
2019).
In 2020, the annual unemployment rate (EU-27) 
was 7 per cent (representing 14.9 million people) 
(Eurostat une_rt_a). The numbers concerned 
were still marginally higher than the number of 
unemployed people in 2008 (Eurostat une_rt_a). The 
countries with the highest rates in 2020 were Greece 
(16.3 per cent), Spain (15.5 per cent), and Italy (9.2). 
During the first quarter of 2021, the situation has 
continued to stabilise from the initial shock of early 
and mid-2020, with 15.4 million unemployed in 
the EU in April 2021, about 1.4 million fewer than 
in the same month of the previous year (European 
Commission 2021a).
Fortunately, the long-term unemployment rate is 
continuing to fall in the final quarter of 2020 (to 
2.7 per cent), but it still affected about 5.8 million 
people (Eurostat online database une_ltu_q; data 
not seasonally adjusted). Those unemployed for 2 
years or more represented over 3.2 million people 
(Q4, 2020). The share of long-term unemployed as 
a percentage of total unemployment declined over 
2020, and in the final quarter of that year stood 
at 37.6 per cent down from 41.2 per cent over the 
final quarter of 2019. (Eurostat online database 
lfsq_upgal). In 2008 it lay between these values at 
38.8 per cent (Q1). Thus, long-term unemployment 
continues to be a concern with implications in 
human and social terms and with financial costs and 
possible impacts on social cohesion. Greece, Italy 
and Bulgaria, had the highest shares of long-term 
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unemployment in final quarter of 2020. The lowest 
ratios were found in Finland followed by Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland.
Both older and younger workers experience lower 
employment rates than other age groups (Eurostat 
2018a). Becoming unemployed at an older age means 
being more likely to remain so and to experience 
long-term unemployment (International Labour 
Organization, 2018).
Focusing on youth unemployment (those under 
25), in 2020, the average EU-28 rate decreased to 
15.2 per cent, representing 3.4 million people (as 
a percentage of active population) (Eurostat online 
database une_rt_a). In 2020, youth unemployment 
stood at 16.8 per cent in the EU-27, 1.8 percentage 
points higher than in 2019 (European Commission 
2021a). Spain is currently the country with the 
highest youth unemployment rate (38.3 per cent), 
followed by Greece (35 per cent) and Italy (29.4 per 
cent).
A related area of concern involves young people who 
are neither in education nor employment (known 
as NEETS). Low educational attainment is one of 
the key determinants of young people entering 
the NEET category with other important factors 
including having a disability or coming from a 
migrant background (Eurostat 2018a). The EU-27 
average NEET rate (ages 15-24) was 11.1 per cent in 
2020, 1 per centage point higher than the 2019 rate 
(Eurostat edat_lfse_20). The 2020 rate was also only 
marginally higher than the 2008 rate of 10.9 per 
cent (Eurostat edat_lfse_20). The 2020 NEET rate 
(ages 15-24) was highest in Italy where almost one 
in 5 young people is in this situation. Furthermore, 
when we look at the NEETs rate for slightly older age 
groups the picture is even more concerning. 
Overall, while there have been welcome improve-
ments in youth unemployment within recent years, 
the pandemic has markedly worsened the position 
of the young in labour markets in the short run and 
is likely to aggravate existing trends affecting certain 
groups.
It is interesting to note that the OECD has recently 
argued for a focus on well-being, lifelong learning 
(or adult learning) and reshaping social protection 
provisions to ensure better coverage of workers in 
non-standard forms of employment as well as greater 
social dialogue to form an enduring post-pandemic 
recovery (OECD, 2009a; 2020f). Overall, despite 
very welcome improvements in employment in the 
EU prior to spring 2020, there remain significant 
ongoing issues and challenges ahead that require 
policy responses in the aftermath of the current 
public health crisis. The relative improvements 
of recent years and current momentum toward 
rebuilding a more resilient post-pandemic economy 
should lead to action to address the problems that 
still exist and to anticipate future challenges. 
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4 4 Key  Services 
Amongst the core rights that need to guide 
policy-making in the future identified by Social 
Justice Ireland (See Table 2 in Section 1, above) 
are the right to appropriate accommodation, to 
relevant education, to essential healthcare, and 
to real participation. At least three functions of 
welfare systems are recognised: social investment 
(through education, for example), social protection 
(providing safeguards across the life-cycle) and 
stabilization of the economy (by cushioning shocks 
when unemployment increases). As well as income 
support, access to enabling services (such as early 
childhood education and care, education and 
training, transport, housing, job assistance, health 
care and long-term care) also play an essential role 
in reducing depth of poverty and supporting people 
to improve their living conditions and employment 
prospects (Social Protection Committee 2015). It is 
interesting that a recent Eurofound report (2019c) 
found that perceived quality of public services is a 
key driver for higher trust in institutions.
In this Section, we look at two of these vital supports 
– education and health. Access to both is now listed 
amongst the European Pillar of Social Rights.
3.1 Education
As mentioned in Section 1, Social Justice Ireland 
includes the right to relevant education amongst its 
core rights that need to guide policy-making in the 
future. The Europe 2020 Strategy sets the following 
targets in the field of education –
• Reducing early school leaving rate to below 10 per 
cent, and 
• Completion of third level education by at least 40 
per cent of 30-34 year-olds.
In this section we will look at progress towards 
achieving these targets along with the situation in 
relation to lifelong learning and adult literacy. It is 
worth noting that Sustainable Development Goal 
4, ‘Quality Education’, the European Union seeks 
to ensure access to equitable and quality education 
through all stages of life, aim to increase the number 
of people with relevant skills for employment, 
decent jobs and entrepreneurship and envisage 
the elimination of gender and income disparities 
in access to education (Eurostat 2017). The 
achievement of universal literacy and numeracy and 
the acquisition of knowledge and skills to promote 
sustainable development are also considered crucial 
for empowering people to live independent, healthy 
and sustainable lives. The European Pillar of Social 
Rights (principle 1) states that:
Everyone has the right to quality and inclusive 
education, training and life-long learning in 
order to maintain and acquire skills that enable 
them to participate fully in society and manage 
successfully transitions in the labour market
Early School-Leaving
Reducing early school-leaving is seen as a ‘gateway’ 
to achieving other Europe 2020 Strategy targets. 
For example, in other parts of this report, we have 
pointed to how lower levels of education leaves people 
at greater risk of a range of negative outcomes – such 
as unemployment or experiencing neither education 
nor training (or becoming a so-called ‘NEET). Early 
leavers from education and training are defined as 
those aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary 
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education and who were not in further education 
or training during the last four weeks preceding the 
survey9.
The average early school leaving rate across Europe 
in 2020 was 9.9 per cent. The 2020 rate was down 
marginally from the 2019 level of 10.2 per cent. 
While it has fallen significantly from 2008, when it 
was 14.7 per cent, it has not decreased to any extent 
in the most recent years (Eurostat online database, 
t2020_40). Thus, while the average rate is now just 
marginally below the <10 per cent target set in the 
Europe 2020 strategy, improvement rates have, 
unfortunately, levelled off. As a report from Eurostat 
(2020a) states, a renewed effort will be needed to 
meet the target by 2020. See Figure 22.
There are wide disparities between European 
countries when it comes to the rate of early school 
leaving. In 2020 the highest rates of early school 
leaving were to be found in Malta (16.7 per cent), 
Spain (16 per cent), Romania (15.6 per cent) and 
Italy (13.1 per cent). There is still a very great gap 
between the countries with the highest rates (Malta, 
Spain and Romania), and that with the lowest rate, 
Croatia (with a rate of 2.2 per cent).
Comparing 2020 with 2019, the greatest improve-
ments have occurred in Estonia (-2.3 percentage 
points), Portugal (-1.7 percentage points) and Lat-
via (-1.5 percentage points). There have been disim-
provements in other countries, including some with 
traditionally relatively low rates such as Cyprus (+2.3 
percentage points) and Lithuania (+1.6 percentage 
points).
When we look back to 2008, there have been 
particularly notable decreases in the rate in countries 
with relatively very high levels such as Portugal (-26) 
and Spain (-15.7) and also in Malta and Greece (that 
is, 2008 to 2020).
9  Lower secondary education refers to ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) 2011 level 0-2 for data 
from 2014 onwards and to ISCED 1997 level 0-3C short for data up to 2013. The indicator is based on the EU Labour 
Force Survey (Eurostat online database t2020_40)
10  This relates to 2016 and (for statistical reasons based on which surveys the rates are derived from) the comparable 
rate for non-disabled young people is 12 per cent, which is different to that derived from the EU ELS – the different 
rates come from SILC and are used in the report cited here so as to be able to compare with early school leavers with 
disabilities (See European Commission 2019a).
Improvements in the rate of early school leaving are 
welcome. However, because its consequences for 
individuals and for society are so grave in terms of 
increased risk of unemployment, poverty and social 
exclusion (European Commission 2013), it is an 
issue that requires ongoing attention from policy-
makers. For instance, about two-thirds of children 
of parents with at most lower secondary education 
were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2018 
(Eurostat 2020a) and 55.7 per cent of 18 to 24-year-
old early leavers from education and training were 
either unemployed or inactive (in 2017) (Eurostat 
2018a).
Furthermore, some groups such as disabled people 
are particularly vulnerable - the proportion of early 
school leavers among young disabled people is 23.6 
per cent, which is much higher than the rate for non-
disabled younger people (European Commission 
2019a)10. Across the EU, rates of early leaving from 
education and training are generally higher for 
people who live in a country different from the one 
they were born in (Eurostat 2020a).
One survey of social justice in Europe suggests that 
to minimize the negative influence of socioeconomic 
background on educational outcomes, it is import-
ant that socially weaker families receive targeted 
support allowing them to invest in good education 
(for instance through minimising fees for preschools 
and whole-day schools) (Schraad-Tischler et al. 
2017). That report highlights how the Nordic states, 
in particular, stand out with regard to policy strat-
egies that support young people and families with 
exemplary preschool, whole-day school and flexible 
parental-leave offerings and suggests that their suc-
cessful approach to combining parenting and work-
ing life thus offers a model for reform in other coun-
tries.
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Figure 22 Early School-Leaving (%), EU-28, 2008, 2019 and 2020
Source: Eurostat online database, t2020_40. Line shows the <10 per cent target set in the Europe 2020 strategy
Completion of Third Level Education
When it comes to third-level education, the target set 
in the Europe 2020 strategy was for completion of 
third level education by at least 40 per cent of 30-34 
year-olds by 2020. In 2020, the EU-27 average was 
41 per cent so the target has been reached. This is an 
area showing large improvements since 2008 when 
the rate had been 31.1 per cent (Eurostat online 
database code t2020_41). Many countries exceed 
the target, as Figure 23 shows, with Luxembourg, 
Cyprus, Lithuania, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden at the top of the league (all with rates at 
or over 50 per cent), and Romania (26.4 per cent), 
Italy (27.8) and Hungary (33.2) at the bottom. 
There is nearly a 38 percentage point gap between 
the country with the highest rate (Luxembourg) and 
that with the lowest (Romania) (2020).
The average rate slightly improved between 2019 and 
2020 (+0.7 percentage points). In six countries there 
was a disimprovement in the rate, amongst which 
were Estonia (-1.9 percentage points), Austria (-0.8 
percentage points), Slovakia (-0.4 percentage points) 
and Hungary (-0.2 percentage points). But the rate 
improved in most other countries, with the greatest 
improvements (more than 3 percentage points) oc-
curring in Portugal (+3.4 percentage points), Latvia 
and Luxembourg. 
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Figure 23 Tertiary Education Attainment (%), EU28, (ages 30-34) 2008, 2019 and 2020
Source: Eurostat online database code t2020_41. Line shows the 40 per cent target set in the Europe 2020 strategy
11  The OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a triennial international survey which aims 
to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. See http://www.
oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/. 
In previous reports we have made the point that 
progress not only needs to continue to be made 
to address the Europe 2020 strategy targets in 
education, but also to manage problems that have 
emerged/worsened since 2008. For example, the 
results of the 2015 PISA11 tests in maths, reading 
and science created alarm about the level of 
competence of 15-year-old Europeans (European 
Commission 2018a). In all three (maths, reading and 
science), one in five pupils is a low achiever (2015). 
This was a step backwards compared to 2012 and 
the EU as a whole is seriously lagging behind in all 
three domains when it comes to progress towards 
the ET 2020 benchmark of less than 15 per cent of 
15 year olds being low achievers (low achievers are 
students who have failed to reach level 2 of the PISA 
test) (Eurostat 2018a). The latest round of results 
for 2018 round has a special focus on reading and 
show improvements for several EU countries, but 
the global trend shows Asian school systems such 
as China and Singapore getting the best results. 
Estonia, Finland Ireland, Poland and Sweden are the 
highest achieving European countries (OECD 2021). 
As the Commission notes (2020a), there is strong 
evidence that low achievers at the age of 15 will 
remain low achievers as adults, because the lack 
of basic skills strongly reduces the likelihood of 
a person achieving a satisfactory labour market 
outcome. The poor PISA scores were linked to 
social background, measured by parents’ education 
attainment level – having parents with only low-level 
education reduces students’ chances of achieving 
high scores in PISA and attaining high skill levels 
during adulthood (European Commission 2020a). 
As the European Commission notes, in some 
countries, the relatively tight connection between 
parental background and a person’s achievement 
means that the educational system is unable to 
ensure equality of opportunity. Along with lifelong 
learning, promoting early childhood education for 
all can be effective in establishing a level playing field 
that reduces inequalities at an early stage in the life 
and work cycle (European Commission 2020a).
A related issue is the cohort of young people nei-
ther in education nor employment – or NEETs, as 
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discussed in Section 3 of this report. As mentioned 
there, this is considered one of the most concerning 
indicators relative to young people. A review from 
Eurofound concerned with NEETs identified educa-
tion as playing a key role in keeping people out of 
this category, as the probability of becoming NEET 
decreased as educational level increased (Eurofound 
2016). 
Among the factors that the OECD points to in 
terms of integrating young people into the world 
of work are education systems that are flexible 
and responsive to the needs of the labour market, 
access to high-quality career guidance and further 
education that can help young people to match 
their skills to prospective jobs (OECD 2015). Most 
recently, this has been stressed again by the OECD 
in the context of ’ building back better’ following 
the post-pandemic recovery, including the provision 
of ‘targeted policies and services’ for the most 
vulnerable youth populations such as NEETs (OECD 
2020c).
Lifelong Learning
Lifelong learning can play many important roles in 
the life of an individual, not least offering a second 
chance for people who may not have had good 
experiences in school first time around. In economic 
terms it is recognised that countries need to invest 
not just in initial education and training systems 
but also in lifelong learning to ensure that skills are 
used, maintained and updated. This is obviously of 
particular importance in ageing societies, not just 
in human terms, but also because there is more 
and more emphasis on extending working lives. 
Furthermore, reviewing the very great difficulties 
that some young people have in transitioning from 
school to work, the OECD notes how many leave 
education without the skills needed for the labour 
market or to continue further in education (2015). 
Hence, they argue, efforts should concentrate on 
ensuring that those with low-skills participate in 
adult learning as well as improving adult learning 
programmes. Despite their apparent greater need 
12  Lifelong learning: those aged 25-64 who received education/ training in four weeks preceding the survey. The denominator consists 
of the total population of the same age group, excluding those who did not answer to the question. This relates to all education or 
training whether relevant to the person’s current or possible future job (Eurostat trng_lfse_01).
for training, the participation of low-skilled people 
in lifelong learning/training activities (both when 
employed and unemployed) is much lower than for 
other groups (European Commission 2016a). 
The EU also has a strategic framework for cooperation 
in education and training under which targets have 
been set for 2020 - the Strategic Framework for 
European Union cooperation in Education and 
Training (known as ‘ET 2020’). Amongst the targets 
which the ET 2020 framework set for 2020 are that 
an average of at least 15 per cent of adults (age group 
25-64) should participate in lifelong learning.
In 2020 the average rate of participation in lifelong 
learning was 9.2 per cent (slightly down on the 
10.8 per cent rate, 2019) (measured through the 
participation rate for people aged 25-64 in training 
and education in the past four weeks12). It is slightly 
lower than it had been in 2008 (when it was 9.5 per 
cent) but in recent years increases have only been 
marginal (Eurostat online database, trng_lfse_01). 
The European Commission argues that such a 
relatively low rate (representing just one in ten of 
those aged 25-64 regardless of labour-market status) 
represents a real lost opportunity (2016a). Clearly, 
the EU is not on target to reach the target (15 per 
cent average) set in the ET 2020 strategy. 
There is great variation across Europe in terms of 
the rates of participation. Nordic countries tend to 
top the table; in 2020 the top three countries were 
Sweden (28.6 per cent), Finland (27.3 per cent) 
and Denmark (20 per cent). They were followed by 
Netherlands, Estonia, Luxembourg and France. At 
the other end of the scale, the rate was lowest in 
Romania (1 per cent), Bulgaria and Slovakia. Thus, 
there is close to a 30 percentage point difference 
between Sweden with the highest rate and Romania 
with the lowest. See Figure 24. 
There have been dis-improvements in the rates in 25 
countries between 2019 and 2020 and there was an 
increased rate in three countries. Some declines were 
slight, but the most notable decline (a pattern over a 
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number of years now) was in France (-6.5 percentage 
points, 2019-20). Improvements occurred in 3 
countries (again often slight), with the most notable 
improvement (+0.4 percentage points) in Spain 
– a country with a traditionally relatively low rate. 
Lithuania and Greece (both +0.2 per centage points) 
also showed improvements. 
Figure 24 Lifelong Learning, (%) EU-28, 2008, 2019 and 2020
Source: Eurostat online database, trng_lfse_01
European countries with the highest levels of 
participation in lifelong learning for both employed 
and unemployed people also have the highest 
transition rates out of unemployment and lowest 
transition rates from employment to unemployment, 
which obviously has positive implications for the 
prevention of long-term unemployment (European 
Commission 2015). The European Commission 
draws attention to the fact that several countries 
with the highest rates of participation in lifelong 
learning are also the world’s most competitive 
(European Commission 2015). Here, countries like 
Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden 
stand out as being among the top five countries in 
terms of lifelong learning participation rates and 
competitiveness as well as a new measure pioneered 
in the wake of the pandemic, namely ‘transformation 
readiness’ (ranking respectively 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th 
internationally) (World Economic Forum 2020). In 
this context, the World Economic Forum (2021) has 
recently stressed that shifts including digitization 
and automation have combined with the impact of 
Covid to produce a ‘massively shifting skill needs 
for the workforce’. The benefit of lifelong learning 
- particularly at a moment when lockdowns have 
forced a sharp growth in virtual working - has become 
essential to both preventing ‘digital exclusion’ and 
fostering a ‘smart’ recovery (European Commission, 
2020d). 
As mentioned in Section 3 of this report, the OECD 
(2020f) has recently again drawn attention to the 
need for adult learning in the context of a range 
of broad societal challenges including an even and 
enduring post-pandemic recovery. They highlight 
the need to move away from a model of front-
loaded education – whereby recognised skills are 
mainly developed in schools and universities and 
subsequently used at work – to a system in which 
skills are continuously updated during the working 
life to match changing skills needs and the need to 
anticipate changes and adapt policies to better target 
disadvantaged groups.
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As we noted in previous iterations of this report, 
problems relating to adult literacy represent a 
challenge for individuals and for societies. They are 
a potentially significant barrier to achieving the aims 
of the 2020 Strategy for inclusive growth, given that 
those with low literacy skills are almost twice as likely 
to be unemployed than others, are more likely than 
those with better literacy skills to report poor health, 
to believe that they have little impact on political 
processes, and not to participate in communal or 
volunteer activities (OECD, 2013). 
Assessments of literacy across countries can be 
complicated processes. In this series of reports, we 
look briefly at one indicator of adult literacy across 
Europe – the OECD’s Survey of Adult Skills, including 
results for the second round (study conducted 2014-
2017) (OECD, 2013; 2016c, 2019b). Its most recent 
round brings to 21, the EU countries participating. 
Data from Round 3 released in November 2019 adds 
Hungary to the list of participating EU countries 
(along with Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Peru and 
United States). 
The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) defines literacy 
as the ability to ‘understand, evaluate, use and 
engage with written texts to participate in society, 
achieve one’s goals, and develop one’s knowledge 
and potential’ (OECD 2013). It also examined 
reading digital texts and involved 5 levels of skill 
graded from below level 1 to level 4/5. The results 
from the assessment are reported on a 500-point 
scale; a higher score indicates greater proficiency; 
to help interpret the scores, the scale is divided 
into proficiency levels. Each level of proficiency 
is described within the study. For example, an 
indication of the types of tasks that respondents can 
complete at level 1 in literacy is as follows:
A person who scores at Level 1 in literacy can 
successfully complete reading tasks that require 
reading relatively short texts to locate a single piece 
of information, which is identical to or synonymous 
with the information given in the question or 
directive and in which there is little competing 
information (OECD 2016c: 21).
Numeracy is defined as: ‘the ability to access, 
use, interpret and communicate mathematical 
information and ideas in order to engage in and 
manage the mathematical demands of a range of 
situations in adult life’ (OECD 2013: 75). Table 4 
shows the findings in respect of the 21 European 
countries that participated in all three rounds (the 
third announced in Nov 2019).
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13  In the results of the previous round, which included fewer countries, the average scores were: literacy 268; numeracy 263 (OECD 
2013:70,80).
Source: OECD 2019b. Non-EU countries omitted from this table. Results were presented separately for England and Northern Ireland; 
for Belgium, Flanders was the participating area. 
Note: The average literacy score across the OECD countries that participated in the assessment was 266 points, numeracy, 262. The 
mean score across all participating countries was lower than those calculated during previous rounds (due to the addition of further 
countries)13.
The average literacy score for the OECD member 
countries participating in the assessment was 266 
points. The lowest average scores were observed 
in Italy (250 points), Spain and Greece (that is, 
amongst participating EU countries), while Finland 
(288 points), Netherlands and Sweden record the 
highest. This means that an adult with a proficiency 
score at the average level in Italy can typically 
only successfully complete tasks of level 2 literacy 
difficulty; in Finland the corresponding level of 
difficulty is higher - level 3. 
The average numeracy score among the OECD 
member countries participating in the assessment 
is 262 points. Looking only at participating EU 
countries, Finland has the highest average score 
(282 points) followed by Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Denmark, while Spain (246 points) and 
Italy (247 points) record the lowest average scores.
Notwithstanding this, overall the variation in litera-
cy and numeracy proficiency between the adult pop-
ulations in the participating countries is considered 
relatively small (OECD 2013). 
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In both literacy and numeracy proficiency, some 
participating countries do significantly better than 
average – Finland’s performance (topping the table 
in both literacy and numeracy) is notable. Also 
scoring relatively high in both are the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Belgium. 
Adult skills matter, because as that report argues, 
where large shares of adults have poor skills, 
it becomes difficult to introduce productivity-
enhancing technologies and new ways of working, 
which in turn stalls improvements in living 
standards and tends to widen income inequality 
(OECD 2019b). Furthermore, in all countries, adults 
with lower skills are far more likely than those with 
better literacy skills to report poor health, to be less 
involved in political processes and to have less trust 
in others.
We can also look at these countries in light of the 
education indicators already discussed (early school 
leaving, third level attainment of 30-34 year olds, 
and participation in lifelong learning of adults). It 
is interesting to note that certain countries tend to 
be better performers across several or all indicators. 
These include, in particular, Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. Luxembourg is 
ranked relatively highly on most indicators though 
they did not participate in the survey of adult 
literacy. Overall, this examination suggests that the 
policies pursued by these countries seem to impact a 
range of different groups positively. 
Croatia tops the league for the lowest early school 
leaving rate, but performs below average on other 
measures and they did not participate in the adult 
literacy survey. Estonia performs well in lifelong 
learning and is above average on third level 
attainment. Slovenia performs notably well on early 
school-leaving (ranked third-highest performing 
after Croatia and Greece, 2020) and is above average 
on third level attainment and slightly above the 
average on lifelong learning. The performance of 
Lithuania is third highest amongst EU-27 countries 
in third-level attainment; they are the sixth best 
performing on the early school leaving rate but they 
do not perform above the EU average in lifelong 
learning.
Denmark, Sweden and Finland, as well as Slovenia, 
Lithuania and Estonia are considered to perform 
well in terms of granting equal access to education 
(Schraad-Tischler et al. 2017). Finland and Estonia 
were singled out surveys of social justice from 
Bertelsmann Stiftung for education systems that 
provide both equity and quality education where 
children even from socially disadvantaged family 
homes experience prospects equal to those of 
children from socially better-off families (Schraad-
Tischler 2015; Schraad-Tischler et al. 2017). 
It is clear that these are complex and dynamic issues 
involving policy impacts on different groups and age 
cohorts over time and in which the policies pursued 
can have quite different outcomes in relation to 
different indicators and for different groups. It is 
also true that certain countries seem to pursue 
policies that produce better outcomes across a range 
of groups. 
4.2. Education - Conclusion
It is welcome that progress has been made towards 
reaching targets set in the European 2020 Strategy 
to address early school leaving and to improve third 
level educational attainment. However, progress has 
stalled on some educational indicators, there is scope 
for improvement in many countries, and progress 
also needs to be made on other indicators.
Improvements in the average (EU-27) rate of early 
school leaving since 2008 is welcome, with the rate 
for 2020 standing at 9.9 per just below the <10 per 
cent target set in the Europe 2020 strategy. But 
while the average rate has fallen significantly from 
2008, it has not decreased to any extent in the most 
recent years – so progress has stalled. There are 
wide disparities between European countries when 
it comes to the rate of early school leaving. In 2020 
the highest rates were to be found in Malta (16.7 
per cent), Spain (16 per cent), Romania (15.6 per 
cent) and Italy (13.1 per cent). There is still a very 
great gap between the countries with the highest 
rates, and that with the lowest rate, Croatia (with 
a rate of 2.2 per cent). Some groups (including 
disabled people) continue to have relatively very 
high rates. Furthermore, because its consequences 
for individuals and for society are so grave in terms 
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of increased risk of unemployment, poverty and 
social exclusion, it is an issue that requires ongoing 
attention from policy-makers and a renewed effort 
will be needed to generate momentum toward a 
more ambitious post-2020 target.
For third level attainment, the target set in the 
Europe 2020 strategy was that at least 40 per cent 
of 30-34 year-olds would complete third level. In 
2020, the EU-28 average was 41 per cent so the 
target has been reached. This is an area showing large 
improvements since 2008 when the average rate had 
been 31.1 per cent. In 2020, six countries had with 
rates at or over 50 per cent. However, there is nearly 
a 38 percentage point gap between the country with 
the highest rate (Luxembourg) and that with the 
lowest (Romania) (2020).
One of the problems that Europe now faces is that 
progress not only needs to continue to be made to 
address the areas in which targets were set in the 
Europe 2020 strategy, but also to manage other 
issues such as low basic skills amongst disadvantaged 
socio-economic groups. Ongoing attention is 
required to issues of literacy and numeracy across all 
age groups. One issue is the phenomenon of NEETs, 
young people neither in education nor employment 
(see Section 3 of this report). Education plays a key 
role in keeping people out of the NEET category.
When we look at lifelong learning, relatively very 
low rates of participation in many EU countries 
represents a lost opportunity both for individuals 
and for societies and economies. At 9.2 per cent, the 
average rate is below what than it had been in 2008 
(9.5 per cent) and in recent years increases have only 
been marginal – so the fact that the rate is stagnating 
is unfortunate given that basic skills are lacking for 
so many people and much remains to be done to 
improve adult literacy in many countries. Clearly, 
the EU is not on target to reach the lifelong learning 
target (15 per cent average) set in the ET 2020 
strategy. There is great variation across Europe in 
terms of the rates of participation. Nordic countries 
tend to top the table; in 2020 the top three countries 
were Sweden, Finland and Denmark followed by 
Estonia, the Netherlands, Estonia and Luxembourg. 
At the other end of the scale, the rate was lowest in 
Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia. There is close to a 
28 percentage point difference between Sweden with 
the highest rate and Romania with the lowest. 
Certain countries tend to be better performers 
across several or all education indicators. These 
include, in particular, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, 
the Netherlands.
3.3 Health Services
As mentioned in Section 1, Social Justice Ireland 
includes the right to essential healthcare amongst 
its core rights that need to guide policy-making 
in the future. Against the backdrop of the worst 
public health crisis in a century, (Calina et al. 2020), 
the issue of access to health care and of reducing 
health inequalities has come absolutely central to 
ensuring an effective, equitable and lasting recovery. 
While the pandemic has massively exacerbated 
such inequalities, the goals of the Europe 2020 
strategy – which aims to ensure better access to 
healthcare as an essential ingredient of inclusive 
growth – appears more pressing than ever before 
(OECD, 2020d). Its aims build upon both the EU 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 3), which aim 
to ensure health and well-being for all at all ages, 
and the European Pillar of Social Rights which calls 
for universal access to high-quality healthcare and 
emphasises the importance of preventive healthcare. 
In international terms, European countries stand 
out globally as leaders in health care and provision 
(GBD 2015 Healthcare Access, 2017) EU citizens 
enjoy near-universal access to healthcare, their 
life expectancy remains among the highest in the 
world while infant mortality rates have dropped to 
very low levels; and health expenditure constitutes 
a significant part of government and private 
expenditure (Eurostat 2018b). 
However, as previous reports in this series have 
discussed, following the economic crisis, many 
people in the EU experienced an erosion of health 
coverage (Thomson, Evetovits and Kluge, 2016) 
which has only become more starkly evident in the 
wake of the coronavirus pandemic (World Health 
Organisation, 2020). In Greece, for example, nearly 
2.5 million people lost access to health services 
during the crisis due to unemployment or inability 
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to pay health insurance contributions (Economou 
et al. 2017) before remedial legislation restored 
coverage for the whole population in 2016. As a 
result of this, when the pandemic hit in spring 
2020, Greece possessed just 560 Intensive Care 
Unit (ICU) beds to serve a population of 10.7 
million (Damaskos et al. 2020). Rebalancing sharp 
inequalities between public and private healthcare 
through the temporary nationalisation of private 
health care facilities in November 2020 and March 
2021 played an important role in ensuring Greece 
could effectively withstand the second and third 
waves of the pandemic (Klatt, 2021)
Previous reports in this series have looked at the 
social justice index from Bertelsmann Stiftung, the 
most recent iteration of which relates to 2019 (see 
Social Justice Ireland 2019; Hellmann et al. 2019). 
The latter report uses a combination of indicators to 
arrive at a basic impression of differing degrees of 
fairness, inclusiveness and quality between health 
systems in EU countries and it allocated a score to 
each country (Hellmann et al. 2019). Overall, the 
report argues that quality of healthcare is high in 
Europe. But amongst the 19 countries for which 
comparison is possible with 2008, deterioration 
between then and 2017 was noted in 10 countries, 
the largest deterioration in Greece. In 2019, 
Luxembourg France and Italy came within the top 
five places followed by the Spain and Denmark 
within the top ten. Country ratings vary depending 
on the indicators employed. In another cross-
country comparison, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, France 
and Germany were the top performers amongst EU 
countries (European Consumer Powerhouse 2018).
Life expectancy has increased in EU countries over 
the past decades, but this rise has slowed since 2010 
in many countries, particularly in Western Europe, 
and is expected to decline in 2020 in the wake of 
the coronavirus pandemic (OECD, 2020d). Large 
inequalities in life expectancy persist not only by 
gender (women still live nearly 5.5 years more than 
men on average), but also by socioeconomic status; 
on average across EU countries, 30-year-old men 
with a low education level can expect to live about 
7 years less than those with a university degree or 
the equivalent. Large inequalities also exist in how 
people experience chronic disease: in the EU, 27 
per cent of people aged 65 and over in the highest 
income quintile reported at least two chronic 
diseases, compared with 46 per cent for those in the 
lowest income quintile (OECD, 2020d). 
There is great diversity in healthcare systems across 
the EU. A report from Alvarez-Galvez and Jaime-
Castillo (2018) evidences positive effects of social 
spending on reducing inequalities in health in a 
broad sample of European countries across a long 
period of time. It is challenging to compare health 
systems, health expenditures and health outcomes 
for different groups and different countries. When 
self-reported measures of the experience of health 
services are used, there is a danger of cultural 
differences and divergent local expectations 
affecting the outcomes, which makes cross-country 
comparisons challenging. 
As in previous iterations of this report, we will look 
at different approaches that allow an examination 
over time. The first is self-reported unmet need for 
medical help from Eurostat. The second, involves 
looking at overall perceptions of the quality health 
services from the European Quality of Life Survey 
(2007-2016) (Eurofound 2017c; 2019c).
Eurostat publishes rates of self-reported unmet need 
defined as the share of the population perceiving an 
unmet need for medical examination or treatment 
(online database hlth_silc_08). This is one of the 
social protection indicators used in the social 
protection performance monitor (SPPM) by the EU’s 
Social Protection Committee (The Social Protection 
Committee 2020). 
A number of reasons may be given for inability to 
avail of medical treatment, but in this case we look at 
reasons associated with problems of access (could not 
afford to, waiting list, too far to travel). The average 
rate of perceived unmet need for medical treatment 
(due to difficulties with access) was falling up until 
2009 when it started to increase again. It rose from 3 
per cent (EU-27) in 2009 to 3.7 per cent in 2013 (EU-
28). There was a noticeable improvement between 
2013 and 2019 up to the eve of the pandemic. The 
average rate was 2 per cent in 2019 (EU-27) (Eurostat 
online database code hlth_silc-08). 
60






However, as Figure 25 shows, the perception is 
different between different income quintiles with 
more perceived unmet need in the poorer quintiles. 
As in previous years, in 2019, it was least perceived 
in the top income earners (5th quintile) (0.9 per cent) 
and most amongst the lowest earners (or 1st quintile) 
(3.4 per cent). In short, as the EU’s Social Protection 
Committee (2020) notes, there is a clear income 
gradient as those in the lowest income quintiles 
more often report an unmet need for medical care, 
and the gap between the lowest and highest quintiles 
rose during the crisis years. Between 2018 and 2019, 
there has been a slight decrease in the average rate 
and in the perception of unmet need in the lowest 
income group and a marginal increase in the second 
lowest cohort (quartiles 1 and 2).
Figure 25 Self-reported unmet need for Medical Examination or Treatment Due to Problem of Access 
(%), EU-28, 2008-2019, By income Quintile
Source: Eurostat online database hlth_silc_08. Reasons associated with problems of access: ‘could not afford to, waiting list, too far to 
travel’. Rates prior to 2010 refer to EU27.
A complete set of data for 2020 including income 
thresholds is not yet available for every Member 
State, but data for 11 countries provides a snapshot 
of how citizens of individual states perceived 
changes in their healthcare needs in the context of 
the pandemic. Looking at the lowest income bracket 
(quintile 1), we find that between 2019 and 2020, 
rates of unmet health needs increased by between 
+0.2 to 1.8 for those on the lowest incomes in 
three countries (Denmark, Romania, and Finland), 
remained stable in one (the Netherlands), fell 
marginally between -0.1 to 0.4 in four (Hungary, 
Slovenia, Austria, Greece) and declined by between 
-0.5 and -0.9 in three (Bulgaria, Belgium and Estonia) 
(Eurostat, hlth_silc_08). 
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Figure 26 Unmet need for healthcare during the pandemic, 2020-21
Source: From Eurofound 2020d. For June-July 2020 the reference period was ‘since the pandemic began’ and for February-March 2021 
it was ‘in the last 12 months’).
14  https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/blog/protecting-access-to-healthcare-during-covid-19-and-beyond 
This partial data reflects the results of the most 
recent (but less detailed) Eurostat e-survey Living, 
working and COVID-19 carried out between April 
2020 and March 2021, which shows significant 
differences in the perception of unmet health 
needs over time and across Member States during 
the pandemic (Eurostat, 2021d). While this data is 
not exactly comparable to Eurostat data for unmet 
health needs detailed in Figure 25, it does suggest 
an enormous increase in the perception of unmet 
healthcare during the pandemic when compared to 
pre-covid figures (due to expense, waiting time or 
distance). The EU-27 average for the latter stood at 2 
per cent in 2019 compared to 21.1 per cent and 20.7 
per cent (covering all reasons) for 2020 and 2021 
respectively. As Figure 26 illustrates, while these 
much higher-than-usual figures for 2020 and 2021 
are similar, individual Member States experienced 
considerable variations between the two periods 
with ten seeing increases in unmet needs (ranging 
between +1.3 and +9.1) and seventeen seeing 
declines (between -0.7 and -12.2). 
While the overall picture appears to be one of 
gradually easing severity, Eurofound (2021)14 has 
warned that the legacy of the pandemic could 
continue to impact Member States with weaker or 
more unequal health provision leading to ‘escalating 
health problems and greater future care needs among 
those who have missed out’. Data from February and 
March 2021 tends to confirm this concern with just 
under half (47 per cent) of all those reporting unmet 
medical needs citing hospital or specialist care as the 
service forgone. (Figure 26)
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Figure 27 Unmet need for healthcare by type of healthcare during previous 12 months, Feb-Mar. 2021
Source: From Eurofound 2020d (Living, working and COVID-19, Figure 6).
Reviewing both pre-pandemic and emerging data, it 
is evident that the pandemic has served to inflame 
underlying health inequalities across and within 
Member States. The is likewise reflected in the 
latest annual report from the EU’s Social Protection 
committee (2020), which highlights how a majority 
of Member States – twenty-two in total – now face 
key challenges around the provision of accessible 
and cost-effective healthcare.
More detailed background to these mounting needs 
is evident in the European Quality of Life Survey 
carried out at the end of 2016. This has not been 
substantially updated since our last report in this 
series (see Eurofound 2017c; and Social Justice 
Ireland 2020) so we reproduce our reporting on it 
from last year and also focus on a few groups about 
whom information is available in a more recent 
Eurofound report (2019c) (based on the same 
survey). Overall that survey found that how people 
rated the quality of public services had improved 
since 2011. See Figure 26. In particular, satisfaction 
with healthcare and childcare improved in several 
countries where ratings were previously low. 
But, unfortunately, in several countries, participants 
rated the quality of health services less favourably in 
2016 than in 2011 (Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Greece, 
UK and Belgium). Thus, the perceived quality of 
public services still varies markedly across EU 
countries (Eurofound 2017c). 
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Figure 28 European Quality of Life Survey: Perceived Quality of Health Services, 2007, 2011, 2016
Source: From Eurofound 2017d (online database, EQLS, Data visualisation, year 2016) and Eurofound 2017c, Table 12, p 54. 
Note: Rating on a scale 1–10, where 1 means very poor quality and 10 means very high quality. Q59: ‘In general, how do you rate the 
quality of the following two healthcare services in [COUNTRY]? Again, please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means very poor 
quality and 10 means very high quality’.
Furthermore, people in lower income groups 
reported less improvement in the quality of services. 
For example, in 17 countries, those from the lowest 
income group (quartile 1, lowest 25 per cent) rated 
the quality of their health service more negatively 
than those in the top income group (quartile 4, top 
25 per cent) (in 2016) (EQLS2017 data visualisation 
Eurofound online database, Eurofound 2017d). The 
European Quality of Life Survey concludes that 
there are persistent inequalities on some indicators 
and that for low-income groups, improvements 
on several dimensions were more limited in terms 
of overall quality of public services, perception of 
social exclusion and risk to mental health (women 
in the lowest income quartile being consistently 
at higher risk over the last decade) (Eurofound 
2017c). The results of ongoing research suggests pre-
existing health inequalities have been both exposed 
and deepened during the Covid-19 pandemic, 
with vulnerable social groups disproportionately 
negatively effected (Mishra et al. 2021).
According to Eurofound (2019c), groups at particular 
risk of health inequality include:
• Younger people: There are strong indications 
of increased risk of mental health problems 
among those aged 12–24 years, with many hard 
groups to reach, such as those with chronic 
health problems, living in rural areas and not in 
education or employment.
• Older People: In central and eastern Europe, 
rates of loneliness, poor mental health and social 
exclusion are particularly high for older people – 
in part due to poorly developed care services.
• People in a ‘twilight zone’: A diverse group 
of people with incomes above a threshold that 
would entitle them to state support but which do 
not enable them to easily pay for care themselves 
are said to be in a twilight zone with recent 
research confirming that the vulnerability of 
this group persists even though economies have 
largely recovered from the crisis in terms of GDP 
(Eurofound 2019c, citing Forster et al.,2018).
• Information/consultation-Low-income 
groups: While satisfaction with different aspects 
of health care has improved, many people were 
dissatisfied with being informed and consulted 
about their care – and this proportion was higher 
among people with low income.
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Finally, one health issue relating to children is 
highlighted in research showing that eligibility for 
health care services for certain groups of children 
is not always clearly defined or well-established 
and only a few Member States have legislation 
guaranteeing children a right to health care, 
regardless of legal status (Palm 2017). Children with 
no regular residence status are the most vulnerable 
group, and others may fall between the cracks or be 
left with insufficient coverage.
Unfortunately, it has been precisely the type of 
complex health inequality described above which has 
come to characterise the impact of Covid-19 within 
and across Member States to date. As Eurofound 
(2021) has reported, vulnerable groups including 
those detailed above have experienced a rapid 
decrease in their ability to meet normal healthcare 
needs, especially those who have faced the brunt of 
the pandemic-induced economic downturn. By June-
July 2020 for example, 7.9 percent of respondents to 
the Living, working and COVID-19 e-survey reported 
they were unable to make scheduled payments related 
to healthcare and health insurance, an increase of 1.4 
percentage points compared to three months earlier. 
This has resulted in what Eurofound have termed an 
‘affluence gap’, with 44 per cent of those in arrears 
reporting unmet needs, compared to 19 per cent of 
people without arrears. Of additional concern is the 
finding that for those who lost their job since spring 
2020, one third (32 per cent) reported in June-July 
2021 that they have unmet medical needs compared 
to 21 per cent of those who had not lost their job 
Eurofound (2021d).
A recent annual report from the EU’s Social Protection 
Committee (2020) summarises the current situation 
relative to healthcare systems, concluding that 
experience of the pandemic has affirmed the need 
for universal access to quality healthcare in the EU 
and has ‘underlined the importance of accessible, 
resilient, efficient and well-staffed systems’. The 
committee suggests that issues which need to be 
addressed include health inequalities and access to 
healthcare faced by the most vulnerable (including 
high out-of-pocket costs in some countries), and 
they suggest shifting the focus towards primary care 
and prevention, as well as promoting healthier life-
style habits and digital healthcare solutions.
All of the above suggests that rising health 
inequalities are now set to assume a high degree 
of valency as EU Member States continue to work 
to recover from the impact of Covid-19. Despite 
incremental improvements in recent years, it 
remains clear that low-income people are amongst 
those, along with certain other groups, who will 
require a special focus to ensure that they benefit 
from general improvements as part of the wider 
post-pandemic recovery.
4.4 Health - Conclusion
Overall, the quality of healthcare is high in the EU. 
However, following the financial crisis of 2008-09, 
many people in EU member states experienced 
an erosion of health coverage and lower income 
groups experienced more unmet need than others. 
Since spring 2020, the pandemic has exposed 
and deepened this erosion, leading the EU and 
international bodies (OECD, 2020d; World Health 
Organization, 2020; Eurofound 2021a) to warn of 
long-term repercussions if health inequalities go 
unaddressed as part of ongoing recovery efforts.
In the five year period from 2014 to 2019, there was 
a welcome downward trend in the average perception 
of unmet need for health care across the EU (due to 
problems of access: online database hlth_silc_08). 
However, the perception is different between 
different income groups, and, as in previous years 
and now against the backdrop of the pandemic, it 
was least perceived in the top income earners and 
most amongst the lowest earners. Unfortunately, as 
between 2019 and 2020, there has been an enormous 
rise in reported unmet medical needs – jumping 
from one-in-fifty in 2019 to closer to one-in-five in 
2020 – though more concrete and comparable data 
is required before the full extent of the impact of 
the pandemic on public health more widely can be 
accurately assessed. The most recent data reported 
by Eurostat (hlth_silc_08) and Eurofound (2021d) 
confirms a dramatic increase in pre-pandemic trends 
of rising unmet health needs among those on low 
incomes.
There also continues to be great variation in these 
perceptions across different countries. Most recently, 
twenty-two Member States have been identified as 
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needing to address key challenges relating to health 
care access in the wake of the pandemic (Social 
Protection Committee 2020).
The perceived quality of public services still varies 
markedly across EU countries (Eurofound 2020). In 
one cross-country comparison, the health systems 
of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, France and Germany were the 
top performers (amongst EU countries) (European 
Consumer Powerhouse 2018). Divergent strategies 
employed throughout the pandemic (most notably 
in the case of Sweden) and the potential for emerging 
EU competencies in relation to public health may 
see this picture shift as a debate around recovery 
and rights to healthcare gathers pace (Galvani et al. 
2020).
As the impact of the pandemic has made clear, 
certain groups continue to experience particular 
difficulties and need a particular policy focus, and 
inequalities still need to be addressed as disparities 
– such as in life-expectancy – remain high between 
socioeconomic groups. Some of the groups whose 
needs have been most recently highlighted include 
younger people at risk of mental health – an issue 
which has intensified throughout the pandemic 
(Eurofound 2021b) – as well as those with chronic 
health problems, those living in rural areas and those 
not in education or employment. The physiological 
vulnerability of older people has been foregrounded 
dramatically throughout the pandemic itself 
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, 2021b). Finally, those in Member States 
marked by sharp internal regional inequalities as well 
as social groups at risk of falling though the ‘gaps’ 
of means-tested healthcare provision have been 
highlighted as likely sites of social investment in the 
context of an ‘inclusive’ and lasting post-pandemic 
recovery (Eurofound 2020a).
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5 5  Taxation 
15  That is, taxes on production and imports, income and wealth, capital taxes, and compulsory social contributions paid by employers 
and employees (see Eurostat 2014:268)
Taxation plays a key role in shaping societies by 
funding public services, supporting economic 
activity and redistributing resources to make 
societies more equal. Appropriate and equitable 
taxation levels and their targeting is also a subject 
of much debate and contestation within individual 
countries. Eurostat publishes information on taxes 
which allows comparison across countries and we 
will look at total taxation across countries in this 
section. We will then consider this in light of some 
indicators of social inclusion and social investment.
5.1 Total Taxation as a percentage of GDP
Taxation can be analysed as including or excluding 
compulsory social security contributions. One 
definition used by Eurostat encompasses all direct 
and indirect taxes received including social security 
contributions15 – and that is the one used in this 
section. The tax-take of each country is established 
by calculating the ratio of total taxation revenue 
to national income as measured by gross domestic 
product (GDP). Taken as a whole, the European 
Union is a high-tax area relative to some other 
countries such as the United States and Japan. 
As a ratio of GDP, in 2019 tax revenue (including net 
social contributions) accounted for 40.2 per cent of 
GDP in the European Union (EU-28) and 41.5  per 
cent of GDP in the euro area (EA-19). Compared with 
2018, a decrease of 0.1 of a percentage point in the 
ratio are observed for the EU-28 and the euro area. 
In absolute terms, tax revenue in 2019 continued 
the growth from its low-point of 2009. From 2018 
to 2019, EU-28 tax revenue increased by EUR 221 
billion and euro area tax revenue increased by EUR 
142 billion. 
However, as Figure 27 shows, there is considerable 
variation between member states in the EU in 
respect of total taxes as a proportion of GDP. Ten 
countries had total taxation ratios greater than the 
EU average of 40.2 per cent (in 2019). It was highest 
in France (47.4 per cent of GDP), Denmark (46.9 per 
cent of GDP), Belgium (45.9 per cent of GDP) and 
followed by Sweden (43.7 per cent of GDP), Austria 
(43.1 per cent of GDP), Italy (42.6 per cent of GDP) 
and Finland (42.3 per cent of GDP) and the lowest 
shares were recorded in Ireland (22.7 per cent of 
GDP), Romania (26.8  per cent of GDP), Bulgaria 
(30.2 per cent of GDP), Lithuania (30.4 per cent of 
GDP ) and Latvia (31.3 per cent of GDP). Thus, the 
highest levels are found in the ‘older’ countries of the 
EU, including France, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, 
Austria and Finland. 
Overall, the range is broad with a difference of 
24.7 percentage points between the country with 
the lowest ratio (Ireland) and that with the highest 
(France). Between 2018 and 2019, increases in 
the tax-to-GDP ratios were observed in thirteen 
Member States. In percentage points, the highest 
increases in  per cent of GDP from 2018 to 2019 
were recorded by Cyprus (from 33.5 per cent in 2018 
to 35.6 in 2019), ahead of Denmark (from 45.1 per 
cent to 46.9) and Italy (from 41.9 per cent to 42.6). 
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Figure 29 EU-28 Total Taxes (incl ssc) as a % of GDP, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat Online database: gov_10a_taxag. Total receipts from taxes and social contributions (including imputed social contribu-
tions) after deduction of amounts assessed but unlikely to be collected
Decreases or in the tax-to-GDP ratio or stable 
ratios were observed in twelve EU Member States 
(Belgium, Greece, France, Sweden, Ireland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland, Malta, Latvia and 
Slovenia). The largest decreases in the tax-to-GDP 
ratio were observed in Belgium (from 47.1 per cent 
in 2018 to 45.9 in 2019), Greece (from 42.7 per cent 
to 41.9) and France (from 48.2 per cent to 47.4). 
Already before the 2004 enlargement, several 
member states had tax ratios close to 50 per cent 
(such as the Scandinavian countries and Belgium), 
and there were also several low-tax Member States 
(such as Ireland, Spain, the UK and Greece) (Eurostat 
2008). The generally lower tax ratios in the accession 
countries meant that the 2004 and 2007 enlargement 
resulted in a significant decline for the EU average 
value. Thus, in Figure 28 the tax ratios are set out 
for EU-15 countries. This shows an average ratio of 
40.7 per cent for EU-15 for 2019, only marginally 
higher than the average for EU-28 countries. When 
looked at in this way it is again Ireland that has the 
lowest ratio, followed by United Kingdom, Spain 
and Portugal. It must also be acknowledged in the 
case of Ireland that the highly globalised nature 
of the Irish economy as well as taxation policies 
pursued inflates GDP as a measure of activity – but 
even notwithstanding this, Ireland’s ratio compares 
poorly with many other countries, especially with its 
peers amongst the older accession countries. 
Eurostat appears to take 35 per cent of GDP as a 
ratio that represents a relatively low-tax approach 
(Eurostat 2008:5). In EU-15 (the ‘old member states 
of the EU), Ireland is the only country with a tax 
take that is appreciably lower than the 35 per cent 
threshold, with the next lowest ratios in Spain and 
the UK (35.4 and 35.3 per cent, respectively). 
It is also worth noting that amongst the countries 
with the highest total taxation ratios relative to 
GDP are some of the countries considered the most 
competitive in the world. According to the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness index for 
2019, Germany, Sweden and Denmark are amongst 
the world’s ten most competitive countries and 
Finland was ranked 11th (World Economic Forum, 
2019).
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Figure 30 EU-15 Total Taxes (incl SSC) as a % of GDP, 2008, 2018 and 2019
Source: Eurostat Online database: gov_10a_taxag. Total receipts from taxes and social contributions (including imputed social contri-
butions) after deduction of amounts
Although Eurostat has not yet published data for 
all EU Member States relating to 2020, returns for 
seven countries provides some indication of trends 
over the fi rst year of the pandemic. Amongst these, 
two (Luxembourg and Sweden) have seen reductions 
in their tax-to-GDP ratio while fi ve others (Denmark, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, and Estonia) have all seen it 
rise by between +0.4 and +1.2 per cent. Signifi cantly, 
increases in the latter fi ve countries have reversed 
trends evident over recent years as in the case of 
Denmark (which last saw its current ratio in 2015), 
Italy (2014), Portugal (2013), Estonia (2009) and 
Slovakia (1999). According to estimates recently 
published in the European Commission’s Annual 
Report on Taxation (2021e) however, the tax-to-GDP 
ratio is projected to fall in 2021 and 2022 as taxes 
decrease faster than expected declines in GDP across 
the EU-27.
5.2  Total Taxation in light of Some Social 
Inclusion Indicators
We can also review total taxation in light of a number 
of the issues that have already been considered in 
previous sections of this report such as how well 
countries perform in relation to poverty and social 
exclusion as well as social investment. We are again 
talking in this section about total taxation (including 
social security contributions) as a percentage of GDP.
In Table 5 we rank them for taxation to GDP ratio. 
We divide countries into three groups – those with 
total taxation levels above the EU average, a middle 
grouping with taxation levels below the average but 
at/above a level of 35 per cent, and a third group 
with taxation levels below 35 per cent.  
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Table 5 EU-28: Total Taxation as % GDP (2019) 
2019































Source: Taxation: Eurostat Online database:  gov_10a_taxag.
We can look at these taxation levels in light of levels 
of poverty or social exclusion set out in Section 
2 of this report. There are 16 countries that have 
below average rates of poverty or social exclusion 
(in 2019). The majority of these (12 out of 16) have 
taxation ratios above 35 per cent. Amongst the top 
10 countries in terms of protecting their populations 
from poverty or social exclusion (all with rates of 
poverty or social exclusion below 20 per cent in 
2019) are central and Scandinavian countries such 
as Finland, Netherlands, Denmark, France, Austria, 
Sweden and Germany, all of which are above the 35 
per cent tax ratio threshold (threshold that signals a 
low-tax economy). In fact, amongst these countries, 
all but Netherlands are above the EU average tax 
ratio to GDP as well.
Czechia has a poverty or social exclusion rate of 12.5 
per cent, the lowest rate in 2019 (EU28), and also 
a taxation rate below the EU average. However, it 
is now above the 35 per cent threshold at 36.1 per 
cent. Czechia is considered to be relatively effective 
at delivering fairness in society due to a favourable 
employment picture and a still rather redistributive 
social policy (Schraad-Tischler 2015; Schraad-
Tischler et al, 2017). As mentioned already, Slovenia 
(with a taxation to GDP ratio of 37.7 per cent in 
2019) is considered to do well in poverty reduction, 
especially on the areas of children and youth. For its 
part, Slovakia is also one of the better performing 
countries on poverty prevention (with a poverty or 
social exclusion rate in 2019 of 16.4 per cent) and 
with a taxation to GDP ratio below the EU average 
but at the 35 per cent threshold (34.6 in 2019 rising 
to 35 per cent in 2020). Thus, it too is considered 
to perform relatively well in poverty prevention due 
mainly to the country’s comparatively even income 
distribution patterns (Schraad-Tischler, 2015). As 
part of the context, it must be acknowledged, that 
income levels in post-communist countries are still 
considerably below those in Western Europe. In 
addition to the overall level of taxation, a range of 
historical and institutional factors are probably also 
relevant to the outcomes achieved as are the social 
policies pursued (Schraad-Tischler and Kroll 2014).
We can also look back at income inequality in light 
of taxation ratios. In Section 2, above, we looked at 
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the S80/20 measure of income inequality (Eurostat 
ilc_di11). A similar list of countries appears to also 
have the highest total taxation ratios and they are 
also some of the countries with the lowest rates of 
income inequality. And, correspondingly, amongst 
those countries with the highest levels of inequality 
are also those with the lowest levels of taxation 
(again relative to GDP). 
It is also of interest, that the social justice index 
use by Bertelsmann Stiftung consistently finds that 
opportunities for every individual to participate 
broadly (in things like education, health services 
and the labour market) tend to be best developed in 
northern countries. For example in the last report 
in that series (2019) northern European states of 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden top the list for social 
justice – all countries with tax ratios above the EU-
28 average - followed by Slovenia, and Czechia (all 
above the 35 per cent threshold) and Germany (also 
above the EU-28 average) (Hellmann et al, 2019).
Social Investment
How well countries perform on social investment is 
discussed in Section 1, above. In Table 6 we compare 
countries’ rankings for total taxation against the 
way that they have been ranked on their approach to 
social investment (following the schema of Bouget et 
al 2015 – see the Introduction to this Report. 
As we reported in previous years, all of the countries 
that are in Group 1 for social investment (identified 
by the European Social Policy Network as having a 
well-established approach to many social policies, 
Bouget et al 2015), have tax takes that are consid-
erably above the 35 per cent line, and most are also 
above the EU average. These countries are Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Slovenia. 
When it comes to how the ten countries that are in 
Group 3 in relation to social investment (the lowest 
group - that is, the social investment approach has 
not made significant inroads into the overall policy 
agenda), it appears that eight have taxation levels 
below the EU average and six have taxation rates 
that are below the 35 per cent line (many of them 
considerably so).
71






Table 6 EU-28 Total Taxation as % of GDP (2019) and Social Investment Approaches
Taxation to GDP ratio 2018 Social Investment Approach
Above EU-28 Average
France 47.4 Group 1*
Belgium 45.9 Group 1
Denmark 46.9 Group 1
Sweden 43.7 Group 1
Austria 43.1 Group 1
Finland 42.3 Group 1
Italy 42.6 Group 3***
Greece 41.9 Group 3
Germany 41.7 Group 1
Luxembourg 40.4 Group 2**
Taxation below European Union (EU-28) average:  40.3%
Netherlands 39.8 Group 1
Croatia 38.7 Group 3
Slovenia 37.7 Group 1
Hungary 36.5 Group 2
Portugal 36.7 Group 2
Czechia 36.1 Group 3
Poland 36.0 Group 2
Spain 35.4 Group 2
United Kingdom 35.3 Group 2
Cyprus 35.6 Group 2
Below 35% threshold
Slovakia 34.6 Group 3
Estonia 33.3 Group 3
Malta 32.1 Group 2
Latvia 31.3 Group 3
Lithuania 30.4 Group 3
Bulgaria 30.3 Group 3
Romania 26.8 Group 3
Ireland 22.7 Group 2
Source: Taxation: Eurostat Online database: I gov_10a_taxag. Approach to Social investment: Bouget et al 2015.
* Group 1: Has well established social investment approach to many social policies; tend to have good linkages between different policy 
areas when addressing key social challenges
** Group 2: Still to develop an explicit or predominant social investment approach, while showing some increasing awareness in a few 
specific areas
*** Group 3: Social investment approach has not made many significant inroads into the overall policy agenda
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Two of these countries (Italy and Greece) have 
taxation ratios that are above the EU average. In a 
previous report, Italy was the only country in this 
category – but it has since been joined by Greece. 
Thus, Italy and Greece represent exceptions, having 
a taxation ratio above the EU-28 average and still 
appearing in the worst grouping in terms of the 
development of a social investment approach.
5.3 Taxation - Conclusion
Without raising resources, countries cannot invest 
in infrastructure and services required to promote 
inclusion and to sustain development. Our conclu-
sions on taxation are very much in line with our con-
clusions in previous years.
There is considerable variation between member 
states in the EU in respect of total taxes as a 
proportion of GDP. The highest ratios tend to be 
found in the ‘old’ 15 members of the EU. Thus, the 
highest levels are found in France (47.4), Denmark, 
Belgium, Sweden, and Austria. At the other end of 
the scale were Ireland (22.7 per cent), Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Overall, the range is broad 
with a difference of 24.7 percentage points between 
the country with the lowest ratio (Ireland) and that 
with the highest (France).
Amongst the countries with the highest total taxa-
tion ratios relative to GDP are some considered the 
most competitive in the world: Germany, Sweden 
and Denmark are amongst the world’s ten most 
competitive countries and Finland was ranked 11th 
(World Economic Forum 2019). These are countries 
that also tend to score highly at protecting their pop-
ulations from poverty or social exclusion and they 
tend to be more equal societies in terms of incomes.
In general, countries in the south and east of Europe 
tend to have lower levels of taxation and also less 
well-developed social investment approaches, and 
higher rates of poverty or social exclusion. Amongst 
the newer accession countries – and with a taxation 
ratio just above 35 per cent of GDP at 36.1 per cent 
in 2019 - Czechia is notable for its performance 
in relation to prevention of poverty and social 
exclusion. The performance of Slovakia and Slovenia 
is also notable.
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6 6  Alternatives:  Some Issues  
for Discussion
Social Justice Ireland has for some time argued (see, 
most recently, Clark and Kavanagh 2019) that some 
measures used to pursue economic growth (policies 
and values) are often barriers to social progress and 
environmental sustainability. As discussed in the 
introduction to this report, there is a widespread 
acknowledgment that the policies pursued following 
the economic crisis of 2008 were unhelpful and 
simply wrong in economic terms. In the wake of a 
devastating global pandemic, it is now clearer than 
ever that alternatives are needed (Reynolds et al, 
2020). Increasingly, discussion surrounding what 
a post-pandemic future should look like among 
policy analysts and international agencies is taking 
cognisance of these issues rather than insisting, as 
in the past, on the panacea of ‘trickle down’ growth 
to eradicate poverty, protect the environment and 
promote social inclusion (Social Justice Ireland, 
2021). The current public health crisis, combined 
with the climate emergency, rising inequality, social 
insecurity and political instability, is finally putting 
pay to the old mantra that ‘there is no alternative’ 
to market fundamentalism. Put simply, a departure 
from the failed orthodoxies of the past now looks not 
only possible, but more vital than ever for Europe.
Wellbeing is a fundamental objective of EU policies: 
Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union states that the Union’s aim is to promote ‘the 
well-being of its peoples’. Good social protection 
systems are vital not only to social wellbeing but also 
to economic development. As we mentioned in the 
introduction to this report, some lessons are being 
drawn from past policy failures related to the 2008 
crisis in the context of the current public health 
emergency, with the OECD emphasising investment 
and policy coherence, which involves looking at how 
a range of different approaches to policy impact on 
overall well-being of a country’s citizens and more 
broadly on the world (OECD, 2020f). The European 
Commission has noted that:
• the best performing Member States in economic 
terms have developed more ambitious and effi-
cient social policies, not just as a result of eco-
nomic development, but as a central part of their 
growth model (European Commission 2016b);
• countries providing high quality jobs and effective 
social protection as well as investment in human 
capital proved more resilient in the economic 
crisis (European Commission 2015). 
For much of the period between the financial crash 
and the Covid crisis, political discourse at European 
level focused on fiscal consolidation and economic 
recovery as well as on protecting the euro. People 
in many countries affected by the financial crisis 
followed by harsh austerity policies that followed 
associate this with the European Union. Meanwhile 
talk of an economic recovery, dramatically punctured 
by the present public health crisis, has yet to be 
experienced amongst many groups in Europe and 
the EU’s efforts to create a more socially just Europe 
have not been as comprehensive, visible or as 
effective. 
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This is the context in which the future of the EU 
must be decided – and, in the opinion of Social Justice 
Ireland, it must be one in which it is recognised that 
economic development, social development and 
environmental protection are complementary and 
interdependent. This means that Europe must be 
seen as not only concerned with economic issues, 
but also with promoting justice, equality and social 
inclusion. In the aftermath of the present public 
health crisis, sustained action to achieve this is 
required at European level. 
As we outlined in the introduction to this report, 
for Social Justice Ireland, every person has seven 
core rights that need to be part of the vision for the 
future: right to sufficient income to live with dignity, 
to meaningful work, to appropriate accommodation; 
to relevant education, to essential healthcare, to 
real participation and the right to cultural respect. 
In this report, we have looked at how these rights 
are currently being realised or otherwise in the areas 
of income, work, education and healthcare. In this 
Section, we discuss some current debates and point 
to some potential policy alternatives in the areas of 
income, work and service-provision. Our intention 
is not to prescribe any particular approaches, but 
rather to outline some pointers toward strategies 
that are currently being employed or are currently 
the subject of increasing debate and consideration.
6.1 Right to Sufficient Income 
Debates about how to achieve adequate income 
often involve discussions of (1) minimum wage, and, 
increasingly, the living wage, (2) minimum income 
schemes, and (3) basic income schemes. We will 
briefly discuss each of these approaches. As noted 
already in this report, new forms of employment, 
and associated gaps in access to social protection and 
lower incomes, may put a growing number of people 
at higher risk of poverty and social exclusion, which 
requires that social protection systems ensure access 
to adequate protection for all persons in employment, 
including various types of self-employment and 
non-standard working (Social Protection Committee 
2020). In the context of emergency measures 
introduced to combat the impact of Covid-19, 
including income and employment support schemes 
on an unprecedented scale, policy-making and 
analysis relating to these areas has clearly advanced 
in significant ways since 2020.
Minimum Wage and Living Wage
As part of its Decent Work Agenda, the International 
Labour Organization encourages the use of a 
minimum wage to reduce working poverty and 
provide social protection for vulnerable employees 
(2013). A minimum wage is the lowest remuneration 
(set hourly, daily or monthly) that employers may 
legally pay to workers. It is recognised that setting 
minimum wages at appropriate levels can help 
prevent growing in-work poverty. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (2016), minimum 
wage policy typically aims to improve income 
distribution and it may also have important 
implications for economic efficiency. 
Twenty-one out of 27 EU countries apply a generally 
binding statutory minimum wage and that others 
set one by way of sectoral collective agreements 
(Eurofound, 2021a). However, the IMF points to 
non-compliance being widespread in both advanced 
and emerging economies. (IMF 2016). For example, 
recent research relating to Ireland found that 5.6 
percent of minimum wage workers in the country 
are paid below the minimum wage for reasons other 
than those permitted under legislation (McGuinness 
et al. 2020).
There are different opinions on the usefulness of 
minimum wages, one criticism being that they 
only apply to those in paid employment, not self-
employed or those doing family work or caring 
(International Labour Organization, 2013). Despite 
limitations, the International Labour Organization 
has concluded that they remain a relevant tool for 
poverty reduction. Also, the International Monetary 
Fund has suggested that governments should 
consider broadening minimum wage coverage where 
it does not currently include part-time workers 
(Hong et al. 2017). They do so in the context of 
addressing the issue of why falling unemployment 
rates have not resulted in wage growth (in other 
words, why isn’t a higher demand for workers driving 
up pay). In Section 3 of this report we quoted from 
a Eurofound report (2019a) which highlighted the 
case of Germany in 2015 where in contrast to several 
other countries wages increased among the lowest-
75






paid employees as a result of the introduction of a 
minimum wage (Eurofound 2019a). It is notable that 
this beneficial effect of the minimum wage policy 
seems to have come with no significant impact on 
employment (Eurofound 2019a).
The European Pillar of Social Rights now asserts 
the right of workers ‘to fair wages that provide for a 
decent living standard’ and suggests that ‘adequate 
minimum wages shall be ensured in a way that 
provide for the satisfaction of the needs of the 
worker and his / her family in the light of national 
economic and social conditions’ (Principle 6 – emphasis 
added). 
Proposals launched by the European Commission 
in October 2020 for an EU Directive on Adequate 
Minimum Wages (2020/682) aims to give legislative 
force to the latter. It will do this by establishing an 
overarching legal framework relating to minimum 
thresholds, wage growth and purchasing power 
to govern national minimum wages (Wixforth 
and Hochscheidt, 2021). Although its eventual 
provisions could fall shy of expectations, it does 
represent an important step forward in terms of 
effective action at the European level (European 
Trade Union Congress, 2020).
The Living Wage assumes that work should provide 
an adequate income to enable people to afford a 
socially acceptable minimum standard of living. It 
differs from the minimum wage approach, in being an 
evidence-based rate grounded in consensual budget 
standards based on research to establish the cost of 
a minimum essential standard of living. It provides 
an income floor, representing a figure that allows 
employees to pay for the essentials of life. The concept 
is derived from the United Nations Convention on 
Human Rights which defined the minimum as ‘things 
which are necessary for a person’s physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral and social well-being’. A Living 
Wage is intended to meet physical, psychological 
and social needs at a minimum but acceptable level 
(Living Wage Technical Group, 2014). Earning below 
the living wage suggests that employees are forced 
to do without certain essentials to make ends meet. 
The cost of a minimum essential standard of living or 
minimum income standard will vary by household 
type and composition, location, and employment 
pattern. Its calculation follows clearly stated and 
transparent processes specified for specific house-
hold compositions and situations (Living Wage 
Technical Group, 2014). 
The Living Wage idea is not a new one. However, 
support is growing for it and research on it 
is expanding with the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) launching a campaign 
drawing on the concept in 2018. The UK’s Living 
Wage Foundation web site suggests that there are 
nearly 6,000 Living Wage Employers in the UK, 
including more than one third of the FTSE 100 and 
household names including Ikea, Aviva, Nationwide 
and Everton FC. While small businesses are usually 
perceived as having fewer resources available and 
thus to be less able to afford to pay higher wages, 
research from the UK suggests that private sector 
SMEs constitute over half of all accredited Living 
Wage employers (Werner and Lim 2016). SMEs that 
have adopted a living wage perceive benefits related 
to employee motivation and productivity, staff 
retention, employee relations and ability to attract 
high quality staff as well as benefits for business 
reputations (Werner and Lim 2016). It is interesting 
to note that the SMEs concerned were operating 
in so-called low-waged sectors such as hospitality, 
retail, social care and manufacturing in England, 
Wales and Scotland. 
Minimum Income Schemes
Adequate and effective social protection systems are 
the bedrock of a truly Social Europe, within which 
minimum income schemes are a safety net of last 
resort to ensure that no one falls below an adequate 
minimum income (Frazer and Marlier 2016). 
Minimum income schemes are protection schemes 
of last resort aimed at ensuring a minimum standard 
of living for people of working age and their families 
when they have no other means of support. They 
vary in coverage, comprehensiveness (that is, their 
availability generally to low-income people) and 
effectiveness. The European Pillar of Social Rights 
enshrines the right to a minimum income as one of 
its 20 core principles:
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Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right 
to adequate minimum income benefits ensuring 
a life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective 
access to enabling goods and services (principle 
14).
This is welcome, but this requires political will and 
involvement of a range of stakeholders to make it 
effective. The lack of adequate minimum income 
schemes in several countries was highlighted 
following the 2008 crisis in Europe and has again 
become a salient feature of debates surrounding 
the future of emergency income and employment 
supports in the aftermath of the pandemic (Social 
Platform, 2020).
A review of minimum income schemes across Europe 
carried out in 2018 found that they play a vital role 
in alleviating the worst impacts of poverty and social 
exclusion (European Commission, 2019e). As a 
more recent discussion by the European Parliament 
indicates, in the context of the current public 
health emergency, the impact of minimum incomes 
schemes across Europe have been thoroughly 
‘stress tested’ in this regard. The results indicate the 
‘differential protective capacity’ of existing systems 
across the EU depending on the ‘accessibility and 
generosity of eligibility conditions’ with leaps in 
simplification and access in several Member States 
a significant step forward (Employment and Social 
Affairs Committee, 2121b).
Yet it remains the case that major differences 
continue to exist between Member States when it 
comes to minimum income schemes in so far as:
• their contribution is still limited; 
• overall progress since 2009 has been disappoint-
ing, and 
• lack of adequate payments coupled with limited 
coverage and poor take-up (due inter alia to poor 
administration, inadequate access to information, 
excessive bureaucracy and stigmatisation) means 
that they fall very far short of ensuring a decent 
life for the most vulnerable in society (Frazer and 
Marlier 2016).
Concerns about minimum income schemes focus on 
affordability and about fears that they will disincen-
tivise work. However, according to the Independent 
Network of Experts on Social Inclusion, in countries 
with the most generous and effective minimum in-
come schemes, there is also a clear recognition that 
they play a vital role in ensuring that people do not 
become so demoralized and excluded that they are 
incapable of participation in active inclusion mea-
sures and in seeking work (Frazer and Marlier 2009). 
As mentioned already, a new EU  Directive 
(2019/1152) seeks to ensure that all workers, in-
cluding those on atypical contracts, benefit from 
more predictability and clarity as regards their work-
ing conditions. Arguable it does not go far enough 
and does not, for example, prohibit zero-hours con-
tracts (Piasna 2019). More effective solutions are 
still needed to secure a higher number of guaranteed 
paid hours and less variable work schedules and to 
address abusive forms of flexibility (Piasna 2019).
Most recently, the conclusions of the German EU 
Council Presidency issued in October 2020 on 
‘Strengthening Minimum Income Protection’ re-
quests that the Commission provide an update of 
the EU framework to support and complement na-
tional minimum income protection policies (Euro-
pean Council, 2020b). Civil society organisations 
including the European Anti-Poverty Network have 
responded with calls for ‘hard law’ and an EU Frame-
work Directive on Adequate Minimum Income to 
‘give flesh to the acknowledged need to protect in-
come adequacy with the impact of the COVID-19 
crisis’ (European Anti-Poverty Network, 2020). 
Here, as elsewhere, much will depend on efforts to 
ensure several emergency and temporary income 
support measures continue as part of an inclusive 
post-pandemic recovery.
Basic Income Schemes
Basic Income has the potential to play a key role 
in supporting people’s rights to meaningful work, 
sufficient income to live life with dignity and real 
participation in shaping the world and the decisions 
that impact on them. The economic crisis of 2008 
and its consequences exposed the failure of current 
policy approaches to secure these rights for people, 
and as a result Basic Income is now being discussed 
and experimented with across several continents 
(Healy and Reynolds 2016). From the legacy of 
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the last crisis to the exigencies of the present one, 
the concept of a Basic Income has gathered both 
momentum and valency. For example, in 2018 
the Council of Europe passed a resolution which 
acknowledges the benefits of a ‘basic citizenship 
income’, on account of the fact that ‘introducing a 
basic income could guarantee equal opportunities 
for all more effectively than the existing patchwork 
of social benefits, services and programmes’ 
(Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2018). 
In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, emergency 
income and employment support measures have 
come to be seen by many as de facto ‘experiments’ 
in Basic Income provision (UNESCO, 2021). The 
debate on the potential future of such schemes has 
been further enriched following the broadly positive 
report of Finland’s 2017-18 pilot scheme – to date 
the most comprehensive carried out in the developed 
world – which was released against the backdrop of 
the pandemic in May 2020 (Kangas et al. 2020).
Aside from the immediate context of the pandemic, 
the fact that the Basic Income concept has been 
receiving more attention in recent times is partly 
in response to new technological developments 
including artificial intelligence and robotics, which 
are expected to transform the nature of work and the 
type and number of jobs. Put succinctly, if more jobs 
become obsolete, there still have to be ways for people 
to get health care, pensions, disability, and income 
supplements outside of full-time employment (West 
2015). It is argued that a basic income scheme 
offers ‘a powerful way of protecting all citizens from 
the great winds of change to be ushered in by the 
fourth industrial age, and of sharing the potentially 
massive productivity gains that it will bring’ (Reed 
and Lansley 2016:8). Another argument in favour 
of changing our system of income generation is that 
it can address growing inequality and, it is argued, 
a universal basic income that grows in line with 
capital productivity would ensure that the benefits 
of automation go to the many, not just to the few.
A basic income is very different to a minimum 
income. A minimum income seeks to ensure a 
minimum standard of living for people of working 
age and their families with no other means of 
support. By contrast, a basic income involves giving 
everyone a modest, yet unconditional income, and 
letting them top it up at will with income from 
other sources (Van Parijs, 2000). It is paid directly 
with a smaller payment for children, a standard 
payment for every adult of working age and a larger 
payment for older people. It is never taxed but in 
essence replaces tax credits (for those with jobs) 
and social welfare payments (for those without 
jobs). Additional payments would be maintained 
for those with particular needs (such as those who 
are ill or have a disability). As defined by the Basic 
Income Earth Network, a basic income is: an income 
unconditionally granted to all on an individual basis, 
without means test or work requirement. It is a form 
of minimum income guarantee that differs from 
those that now exist in various European countries 
in three important ways:
a. it is being paid to individuals rather than 
households;
b. it is paid irrespective of any income from other 
sources;
c. it is paid without requiring the performance of 
any work or the willingness to accept a job if 
offered.
If social policy and economic policy are no longer 
conceived of separately, then basic income is 
increasingly viewed, according to the Basic Income 
Earth Network, as the only feasible way of reconciling 
two of their central objectives: poverty relief and full 
employment. Every person receives a weekly tax-free 
payment from the Exchequer while all other personal 
income is taxed. 
Amongst its advantages is lack of stigma - there is 
nothing stigmatising about benefits given to all as a 
matter of citizenship, something that cannot be said, 
even with well-designed processes, about benefits 
reserved for ‘the needy, the destitute, those identified 
as unable to fend for themselves’ (Van Parijs, 2000). 
So it helps to overcome the problem of non-take-up of 
benefits, something observed in some EU countries 
(Eurofound, 2015). It also removes unemployment 
traps because it does not cease if someone takes up 
employment – one is bound to be better off working 
as you can keep the basic income and earnings on 
top of it - and it incentivizes increasing one’s income 
while employed. It promotes gender equality also 
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because everyone is treated equally and it respects 
forms of work other than paid work – like work in the 
home or informal caring. It is also considered more 
guaranteed, simple and transparent than current tax 
and welfare systems (Healy et al, 2012).
There are a range of basic income proposals. They 
differ in many respects including as to the amounts 
involved, the source of funding, the nature and 
size of the reductions in other transfers. Some 
propose financing through tax and welfare systems. 
In practice this would mean that those on low and 
middle-income would see net gains while the richest 
would be required to pay more tax as many tax 
breaks would be removed. Others propose that a 
Basic Income be financed by environmental taxation 
or a financial transactions tax. Current discussion 
is focusing increasingly on so-called partial basic 
income schemes, which would not be full substitutes 
for present guaranteed income schemes but would 
provide a low - and slowly increasing - basis to 
which other incomes, including the remaining social 
security benefits and means-tested guaranteed 
income supplements, could be added. 
Growing interest in Basic Income across the world is 
being driven by both negative and positive factors. 
Among the negative drivers is the growing fragility 
of the jobs market and the acceptance that there will 
never be sufficient jobs for those seeking them. Other 
negative drivers include the continuing failure of the 
welfare system to protect people against poverty 
and the ongoing exclusion of vulnerable people 
from having a voice in the decisions that impact 
on them. Among the positive drivers of interest in 
Basic Income is the recognition that as a system it 
could address all three of these negative drivers by 
providing sufficient income to enable people to live 
life with dignity; by enabling people to do meaningful 
work that is not paid employment and by supporting 
people as they seek to play a participative role in 
shaping the decisions that impact on them (see 
Healy and Reynolds 2016).
A range of countries and cities have introduced basic 
income schemes (or partial schemes) with renewed 
momentum following income support schemes 
adopted in several Member States throughout the 
pandemic which mirror Basic Income schemes 
(Eurofound, 2021e).
For example, a partial basic income system has 
existed for decades in the US state of Alaska 
financed by taxes paid on oil produced in the State. 
In 2012 The World Bank identified 123 Basic Income 
systems in various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Garcia and Moore, 2012). In California, preliminary 
results from a relatively small scheme in Stockton, 
California giving 125 low-income residents $500 
per month suggests that they are mostly spending 
it on food, clothes, and utility bills (not frivolous 
items as argued by critics of such schemes) (Samuel 
2019). Most recently, the results of Finland’s Basic 
Income polit scheme – the first randomised control 
trial of its kind in the world – targeted at 2,000 
unemployed people in receipt of an income of 560 
euro per month. The results suggest higher levels of 
subjective well-being and less mental strain than the 
control group but with no significant differences in 
labour market behaviour (KELA, 2020; European 
Social Policy Network, 2019).
A report from the UK estimated the net annual cost 
of a modified (transitional) basic income scheme 
there at around £8bn or just under 0.5 per cent of 
GDP, something that may be judged as a relatively 
modest sum in relation to the benefits and the 
reduction in poverty and inequality that it delivers 
such as a sharp increase in average income amongst 
the poorest; a cut in child poverty of 45 per cent; and 
a modest reduction in inequality (Reed and Lansley 
2016; Murphy and Ward, 2016). 
Healy and Reynolds (2016) conclude that for decades, 
the European social model has been offering its 
citizens a future that it has failed to deliver and that 
it is time to recognise that current policy approaches 
are not working. They suggest that a Universal 
Basic Income system has the capacity to be the 
cornerstone of a new paradigm that would be simple 
and clear, that would support people, families and 
communities, that would have the capacity to adapt 
to rapid technological change in a fair manner, that 
would enable all people to develop their creativity 
and could do all of this in a sustainable manner. 
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Against the backdrop of a potential winding-down of 
emergency income support measures as pandemic-
related restrictions ease, pressure is continuing to 
mount for Basic Income schemes to be considered 
at a European level, including a renewed push for a 
European Citizens’ Initiative launched in September 
2020 (European Citizens Initiative, 2020). Emerging 
research indicates that public opinion is trending 
toward ‘much stronger support’ for Basic Income 
models due to ‘increased importance attached, in 
the pandemic context, to a system that is simple and 
efficient to administer, and that reduces stress and 
anxiety’ (Nettle et al. 2021). Building on the Belgian 
political economist Philippe Van Parijs’ (2013) 
earlier proposals for a “euro-dividend” of 200 euros 
per month, in the present context, campaigners for 
an EU-wide Basic Income are posing the question: ‘if 
not now, when?’ (Neves and Merrill, 2020).
6.2 Right to Meaningful Work
The dominant policy framework in Europe 
and elsewhere in response to persistent high 
unemployment focuses on the notion of full-
employability and understands unemployment in 
terms of skills shortages, bad attitudes of individuals 
and/or disincentives to work that exist in welfare 
systems or other alleged rigidities like minimum 
wages or employment legislation (Mitchell and 
Flanagan 2014). It is a supply-side understanding, 
which can be considered to ignore other causes – 
such as lack of jobs and spatial spill-overs (Mitchell 
and Flanagan 2014). 
In the wake of the financial crisis, and now in the midst 
of an unprecedented global health emergency, this 
interpretation continues to face mounting criticism 
in both political and intellectual terms. Progressive 
approaches to jobs policy are investigating how to 
achieve full employment, as a key to well-being (there 
being evidence that high well-being is associated with 
low levels of unemployment and high levels of job 
security), something that involves satisfying work 
in the right quantities within a broader economy 
that respects environmental limits (Greenham et al, 
2011).
Thus, in the context of both past failures and the 
current public health emergency, basic questions 
are now being asked about whether the market 
economy is capable of delivering what is needed, 
particularly in light of the move away from industry 
and manufacturing towards a knowledge economy. 
Increasing developments in artificial intelligence 
also evoke anxiety about potential job losses. One 
influential study estimated that 47 per cent of 
workers in America had jobs at high risk of potential 
automation (Economist 2016). All of this poses the 
question whether the ‘trickle-down effect,’ that is, the 
wealth and job creation potential of entrepreneurs 
and wealthy individuals, can really deliver even full 
employment. 
One of the debates that arises in this context is the 
need to recognise and value all work. Another relates 
to government guaranteeing work as a response to 
widespread unemployment, particularly long-term 
unemployment which has damaging consequences 
for individuals and for the wellbeing of society. A 
further approach relates to reductions in hours 
worked by everyone. Finally, the need for investment 
by government will be considered.
Valuing All Work
Ideas about who we are and what we value are shaped 
by ideas about paid employment and the priority 
given to paid work is a fundamental assumption 
of current culture and policy-making. Other work, 
while even more essential for human survival and 
wellbeing, such as caring for children or sick/disabled 
people, often done by women, is almost invisible in 
public discourse. But because well-being relies on 
work and relationships (and other things), there 
must be a fair distribution of the conditions needed 
for satisfactory work and relationships – and this is 
particularly important for gender equality. 
The impact of ‘social distancing’ throughout the 
pandemic, alongside the suspension of many vital 
public services including education and child care, 
have served to highlight the enormous economic 
and social contribution of traditionally unpaid 
and voluntary workers. Now more than ever, there 
is a need to recognise all work including work in 
the home, work done by voluntary carers and 
by volunteers in the community and voluntary 
sector. Their contribution to society is significant 
in terms of social and individual well-being as well 
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as in economic terms. The European Commission 
estimates that the time spent on housework and care 
per day could represent +/-830million hours per day 
in the EU or nearly 100 million full-time equivalent 
jobs (European Commission 2012). Research from 
the UK suggests that if the average time spent on 
unpaid housework and childcare in 2005 was valued 
in terms of the minimum wage it would be worth the 
equivalent of 21 per cent of GDP (Coote et al, 2010). 
Introduction of a basic income (see above) is one 
means of enabling the recognition of all meaningful 
work in practice. 
Jobs Guarantee Schemes
Many job guarantee proponents see employment as 
a right. Unemployed people cannot find jobs that 
are not there, notwithstanding activation measures. 
Thus, thinking has been developed around the 
idea of jobs guarantee schemes. High levels of 
unemployment co-exist with significant potential 
employment opportunities, especially in areas such 
as conservation, community and social care. A jobs 
guarantee scheme involves government promising 
to make a job available to any qualifying individual 
who is ready and willing to work. Jobs guarantee 
schemes are envisaged in different ways with the 
most broad approach being a universal job guarantee, 
sometimes also called an employer of last resort 
scheme in which government promises to provide a 
job to anyone legally entitled to work. Apart from a 
broad, universal approach, other schemes envisage 
qualifications required of participants such as being 
within a given age range (i.e. teens or under, say, 
25), gender, family status (i.e. heads of households), 
family income (i.e. below poverty line), educational 
attainment and so on.
The concept involves government absorbing workers 
displaced from private sector employment. It involves 
payment at the minimum wage, which sets a wage 
floor for the economy. Government employment and 
spending – providing a ‘public option’ and baseline 
16  Excluding, presumably, recent examples such as Ireland in the 2000s, where with hindsight it is evident that the very high levels of 
employment were based on an enormous boom in construction based on reckless lending and fuelled by what became one of the 
biggest banking crisis in the world.
17  For example, in Ireland, Social Justice Ireland has made proposals to Government for a Part-Time Job Opportunities Programme that 
has already been piloted and costed. Also a costed proposal has been published in Greece by the Observatory of Economic and Social 
Development and other organisations (Antonopoulos et al, 2014).
wages – automatically increases as jobs are lost in the 
private sector (Wray et al. 2018).
Amongst those championing the idea is the Centre 
of Full Employment and Equity, University of 
Newcastle, Australia. Based on an analysis across 
countries, they argue that the private sector has 
always only been able to employ around 77 per 
cent of the labour force; unless the public sector 
provides jobs for the remaining workers seeking 
employment, unemployment will remain high16 
(Centre of Full Employment and Equity, n.d.). Costs 
of Jobs Guarantee Schemes have been calculated for 
a number of countries and it is considered relatively 
cheap, in comparison with the costs associated 
with unemployment17. It also results in a multiplier 
effect from the contributions to the economy of 
the workers concerned (Centre of Full Employment 
and Equity, n.d.). Furthermore, such schemes are 
considered to promote economic and price stability, 
acting as an automatic stabilizer as employment 
(within the scheme) grows in recession and shrinks 
in economic expansion, to counteract private sector 
employment fluctuations (Wray et al. 2018).
The Job Guarantee proposal acknowledges the 
environmental problem and the need to change 
the composition of final economic output towards 
environmentally sustainable activities. The required 
jobs could provide immediate benefits to society, 
and are unlikely to be produced by the private 
sector - they include urban renewal projects and 
other environmental and construction schemes 
(reforestation, sand dune stabilisation, river valley 
erosion control and the like), personal assistance 
to older people, assistance in community sports 
schemes, and many more (Centre of Full Employment 
and Equity, n.d.).
Such schemes are not intended to subsidise private 
sector jobs or to threaten to undercut unionised 
public sector jobs. Any jobs with a set rate of pay or 
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in the private sector should not be considered. Only 
those jobs that directly benefit the public and do 
not impinge on other workers should be considered. 
Neither is a Job Guarantee Scheme intended to 
replace other social programmes. However, Job 
Guarantee Schemes could complement a social 
support system such as a Basic Income scheme (see 
above). 
Job creation schemes have been implemented 
in different parts of the world, some narrowly 
targeted, others broadly-based. Examples include, 
the 1930s American New Deal which contained 
several moderately inclusive programmes; a broad 
based employment programme existed in Sweden 
until the1970s; Argentina created Plan Jefes y Jefas 
that guaranteed a job for poor heads of households; 
and India also has a scheme (Wray 2009). The EU 
Youth Guarantee scheme, in which member states 
committed to ensure that all young people up to 
the age of 25 receive a high-quality offer of a 
job, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within 
four months of becoming unemployed or leaving 
formal education is an example of a partial jobs 
guarantee scheme. While a potentially valuable 
initiative, one problem that arises in schemes such 
as this, often introduced in difficult economic 
times, is that the additional resources required to be 
provided at national level are often taken from other 
services that may well have been supporting other 
unemployed or vulnerable people who were long-
term unemployed or were outside the age group to 
whom the new initiative applies. The end result may 
not reduce the overall problem of unemployment or 
social exclusion.
Given the unprecedented employment supports 
brought into existence at both national and EU-
level in the wake of the pandemic, the concept of a 
Job Guarantee – like that of a Basic Income – has 
assumed new momentum out of recent exigency. 
Advocates of strengthening existing EU programmes 
into a more robust Job Guarantee – as in the 
case of the ‘reinforced’ Youth Guarantee unveiled 
in 2020 – stress the benefit of macroeconomic 
stabilisation as well as high quality employment 
(European Trade Union Institute, 2021). Others 
have argued for an entirely new scheme which might 
draw on guaranteed liquidity provided by the EU 
recovery plan (Argitis and Koratzanis, 2021). It has 
likewise been suggested that such a scheme might 
provide the EU with a much-needed common fiscal 
mechanism to ‘bridge gaps’ within and between 
Member States (Zygmuntowski, 2020). What is 
evident from the recent upsurge in proposals as well 
as the Commission’s efforts to ‘reinforce’ the Youth 
Guarantee is not only the growing valency of the 
Job Guarantee as an idea, but a growing appetite 
to see it take on more concrete and effective forms 
(Economic and Social Committee, 2021).
Shorter Working-Week
The starting point for debates about shortening the 
working week is that there is nothing ‘normal’ or 
inevitable about what is considered a typical working 
day today, and that what we consider normal in 
terms of time spent working is a legacy of industrial 
capitalism that is out of step with today’s conditions. 
A number of proposals exist. The New Economics 
Foundation (NEF) proposed a rebalancing of 
work and time involving a new industrial and 
labour market strategy to achieve high-quality and 
sustainable jobs for all, with a stronger role for 
employees in decision-making and a gradual move 
towards shorter and more flexible hours of paid 
work for all, aiming for 30 hours (4 days) as the new 
standard working week (Coote et al 2010). Active 
support for ‘short time working’ throughout the 
present crisis – supported through EU mechanisms 
such as the SURE fund – have combined with the 
sudden turn to digital homeworking on a mass scale 
to transform perceptions and expectations around 
traditional work-time norms. Addressing the issue 
in this context, NEF has urged states to accept that 
the ‘time has come’ for a shorter work week (Coote 
et al. 2020).
As recently as 2019 Eurofound estimated that at least 
one in ten EU workers spent more than 48 hours per 
week at work (Brandsma, 2019). These proposals 
are intended to address problems of overwork, un-
employment, over-consumption, high carbon emis-
sions, low well-being, entrenched inequalities and 
lack of time to live sustainably, to care for each other 
or to enjoy life. Crucial to this kind of proposal is that 
made above about moving toward valuing both paid 
work and unpaid work; it is intended to spread paid 
work more evenly across the population, reducing 
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unemployment and its associated problems, long 
working hours and too little control over time. It is 
also intended to allow for unpaid work to be distrib-
uted more evenly between men and women, and for 
people to spend more time with their children and in 
contributing to community activities. 
Mexican telecoms billionaire Carlos Slim (often 
identified as one of the richest people in the world) 
is amongst those who have expressed support for 
this, suggesting that a new three-day working week 
could and should become the norm as a way to 
improve people’s quality of life and create a more 
productive labour force. A UK doctor, John Aston, 
President of the UK Faculty of Public Health (a body 
that represents over 3,000 public health experts in 
the UK), also called for a four day week to deal with 
the problem of some people working too little others 
too much and to improve the health of the public 
(Guardian, online).
Investment
Keynesian economic policies require active govern-
ment intervention in ways that are ‘countercyclical’. 
In other words, deficit spending when an econo-
my suffers from recession or when unemployment 
is persistently high, and suppression of inflation 
during boom times by either cutting expenditure or 
increasing taxes: ‘the boom, not the bust, is the right 
time for austerity at the treasury.’
Learning from failed policies pursued in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and seeking 
to reconstruct Europe’s economy and society on 
a more inclusive and sustainable basis from the 
present conjuncture, it will be essential that policy-
makers consider investment on a sufficiently large 
scale to create growth required to generate jobs. 
In this context it is of interest that the OECD has 
recommended a stronger collective policy response 
to economic challenges both before and throughout 
the present crisis, including a commitment to raising 
public investment to support future growth and 
make up for the shortfall in investment following the 
cuts imposed in recent years (OECD, 2016b; 2020f). 
EU rules have seen government investment become 
more reliant on off-balance sheet sources (such as 
Commercial Semi-State borrowing or European 
Investment Fund or pension fund investments). 
Going forward, areas for investment should be 
carefully chosen to aim for job-intensive investment 
in essential sectors with potentially substantial 
returns. Examples could include building new 
infrastructure and facilities, which might include 
social housing, better public health or education 
facilities, investment in key infrastructure like 
water or in sustainable energy sources. Substantial 
investment of this kind would of itself lift economic 
growth rates and there would be a multiplier effect 
by creating further economic activity and growth, 
increases in taxes and decreases in social welfare 
spending. 
The economic crisis created by the onset of Covid-19 
has accelerated the potential for effective investment 
along these lines at a European level. In addition to 
an unprecedented EU budget of €1.07 trillion agreed 
for 2021–27, agreement was reached in July 2020 
on a separate €750 billion Next Generation EU 
(NGEU) fund earmarked for strategic investment 
to be deployed via a new Recovery and Resilience 
Facility (European Council, 2021a). The overall 
size, conditionality and financing of the European 
Recovery Fund, encompassing the NGEU and part of 
the EU budget, has involved compromise around the 
balance of loans and grants as well as the issuance 
of a form of common debt through European 
Commission borrowing. This represents a potentially 
significant break with the past. To what extent these 
advances will ensure the EU does not retrace ‘the 
mistakes of the past’ – as the European Commission 
itself has warned - will depend on normalising new 
practices and attitudes arising from the current crisis 
but retained to aid longer-term social investments. 
In this context, the current but temporary relaxation 
of fiscal disciplines given force through the Stability 
and Growth Pact, the Fiscal Compact, and the 
European Semester may also provide an opportunity 
for wider reassessment of appropriate budgetary 
flexibilities (Social Justice Ireland, 2020). It should 
be possible for the European fiscal governance 
rules to accommodate and indeed to encourage, 
when appropriate, investment of this nature as a 
basic tool of economic policy within the capacity of 
governments. In this regard, the activation of the 
general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact 
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announced by the European Commission in March 
2020 is welcome. However the continued focus on 
prudent fiscal positions, albeit in the medium term, 
risks saddling member states with the economic 
consequences of Covid-19 for decades to come. 
As we emerge from the current crisis and work toward 
a sustainable and inclusive recovery, the European 
Social Model is needed now more than ever. A large 
increase in direct public spending and investment 
is one of the most effective tools available to 
European countries to address the current crisis. At 
a European level immediate, a lasting commitment 
to well-planned investment and ambitious actions 
to mitigate the ongoing economic downturn will be 
essential to protecting the most vulnerable in future 
years. This must be based on the European Social 
Model. The Stability and Growth Pact and the fiscal 
rules must not inhibit Member States from doing the 
large scale investment that a post Covid-19 recovery 
requires. The fiscal rules must support investment at 
national level, not inhibit it.
6.3 Right to Access to Quality Services
Access to high-quality services is an important 
aspect of social protection, contributing to ‘inclusive 
growth’, a main objective of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
At least five types of welfare systems are recognised 
as operating in Europe18 and change happens all 
the time (Abrahamson, 2010). General trends that 
have been observed include expansionism (from 
the 1950s to the 1970s) followed by uncertainty 
and challenge associated with neo-liberalism and a 
newer tend, which can be described as ‘productivist’ 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2008). The ‘productivist’ approach, 
called a ‘new social investment state’ is promoted 
by the EU and the OECD and emphasises social 
investment with a desire to maintain the range of 
mass services but with pressure for cost-efficiency 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2008). 
From the financial crash of 2008 to the current 
public health emergency, policy-makers in Europe 
have sought to learn from the past. Positives which 
18  The regimes can be categorised in different ways; typically five are recognised: Continental North-western Europe, Scandinavian 
model, Southern/Mediterranean model, Atlantic Europe (UK and Ireland) and Eastern European (Abrahamson, 2010).
have thus far emerged include commitments in 
the Social Investment Package, the articulation of 
vital principles through the Pillar of Social Rights 
and, most recently, investment promised via the 
European Recovery Fund and a relaxation of fiscal 
rules. We have discussed each of these elements in the 
introduction to this report. Typical social investment 
policies include gender-related child and elder-care, 
family-friendly labour market regulation, allowing 
especially women to move back and forth between 
full-time and part-time employment in relation to 
evolving informal care responsibilities (Hemerijck 
2014). Social investment is not, however, a substitute 
for social protection and adequate minimum income 
protection is a critical precondition for an effective 
social investment strategy as a ‘buffer’ helping to 
mitigate social inequity while at the same time 
stabilizing the business cycle (Hemerijck 2014).
Ongoing challenges exist regarding quality and 
equity of public services, including healthcare, 
and to their sustainability. European population 
ageing, increased expectations of citizens, and other 
factors impinge on demand for services and require 
a range of responses across the life-course. Similar 
investments by different countries have different 
outcomes in terms of poverty, employment and 
health, suggesting that there is variation in the ways 
that resources are used (European Commission 
2013a). 
Some of the issues that are informing current de-
bates include the following:
Securing Adequate Investment? Support for 
social investment in recent decades is based on the 
aspiration of men and women of all socio-economic 
backgrounds to be employed and to raise children. 
Consequently, they have been willing to provide the 
investment required to provide services capable of 
making that possible. In difficult economic times, 
however, there is more and more scrutiny of social 
spending. This danger that social spending will 
become more marginal is exacerbated in the Eurozone 
because national and EU monetary authorities 
have very little room for manoeuvre. The emphasis 
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is on addressing and reducing deficits, which will 
continue to starve social provision of the financing 
required for ongoing development. There is a strong 
risk that support for social investment will decline. 
This situation is worsened as electorates seem to 
forget that the crisis of recent years originated in 
the excesses in deregulated financial markets, not in 
excess welfare spending. This leads to a rejection of 
welfare spending because they misunderstand it as 
being the cause of the crisis which it wasn’t.
Who Provides? Public services are not synonymous 
with the public sector. A wide range of actors are now 
involved in service provision and the mix differs from 
country to country (and has done so historically). As 
well as the public sector, these include:
• people and families, 
• non-profit organizations and social enter-
prises, and 
• the private sector. 
While it is considered that there is now more scope 
for private and civil society to be involved in service 
provision, the state is still in charge of regulation 
and to a large extent also in the financing of social 
entitlements (Abrahamson, 2010). In relation to 
the private sector, the European Commission notes 
that there needs to be encouragement to use the 
potential of social investment more through on-
the-job training, in-house childcare facilities, health 
promotion and family-friendly workplaces (2013a).
Public Value? The central plank of the influential 
‘public value’ approach to the public sector is that 
public resources should be used to increase value 
not only in an economic sense but also in terms 
of what is valued by citizens and communities. It 
is associated with Moore, who argues that public 
services are directly accountable to citizens and 
their representatives and it requires ongoing public 
engagement and dialogue as well as rigorous 
measurement of outcomes (1995). The approach 
involves the following building blocks: 
• providing quality services for users, which are 
cost effective,
• ensuring fairness in service provision, 
• concentrating more on the outcomes as well 
as on the costs and inputs,
• building trust and legitimacy by convincing 
people that policy is geared toward serving 
the overall public interest (NESF, 2006).
These building blocks are linked and the improvement 
of public services is intended to generate support 
for them amongst users and others who pay for 
them indirectly through taxation. User satisfaction 
is shaped by factors such as customer service (that 
is, how well they are treated), information, choice, 
availability and advocacy (that is, knowing that 
the services will be available to them when needed 
and that they will be supported in getting access to 
them).
Social wage: Public services such as healthcare and 
schooling, childcare and adult social care, can be said 
to comprise a ‘social wage’ that helps to determine 
how much earned income people consider ‘enough’ 
(Coote et al 2010). The extent to which these services 
relieve pressures on household income depends on 
their accessibility, reliability, quality, and overall 
affordability. In recent times in many countries, 
public services have been curtailed/targeted and in 
some countries stripped to essentials by outsourcing 
and competitive tendering, or have had some costs 
transferred to the user – as is the case in relation 
to healthcare costs in some European countries 
(European Observatory on Health Systems and 
Policies, 2012). The legacy of such policies have been 
sorely felt throughout the present public health 
emergency. While there are different definitions, 
discussions of the ‘social wage’ generally define it 
as disposable income plus public provision of goods 
and services (such as health care and education). It 
is sometimes used in discussions of government 
spending and it can be a way of characterising the 
contribution that public services make to individuals 
and households. 
It is a measure of how much better-off individuals are 
with the provision of publicly funded welfare services 
than they would be without these ‘in-kind’ benefits 
(i.e. if they had to pay the full cost of these services). 
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Thus, the value of services such as health and social 
care, education and housing can be thought of as an 
income in-kind – or a ‘social wage’ – that represents 
a substantial addition to people’s cash incomes 
(Sefton 2002). Although most measures of poverty 
and inequality do not take account of the value of 
these kinds of benefits in kind, their inclusion is 
potentially significant in monitoring the impact of 
public policies on the poorest households (Sefton 
2002). 
Reduced public spending and a corresponding 
diminished social wage require individuals/ 
households to spend on essential services and 
this increases barriers to access for poorer people 
(McCarthy 2015). Obviously, maintaining the social 
wage requires the state’s revenue base is protected. 
More, better and free public services – for everyone, 
not just the very poor – would certainly make it 
easier to live on lower levels of earned income, but 
this would depend very largely on increasing tax 
revenues (Coote et al 2010) in many countries.
6.4 Other Key Issues
There are other issues of overarching importance 
that are not the key focus of this report. However, 
we wish to refer to two of them briefly - the need 
for greater representation in policy-making and the 
need for environmental sustainability. 
Representation
Any new policy directions are affected by the fact that 
Europeans have experienced a sense of frustration 
with consequent risks of alienation and social 
disruption. The European Social Survey tracked a 
decline between 2004 and 2010 in overall levels of 
political trust and satisfaction with democracy widely 
across much of Europe, with the extent to which 
this was the case varying by country (Gallie 2013). 
This has continued in the midst of the pandemic, 
with Eurofound reporting that trust in institutions 
‘plummeted’ in relation to both the EU and national 
governments between summer 2020 and spring 
2021 (Eurofound, 2021f). Many voters have felt 
that the EU’s dominance of national economic policy 
in the crisis meant they could change government 
but not policy (Leonard & Torreblanca, 2013). As 
discussed in the introduction to this report, this 
lesson has been underlined by the rise of populism 
and Euroscepticism across Europe. 
Even prior to the present Covid-related economic 
crisis, successive European quality of life survey 
have noted the positive impact of growth alongside 
an keen awareness that this rising tide has not 
reached all citizens equally and improvements 
are often more limited for some groups including 
for those on low-incomes (Eurofound 2017c). 
Perceptions of tensions –between ethnic or racial 
groups, and between religious groups – was more 
common in 2016 than before the crisis, with a 
significantly negative impact on trust in institutions. 
Furthermore, perceived insecurities related to 
income, accommodation (Eurofound 2019c), and 
employment are increasingly recognised and often 
widespread, with negative impacts on well-being 
and on trust (Eurofound 2019c). These trends have 
intensified throughout the pandemic, with trust 
in institutions clearly linked to both shifting levels 
of financial insecurity and the receipt of support 
(Eurofound, 2020a).
These finding confirms the wider argument that 
public services are found to be positively linked to trust 
as perceived quality of public services is a key driver 
for higher trust in institutions (Eurofound 2019c). 
Thus, Eurofound argues for more attention to be 
given to growing feelings of unfairness (between 
countries, regions and groups), particularly with 
respect to access to quality public services and for 
the value of public participation in the co-design 
of services (Eurofound 2019c). This has likewise 
been highlighted throughout the pandemic, with 
particular salience in relation to healthcare access 
(Eurofound, 2021d).
Ways of addressing a sense of alienation or disem-
powerment are associated with the concept of ‘de-
liberative democracy’ which champions informed 
debate, emphasising politics as an open-ended 
and continuous learning process (Held, 2006). The 
Europe 2020 Strategy envisages a partnership ap-
proach that would aim to foster joint ownership. But 
the views of the weaker stakeholders must be able 
to be heard and be capable of influencing decisions 
and results. 
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Potentially very valuable is the Charter on Shared 
Social Responsibilities which argues that having 
a well-defined deliberative process can ensure, 
among other things, that individual preferences are 
reconciled with widespread priorities in the field of 
social, environmental and intergenerational justice. 
It can also reduce the imbalances of power between 
stakeholders (Council of Europe, 2014). 
Sustainability
The latest UN report on emissions (United Nations 
Environment Programme 2019) presents some 
very stark findings, including that on current 
unconditional pledges, the world is heading for 
a 3.2°C temperature rise, and that unless global 
greenhouse gas emissions fall by 7.6 per cent 
each year between 2020 and 2030, the world will 
miss the opportunity to get on track towards the 
1.5°C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. 
Technologies and policy knowledge exist to cut 
emissions, but transformations must begin now 
(United Nations Environment Programme 2019). 
In this regard, aspects of the handling of the current 
public health crisis may serve as a model and 
mechanism to further mobilize public resources 
to tackle the climate emergency (Manzanedo and 
Manning 2020; Balmford et al. 2020).
As already stated, Social Justice Ireland believes that 
the future must be one in which it is recognised 
that economic development, social development 
and environmental protection are complementary 
and interdependent. Pollution and depletion of 
resources have thrown into doubt the reliance on 
untrammeled market forces as the key driver of 
wellbeing for everyone. The current approach is 
patently unsustainable and economic policy must 
be designed to prevent catastrophe. Indeed, several 
of the alternatives that we have outlined above have 
been developed taking account of environmental 
limitations. As Social Justice Ireland argues elsewhere, 
narrow thinking about economic growth leads to 
policies that only promote one aspect of what can 
be called sustainable social progress and wither 
ignores or harms other aspects – so what is needed 
is a view of prosperity that is inclusive of all and is 
socially and environmentally sustainable (Clark and 
Kavanagh 2019). 
A successful transition to sustainability requires 
a vision of a viable future societal model and also 
the ability to overcome obstacles such as vested 
economic interests, political power struggles and 
the lack of open social dialogue (Hämäläinen, 2013). 
A number of approaches to a sustainable economy 
have been outlined, all involving transformative 
change (for example the ‘performance economy’ 
associated with Stahel and the ‘circular economy’ 
associated with Wijkman). Another is the concept 
of the ‘Economy of the Common Good’, based on 
the idea that economic success should be measured 
in terms of human needs, quality of life and the 
fulfilment of fundamental values (Felber 2010). This 
model proposes a new form of social and economic 
development based on human dignity, solidarity, 
sustainability, social justice and democratic co-
determination and transparency and involving 
the concept of the common good balance sheet 
showing the extent to which a company abides by 
values like human dignity, solidarity and economic 
sustainability. 
All three pillars – economic, social and environmental 
- must be addressed in a balanced manner if 
development is to be sustainable and sustainability 
must be a criterion for all future public policies.
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7 7  Summary, Conclusions and 
Recommendations
19  As noted already, Eurostat gives -8.5m as the cumulative difference to 2008 for EU27. However, it gives -8.8m as the 
cumulative difference to 2008 for EU28 (Eurostat Online database: [ilc_peps01]) This is likely to be because Croatia 
joined EU in 2013 and thus EU28 data is only available starting from 2010 (when the level was 117.9m, EU28) (European 
Commission, Europe 2020 Targets, pdf).
7.1 Summary of Findings
This report has examined social developments in 
Europe from the financial crisis to the current public 
health emergency, utilising a range of indicators of 
poverty, inequality and income, employment and 
unemployment. It has also looked at how European 
countries perform on certain indicators in respect 
of education and health. In each case, we looked at 
what the indicators tell us about the most recent 
years and we also looked back to 2008 in many 
cases. We also examined levels of total taxation as 
a proportion of GDP amongst European countries 
in light of key indicators and also in light of their 
respective approaches to social investment. Finally, 
we set out some alternative policy approaches in the 
previous section of this report. In this final Section, 
we summarise our findings, draw some conclusions 
and finish with some recommendations for European 
and national leaders.
Poverty and Income
The review set out in this report shows how the 
Europe 2020 target set in 2010 of taking 20 million 
people out of risk of poverty or social exclusion is 
likely to be missed by a very wide margin. In 2019, 
Europe has only reduced the number by about 8.5 
million people (see footnote19). 
88






Table 7 EU-28 Key Poverty Indicators 2008 and 2019
Poverty Indicators
People at risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion 
People at risk 
of poverty (60% 
threshold)
People experienc-
ing Severe Material 
Deprivation
People in households 
with very low work 
intensity
EU-28 Number % Number % Number % Number %
Total population
2008** 116m 23.7 80.9m 16.6 41.5m 8.5 34.6m 9.2
2019 107.5m 21.4 84.5m 16.8 27.5m 5.5 31.3m 8.5
Children (under 18) 
2008** 25m 26.5 19.2m 20.4 9.3m 9.8 7.3m 7.8
2019 22.2m 23.4 18.7m 19.4 5.7m 6.0 6.6m 7.0
Older people (over 65s)
2008** 19.2m 23.3 15.6m 18.9 6.1m 7.5 n/a n/a
2019 18.3m 18.6 15.6m 15.9 4.6m 4.7
Source: Eurostat Online Databases: t2020_50, t2020_51, t2020_52, t2020_53, ilc_lvhl11, ilc_li02, Ilc_mddd11, ilc_peps01
** Rates for 2008 relate to EU-27 countries, not EU-28, as this was prior to the accession of Croatia
The risk of poverty or social exclusion rate affected 
over 116 million people in 2008, a figure that rose in 
subsequent years but has improved each year since 
2012. However, the average rate stood at 21.4 per 
cent in 2019 (EU-28) representing more than one 
in 5 Europeans or over 107 million people (Eurostat 
online database code t2020_50). This indicates how 
far away from a reduction of 20 million people affected 
Europe is. Thus, despite recent improvements, there 
is reason for concern about a range of issues and the 
length of time that high levels of poverty or social 
exclusion have persisted is unacceptable in human 
and societal terms. There are also indicators that 
depth of hardship for those affected has increased 
slightly (between 2008 and 2019) (Eurostat 2019a). 
Groups facing a higher risk of poverty and social 
exclusion include single households, migrants and 
people with lower education as well as their children.
In 2019, the highest rates of poverty or social 
exclusion were to be found in Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Greece where the rates were above 30 per cent. 
In 4 other countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Italy and 
Spain) the rate was over 25 per cent. The lowest rates 
were found in Czechia (12.5 per cent) followed by 
Slovenia, Finland and Denmark.
Even though there have been welcome improvements 
in the most recent year in some countries with 
typically high rates, there continues to be great 
divergence between countries. Between 2018 and 
2019, disimprovements in the poverty or social 
exclusion rates were observed in several countries 
including, notably, the UK (+1.8 percentage points) 
and also in some countries with traditionally 
relatively low rates such as France. The greatest 
improvements occurred in the newer accession 
states of Lithuania and Slovenia, and also in the 
Mediterranean in Greece, Italy and Malta.
It is notable that those countries identified by the 
European Social Policy Network as having a well-
established approach to social investment (mainly 
Nordic and central European countries) tend to do 
well at protecting their populations from poverty or 
social exclusion relative to other countries with a less 
well developed social investment approach. 
The risk of poverty rate, a measure or relative 
income poverty, suggests that in 2019, 16.8 per 
cent of the population (EU-28) was living at risk 
of poverty (over 84 million people), and that 
considerably more people were affected in 2019 
than in 2008 (in 2008 the rate was 16.6 per cent, 
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affecting 80.9 million people EU-27) (Eurostat 
online database, code t2020_52). Other indicators 
showed more improvement - the average EU-28 rate 
of severe material deprivation was 5.5 per cent 
in 2019, representing approximately 27.5 million 
people, down from a rate of 5.9 per cent in 2018 (and 
representing over 29.7 million people). It is a positive 
development that there have been improvements in 
this indicator in recent years.
Children (those under 18): Like other reports in 
this series, this report highlights again how ongoing 
high levels of poverty or social exclusion amongst 
children is one of the most challenging and serious 
issues faced by Europe. The rate of poverty or social 
exclusion that children experience continues to be 
higher than for the general population and about 
one quarter of children in Europe are affected. 
Thus, children who are considered to be at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion numbered 22.2 million 
in 2019 or 23.4 per cent (EU-28 average) (Eurostat 
online database, code ilc_peps01). Levels of severe 
material deprivation have, fortunately, improved 
for children in recent years, but there are also some 
reasons for concern, because the rates still remain 
at very much higher levels than in 2008 in some 
countries (notably, Greece and Cyprus). 
In short, poverty in all its forms still affects far too 
many children and childhood poverty remains a 
pressing problem because of its long-lasting effects 
on society and on the lives of individuals. A range of 
interventions are necessary to address this situation 
including access to affordable quality early childhood 
education and care, along with well-designed work-
life balance policies.
Older People: The situation of older people varies 
greatly as between countries, with very high levels of 
income poverty and material deprivation especially 
in newer accession countries and also in some Med-
iterranean countries. The European average rate for 
poverty or social exclusion amongst those aged 
65+ was 18.9 per cent in 2019 (representing 18.7m 
people). This was a slight increase on the 2018 rate 
(18.6 per cent) but it represents a relatively large in-
crease in numbers (+400,000 people approximate-
ly). The rate was higher for those aged 75+ (20.2 per 
cent) (Eurostat online database, code ilc-peps01). 
The average severe material deprivation rate for 
this age group showed improvement during the year 
2018-2019 – falling to 4.4 per cent (representing 
approximately 4.4 million people aged 65+, EU-28) 
(Eurostat online database, code ilc_mddd11). This 
is an encouraging sign. However, many more older 
women than older men are affected by all aspects of 
poverty. These issues are significant for policy-makers 
(as well as for the individuals concerned) given that 
populations are ageing at an unprecedented rate and 
that there are many more older women than older 
men and they tend to have poorer pension provision 
(see EU Social Protection Committee 2020).
Working Poor: In 2019, 9.2 per cent of employed 
people (aged 18+) were living under the poverty 
threshold (EU-28) and the average rate (that is, 
the in-work poverty rate) has been at similar levels 
since 2014 and was still higher than it was in 2008 
(Eurostat Online database, code ilc_iw01). Thus, in 
2019 over 9 per cent of employed people in the EU 
live in poverty. They amounted to an alarming 20.5 
million people (in 2017) (Pena-Casas et al 2019). 
Some groups are particularly affected (including 
younger people, people with lower education levels, 
and non-standard workers, poor households with 
children including lone parents). It is concerning 
that limited policy attention is paid to this group 
and they were not, for example, included within the 
groups for which poverty reduction targets were set 
in the Europe 2020 Strategy.
When income inequality is examined there are 
concerns overall about increases over time and 
substantial differences between countries in 
Europe. In 2019, while in some countries (notably 
Nordic, some central European countries and some 
peripheral countries), the rich earned around four 
times as much as the poor or less, in other countries, 
notably, Bulgaria Romania, the value was above 7.
The highest levels of median disposable income 
occur in Scandinavian, central and western European 
countries, the lowest in other newer accession 
members and there are very great variations in the 
levels. While, within the past year (2018-2019), 
median disposable income has increased in almost 
all Member States, in Greece it is still lower than it 
had been in 2008 (Eurostat ilc_di03). 
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Financial distress (defined as the need to draw 
on savings or to run into debt to cover current 
expenditures) has gradually declined since 2014. 
However, the greatest distress is being experienced 
by the lowest income quartile (or lowest 25 per cent) 
and also by the second quartile (lowest 50 per cent). 
In February 2021, it was recorded at 23.7 per cent 
for the lowest-income quartile and at 14.9 for the 
second quartile.
Overall, while there have been some improvements 
in the latest years (2017-2019) in several indicators 
and for key groups, Europe is still far off-track in 
relation to meeting its poverty reduction targets. 
The social indicators suggest little improvement 
for very many people living in Europe, with dis-
improvements for some groups in several countries. 
These include older people in some countries, an 
issue that particularly affects older women. Those 
working who still live in poverty is another group 
to be concerned about and this issue now affects a 
greater proportion of people than it did in 2008. The 
position of children, in particular, while improved 
somewhat continues to be strikingly negative for 
very many children with potentially very serious 
long-term consequences. Thus, a rising tide has yet 
to lift all boats. 
Employment 
As in previous reports in this series, we welcome 
the fact that employment has continued to increase 
in the EU since 2013. It is very important that this 
opportunity is taken to make the most of this positive 
economic momentum and deliver on new and more 
effective rights.
However, while improving up to the onset of the 
pandemic in spring 2020, the employment rate 
has not increased at the anticipated rate and has 
not attained the Europe 2020 strategy target of 
75 per cent. There are significant variations in the 
employment rates in different countries. Countries, 
especially in central and northern Europe, have 
exceeded the Europe 2020 strategy target, while 
other countries, especially in the south and 
periphery, are very far away from achieving it. The 
lowest employment rates in 2019 were found in 
Greece, Italy, Spain and Croatia (looking at ages 20-
64). Some countries still have rates of employment 
that are a good deal lower than in 2008 – this is very 
notable in Greece and Cyprus.
There are also concerns about the way that the 
employment picture is evolving– especially regarding 
growth in temporary, part-time and precarious work 
and falling or stagnating wages. Another issue is 
that employment recovery is not reaching all regions 
equally, as employment growth has been much 
stronger in the capital city regions of countries 
(Eurofound and the European Commission 2019).
In 2020, the annual unemployment rate (EU-27) 
was 7 per cent (representing 14.9 million people) 
(Eurostat une_rt_a). The numbers concerned 
were still marginally higher than the number of 
unemployed people in 2008 (Eurostat une_rt_a). 
The countries with the highest rates in 2020 were 
Greece (16.3 per cent), Spain and Italy. 
Fortunately, the long-term unemployment rate 
has held stable up to the final quarter of 2020 (at 
2.7 per cent), but it still affected about 5.8 million 
people (Eurostat online database une_ltu_q; data 
not seasonally adjusted). Those unemployed for 2 
years or more represented over 3.2 million people 
(Q4, 2020). The share of long-term unemployed as a 
percentage of total unemployment was 37.6 per cent 
in the final quarter of 2020 (Eurostat online database 
lfsq_upgal). In 2008 it was only marginally higher at 
(38.8 per cent) (Q1). Thus, long-term unemployment 
continues to be a concern with implications in 
human and social terms and with financial costs and 
possible impacts on social cohesion. Greece, Italy 
and Bulgaria had the highest shares of long-term 
unemployment in quarter 4, 2020. The lowest ratios 
were found in Sweden followed by Denmark and 
Finland.
Both older and younger workers experience lower 
employment rates than other age groups. Becoming 
unemployed at an older age means being more 
likely to remain so and to experience long-term 
unemployment (International Labour Organization, 
2018).
Focusing on youth unemployment (those under 25), 
in 2020, the average EU-27 rate increased to 16.8 per 
cent, representing 2.9 million people (as a percentage 
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of active population) (Eurostat online database une_
rt_a). In April 2021, youth unemployment stood at 
17.1 per cent in the EU-27, 1.1 percentage points 
higher than in the same month of the previous year 
and 1.8 per cent higher than prior to the pandemic 
in April 2019. In 2020 Spain was the country with 
the highest level of youth unemployment (38.3 per 
cent) followed by Greece (35.0 per cent) and Italy 
(29.4 per cent).
A related area of concern involves young people who 
are neither in education nor employment (known as 
NEETS). The EU-28 average NEET rate (ages 15-24) 
was 11.1 per cent in 2020, higher than in 2019 rate 
(Eurostat edat_lfse_20). Thus, while there have been 
welcome improvements in youth unemployment 
within recent years, the situation of young people is 
still difficult especially for some groups and in some 
countries. 
Overall, despite very welcome improvements in 
employment in the EU over several years prior to 
the onset of the pandemic, there are significant 
ongoing issues and challenges ahead that require 
policy responses. Policies linked to recovery from the 
current crisis will need to address the problems that 
still exist and to anticipate future challenges. 
Education
It is welcome that progress has been made towards 
reaching targets set in the European 2020 Strategy 
to address early school leaving and to improve third 
level educational attainment. However, progress has 
stalled on some educational indicators, there is scope 
for improvement in many countries, and progress 
also needs to be made on other indicators.
Improvements in the average (EU-28) rate of early 
school leaving since 2008 are welcome, as is the fact 
that (at 9.9 per cent) the average for 2020 is just 
below the <10 per cent target set in the Europe 2020 
strategy. But the average rate has not decreased to 
any extent in the most recent years – so progress 
has stalled. In 2020 the highest rates of early school 
leaving were to be found in Malta (16.7 per cent), 
Spain (16 per cent), Romania (15.6 per cent) and 
Italy (13.1 per cent). There is still a very great gap 
between the countries with the highest rates (Malta, 
Spain and Romania), and that with the lowest rate, 
Croatia (with a rate of 2.2 per cent). Because its 
consequences for individuals and for society are so 
grave in terms of increased risk of unemployment, 
poverty and social exclusion, this is an issue that 
requires ongoing attention from policy-makers 
and renewed ambition to surpass the Europe 2020 
target.
For third level attainment, the target set in the 
Europe 2020 strategy was that at least 40 per cent 
of 30-34 year-olds would complete third level. In 
2020, the EU-28 average was 41 per cent so the 
target has been reached. This is an area showing large 
improvements since 2008 when the average rate had 
been 31.1 per cent. In 2020, six countries had with 
rates at or over 50 per cent. However, there is nearly 
a 38 percentage point gap between the country with 
the highest rate (Luxembourg) and that with the 
lowest (Romania) (2020).
When we look at lifelong learning, relatively very 
low rates of participation in many EU countries 
represents a lost opportunity both for individuals 
and for societies and economies. At 9.2 per cent in 
2020, the average rate is lower than it had been in 
2008 (9.5 per cent) and in recent years increases 
have only been marginal – so the fact that the rate 
is stagnating is unfortunate given that basic skills 
are lacking for so many people and much remains to 
be done to improve adult literacy in many countries. 
Clearly, the EU is have failed to reach the lifelong 
learning target (15 per cent average) set in the 
ET 2020 strategy. There is great variation across 
Europe in terms of the rates of participation. Nordic 
countries tend to top the table; in 2020 the top 
three countries were Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
followed by the Netherlands, Estonia, Luxembourg 
and France. At the other end of the scale, the rate 
was lowest in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia. 
One of the problems that Europe now faces is that 
progress not only needs to continue to be made to 
address the areas in which targets were set in the 
Europe 2020 strategy, but also to manage other 
issues such as low basic skills amongst disadvantaged 
socio-economic groups. Ongoing attention is 
required to issues of literacy and numeracy across 
all age groups. Certain countries tend to be better 
performers across several or all education indicators. 
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These include, in particular, Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands.
Health 
The current global public health crisis is unprece-
dented and has been termed the worst in a century. 
In tacking the threat posed by Covid-19, Europeans 
have generally relied on healthcare systems which 
compare well internationally in terms of quality and 
access. However, as yet incomplete data relating to 
2020 suggests the pandemic has seen a rise in per-
ceptions of unmet need for health care in some coun-
tries (Eurostat, hlth_silc_08; Eurofound, 2021d). 
Perception has also been persistently different be-
tween different income groups, with the lowest per-
ception among top income earners and the highest 
amongst those who earn least. Between 2018 and 
2019, the average rate in the perception of unmet 
need in the lowest two income groups (quartiles 1 
and 2) has stagnated. 
There also continues to be variation in these 
perceptions across different countries. In the wake 
of the pandemic, twenty-two Member States have 
been categorised as facing key challenge in relation to 
access to health care, based on self-reported unmet 
needs for medical care due to cost, waiting time, or 
distance (Social Protection committee 2020).
In one cross-country comparison, the health systems 
of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, France and Germany were the 
top performers (amongst EU countries) (European 
Consumer Powerhouse 2018). 
Several indicators we reviewed suggest that there 
have been improvements in respect of access to, and 
perceptions of quality of, health services in recent 
years, and this is welcome. But, unfortunately, in 
several countries, participants rated the quality of 
health services less favourably in 2016 than in 2011 
(Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Greece, U.K. and Belgium) 
(European Quality of Life Survey, Eurofound 2017c). 
Certain groups continue to experience particular 
health difficulties and need a particular policy 
focus, and inequalities still need to be addressed as 
disparities, such as in life-expectancy, continue to be 
great between socioeconomic groups. Some of the 
groups whose needs have been recently highlighted 
include younger people at risk of mental health 
(such as those with chronic health problems, living 
in rural areas and not in education or employment), 
older people in central and eastern Europe, and a 
diverse group with incomes above a threshold that 
would entitle them to state support (Eurofound, 
forthcoming 2022). 
Taxation 
Without raising resources, countries cannot invest 
in infrastructure and services required to promote 
inclusion and to sustain development. Our conclu-
sions on taxation are very much in line with our con-
clusions in previous years.
There is considerable variation between member 
states in the EU in respect of total taxes as a 
proportion of GDP. The highest ratios tend to be 
found in the ‘old’ 15 members of the EU. Thus, the 
highest levels are found in France (47.4), Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Finland. At the 
other end of the scale were Ireland (22.7 per cent), 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Overall, the range 
is broad with a difference of 24.7 percentage points 
between the country with the lowest ratio (Ireland) 
and that with the highest (France).
Amongst the countries with the highest total 
taxation ratios relative to GDP are some considered 
the most competitive in the world: Germany, 
Sweden and Denmark are amongst the world’s ten 
most competitive countries and Finland was ranked 
11th (World Economic Forum 2019). These are 
countries that also tend to score highly at protecting 
their populations from poverty or social exclusion 
and they tend to be more equal societies in terms of 
incomes.
In general, countries in the south and east of Europe 
tend to have lower levels of taxation and also less 
well-developed social investment approaches, and 
higher rates of poverty or social exclusion. Amongst 
the newer accession countries – and with a taxation 
ratio just below 35 per cent of GDP - Czechia is 
notable for its performance in relation to prevention 
of poverty and social exclusion. The performance of 
Slovakia and Slovenia is also notable.
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All of the countries that are identified by the 
European Social Policy Network as having a well-
established approach to many social policies (Bouget 
et al. 2015), have tax takes that are above a low-
taxation threshold ratio of 35 per cent of GDP, and 
most are also above the EU average.
7.2 Conclusions and Recommendations
As we stated in the introduction to this report, 
for Social Justice Ireland seven core rights need 
to be part of the vision for the future of Europe: 
right to sufficient income to live with dignity, to 
meaningful work, to appropriate accommodation; 
to relevant education, to essential healthcare, to 
real participation and the right to cultural respect. 
For Social Justice Ireland economic development, 
social development and environmental protection 
are complementary and interdependent – three 
sides of the same reality - and we have long argued 
that all three must be given attention rather than 
allowing economic considerations to dominate. 
Unfortunately, in Europe, economic issues are 
still allowed to dominate social issues, officials are 
perceived as at a distance from poor people, and 
this, unfortunately, is corrosive of trust in the whole 
European project and is capable of being exploited 
by certain politicians. Leadership at EU level in 
relation to vulnerable groups is critical not just to 
the future economic and social outlook but also to 
the democratic future of Europe. 
In the wake of a devastating global pandemic, it is 
now clearer than ever that alternatives are needed. 
We make the following recommendations aimed at 
EU Leaders and EU Institutions:
1. Ensure Greater Coherence of European Policy 
by acting on the von der Leyen Commission’s 
recent decision to integrate the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals and the European Pillar of 
Social Rights into the economic processes of the 
European Semester. For example, the priorities 
of Annual Growth Surveys should provide 
greater focus on long-term social objectives, and 
on building adequate, effective social systems 
that include both investment and protection 
dimensions and are better aligned to the EU 
Social Investment Package and the new European 
Recovery Fund. This could be facilitated by:
• Making the European Pillar of Social Rights 
enforceable through legislative initiatives and 
turning it into a strategic tool to influence EU 
macroeconomic governance.
• Supporting efforts to promote growth and 
jobs while meeting deficit reduction targets in 
the medium rather than the short term.
• Taking greater account of social impacts when 
making Country Specific Recommendations, 
especially those requiring fiscal consolidation 
measures. 
• Making country-specific recommendations 
that seek to achieve reductions in poverty and 
unemployment where rates are high or rising.
2. Address inappropriate EU governance 
structures that prohibit or inhibit legitimate 
investment by national governments.
3. Advance proposals for a guarantee of an 
adequate minimum income or social floor 
in the EU under a framework directive, and for 
minimum standards on other social protection 
measures building upon the Directive on 
Adequate Minimum Wages. This should include 
access to child care, access to education and 
healthcare across member states and other 
measures supportive of the implementation of 
the European Pillar of Social Rights.
4. Monitor and Address poverty amongst sub-
groups such as children, young people, older 
people and working poor. Child poverty is such a 
serious issue that it requires further action as does 
the issue of young people neither in employed nor 
in education (NEETS). Monitor implementation 
of the Commission’s Recommendation on 
Investing in Children through a strengthened 
process and work with member states with high 
levels of child poverty to help them access and 
deploy structural funds to address the issue. The 
ageing of Europe’s population, the fact that there 
are many more women than men in this group, 
and the very great differentials between countries 
make poverty amongst older people (especially 
in some countries) an issue that requires more 
attention now and in the future. The situation of 
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those who work and still live in poverty needs to 
be tackled as a matter of urgency.
5. Focus on Youth Unemployment: Youth 
unemployment continues to be a serious problem 
despite Youth Guarantee schemes and there is a 
need to recognise that young people experiencing 
multiple disadvantage are likely to need support 
over a lengthy period.
6. Support Developments in the Social 
Economy: Leadership and support from the EU 
for social initiatives would benefit both people 
in need of support (through health and social 
care programmes) and societies generally. This 
would be consistent with the Social Investment 
Package and could provide valuable employment 
opportunities for people who are long-term 
unemployed. 
7. Improve Representation: EU policy-making 
must engage meaningfully with stakeholders 
representing poorer people and those most at 
risk of exclusion. 
8. Structural Funds: Structural funds must be of a 
sufficient scale to make an impact and should be 
given greater priority so as to ensure significant 
progress is made in bridging the gap between the 
economic and social dimensions of policy and in 
promoting a social investment approach to public 
policies where this is absent or insufficient. 
9. Adopt a Human Rights Strategy to prevent 
the violation of the human rights of Europe’s 
population.
We make the following recommendations for 
National Governments (and relevant local /regional 
authorities):
1. Prioritise Investment: Large-scale, investment 
programmes are needed to ensure a sustainable 
and inclusive recovery from the current crisis 
which operate in job-intensive areas and assist 
growth as well as social and infrastructural 
deficits. The focus would need to be tailored to 
each individual country/ region but might include 
development of renewable energy sources, health 
and social care infrastructure, housing, education 
and early childhood care infrastructure. As 
already stated, inappropriate EU rules need to 
be adjusted that currently block needed, viable 
investment.
2. Implement the European Pillar of Social 
Rights: Establish processes involving social 
partners and civil society partners to implement 
the European Pillar of Social Rights in ways that 
are legally binding, aiming for equal opportunities 
and access to the labour market, fair working 
conditions, and social protection and inclusion
3. Strengthen Welfare Systems: Governments 
need to introduce social protection schemes that 
are more resilient and that tackle inequalities 
within the present systems, ensuring equal access 
to services and to strengthen social cohesion. 
Where inadequate minimum income schemes 
exist they need to be strengthened.
4. Adopt Effective Labour Market Measures: 
Activation measures in the wake of the pandemic 
which focus on supporting unemployed people, 
aiming to maintain and develop appropriate skills 
and to not be accompanied by the threatened loss 
of welfare benefits or assistance. Employment 
measures must not be implemented in a way that 
removes income security and increases in-work 
poverty. 
5. Tackle Low Pay by supporting the Living Wage 
concept and moving toward a Basic Income 
System: Start to tackle low-paid employment 
by supporting the widespread adoption of the 
Living Wage, including giving public recognition 
to organisations (including SMEs) that commit 
to paying the Living Wage, and consider moving 
toward a basic income system.
6. Develop Sustainable Approaches to taxation: 
Sustainable and inclusive growth requires 
approaches to raising revenue that generate 
enough to support vital services and to move to a 
social investment approach (where that is absent 
or insufficiently realised). Measures should not 
disproportionately negatively affect low income 
groups, which means, amongst other things, 
avoiding increases in indirect taxes on essential 
items. 
7. Tackle Tax Evasion: Tax evasion and the grey 
economy are a particular problem in some coun-
tries where a disproportionate burden falls on 
compliant tax-payers. Tax evasion must be tack-
led and fair taxation systems introduced in which 
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all sectors of society, including the corporate sec-
tor, contribute a fair share and those who can af-
ford to do pay more. 
8. Consider how Government could become an 
employer of last resort: Given the ongoing 
impact of unemployment, governments in 
badly affected countries should consider being 
an employer of last resort through voluntary 
programmes framed so as not to distort the 
market economy.
9. Ensure Inclusive Governance: Engage with 
key stakeholders to ensure that groups at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion, and unemployed 
people can influence policy-direction and 
implementation, and that their experiences 
become part of the dialogue with European 
institutions to try and repair social cohesion and 
political legitimacy.
10. Poverty Proofing and Monitoring: All 
Government decisions should be subject to a 
poverty-proofing process that ensures actions 
taken will not increase poverty under any 
heading or cumulatively impact negatively on any 
particular groups. Integrate social assessments 
of the impacts of policy changes into decision-
making processes that focus beyond short-term 
cost saving. Use macroeconomic modelling 
processes to assess the impact of proposed 
changes in social policies.
11. Avail of the social investment aspects of the 
programming of EU funds to fund measures 
that address the social situation, including 
support for initiatives set out in the EU’s Social 
Investment Package such as supporting social 
enterprises or facilitating the implementation of 
the Recommendation on Investing in Children. 
12. Commit to appropriate regional strategies 
that ensure that investment is balanced between 
the regions, with due regard to sub-regional areas, 
aiming to ensure that rural development policy 
is underpinned by goals of social, economic and 
environmental wellbeing.
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9 9 . Glossary
The S80/S20 ratio (also known as the income 
quintile share ratio) is a measure of the inequality 
of income distribution. It is calculated as the ratio 
of total income received by the 20 per cent of 
the population with the highest income (the top 
quintile) to that received by the 20 per cent of the 
population with the lowest income (the bottom 
quintile). The calculation is based on equivalised 
disposable income, which is the total income of 
a household after tax and other deductions, that 
is available for spending or saving, divided by the 
number of household members converted into 
equalised adults; household members are equalised 
or made equivalent by weighting each according to 
their age.
GINI Coefficient: The Gini coefficient is defined 
as the relationship of cumulative shares of the 
population arranged according to the level of 
equivalised disposable income, to the cumulative 
share of the equivalised total disposable income 
received by them.
Europe 2020 Strategy - Adopted in 2010, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy aims to turn the EU into a 
‘smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering 
high levels of employment, productivity and social 
cohesion’. It sets targets to reduce poverty, raise 
employment, and raise educational levels amongst 
other things.
European Semester - A yearly cycle of economic 
policy coordination which involves the European 
Commission undertaking a detailed analysis of 
EU Member States’ programmes of economic 
and structural reforms and provides them with 
recommendations for the next 12-18 months. The 
European semester starts when the Commission 
adopts its Annual Growth Survey, usually towards 
the end of the year, which sets out EU priorities 
for the coming year. For more: http://ec.europa.eu/
europe2020/making-it-happen/index_en.htm
Eurostat – the statistical office of the European 
Union
GDP - Gross domestic product, which is a measure 
of the economic activity, defined as the value of all 
goods and services produced less the value of any 
goods or services used in their creation (Eurostat, 
tec00115)
Household disposable income is established by 
Eurostat by summing up all monetary incomes 
received from any source by each member of the 
household (including income from work, investment 
and social benefits) — plus income received at the 
household level — and deducting taxes and social 
contributions paid. In order to reflect differences in 
household size and composition, this total is divided 
by the number of ‘equivalent adults’ using a standard 
(equivalence) scale, which attributes a weight of 1.0 
to the first adult in the household, a weight of 0.5 to 
each subsequent member of the household aged 14 
and over, and a weight of 0.3 to household members 
aged less than 14. The resulting figure is called 
equivalised disposable income and is attributed to 
each member of the household. For a lone-person 
household it is equal to household income. For a 
household comprising more than one person, it is 
an indicator of the household income that would 
be needed by a lone person household to enjoy the 
same level of economic wellbeing. Source: Eurostat 
Statistics Explained: Living Standards Statistics: 
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In work at risk of poverty rate (or working poor) 
- The share of employed persons of 18 years or over 
with an equivalised disposable income below the 
risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 per 
cent of the national median equivalised disposable 
income (after social transfers) (Eurostat, tsdsc320)
NEET rate - The indicator on young people neither 
in employment nor in education and training 
(NEET)  corresponds to  the percentage of the 
population of a given age group not employed 
and not involved in further education or training 
(Eurostat, explanatory text, Code:yth_empl-150)
OECD - The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, which has 34 member countries. 
People at risk-of-poverty - Persons with an 
equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-
poverty threshold, which is often set at 60 per 
cent of the national median equivalised disposable 
income (after social transfers) (Eurostat, t2020_50). 
The 60 per cent threshold is adopted in the Europe 
2020 Strategy. It is also possible to examine incomes 
at other thresholds such as 40 per cent, 50 per cent 
or 70 per cent. 
People at Risk of poverty or social exclusion - The 
Europe 2020 strategy promotes social inclusion by 
aiming to lift at least 20 million people out of the 
‘risk of poverty and social exclusion’. This indicator 
corresponds to the sum of persons who are: (1) at 
risk of poverty or (2) severely materially deprived 
or (3) living in households with very low work 
intensity. Persons are only counted once even if 
they are present in several sub-indicators. (Eurostat, 
t2020_50)
Severe Material deprivation Severely materially 
deprived people have living conditions severely 
constrained by a lack of resources, they experience at 
least 4 out of 9 following deprivations items: cannot 
afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) to keep home 
adequately warm, iii) to face unexpected expenses, 
iv) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every 
second day, v) a week holiday away from home, vi) a 
car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV, or ix) a 
telephone (Eurostat, t2020_50). 
Very Low Work Intensity People living in 
households with very low work intensity are those 
aged 0-59 living in households where the adults 
(aged 18-59) work less than 20 per cent of their 
total work potential during the past year (Eurostat, 
t2020_50).
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 10 Statistical  Issues
20  The 60 per cent threshold is adopted in the Europe 2020 Strategy. It is also possible to examine incomes below other thresholds such 
as 40 per cent, 50 per cent or 70 per cent.
Time lag: The main source of comparable data on 
poverty and social exclusion, the EU Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), has a 
significant time-lag. Most of the data available for 
this report relates to 2019 and 2020 being the latest 
years for which Europe-wide data are available as 
we prepare this report. Data from any given year 
relates to data collected during the previous year. 
Thus, there is virtually a two year time lag in the data 
and the most recent data available does not give the 
latest picture. 
Indicators: Another important point relative to 
the data presented here is that there are different 
approaches to the measurement of poverty and 
social exclusion. Under the EU 2020 Strategy, 
headline targets have been set for reductions in 
poverty or social exclusion. The indicator, ‘poverty or 
social exclusion’ is based on a combination of three 
individual indicators: 
(1) persons who are at risk of poverty - people 
with an equivalised disposable income below 
the risk-of-poverty threshold set at 60 per 
cent of the national median (or middle) 
equivalised disposable income (after social 
transfers) (Eurostat, t2020_50)20. 
(2) people severely materially deprived have living 
conditions severely constrained by a lack of 
resources; they experience at least 4 out of a 
list of 9 deprivation items (See Glossary for 
the full list). (Eurostat, t2020_50), or 
(3) people living in households with very low 
work intensity are those aged 0-59 living 
in households where the adults (aged 18-
59) work less than 20 per cent of their total 
work potential during the past year (Eurostat, 
t2020_50).
Relative Poverty: The first of the three indicators 
used in the Europe 2020 Strategy, ‘at risk of poverty,’ 
is a relative income poverty threshold, which means 
that it is used to assess poverty levels relative to the 
national median income, something that relates it to 
local conditions and that shifts in line with changes 
in general income/salary levels. It is also recognised 
that because relative poverty measures are related 
to current median (or middle, not average) income, 
it can be difficult to interpret at a time when the 
incomes of all households start to decline or rise (that 
is, during recessions or recoveries). In fact, where the 
incomes of all households fall in a recession, but they 
fall by less at the bottom than at the middle, relative 
poverty can actually decline. This can mask or delay 
the full picture of poverty emerging. 
Comparable Data: There can occasionally be 
slight differences of definition and differences of 
interpretation between national bodies and Eurostat. 
Using the figures from Eurostat makes it possible to 
compare like with like across countries.
